


# Final Report

## Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in The U.S. Navy

24 September 2001



**Prepared By**  
**Gerald A. Klopp, Ph.D.**  
AEPCO, Inc.  
15800 Crabbs Branch Way, Suite 300  
Rockville, MD 20855

**Assisted By**  
**Mark Hemenway**  
Dynamics Research Corporation  
60 Frontage Road  
Andover, MA 01810

**"The goal is to use the system description and the interrelationships from the study to identify improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the Enlisted Production System."**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited

20020722 259

## NOTICES

### DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

This document has been approved for public release.

### DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the author, and are not to be construed as an official Department of Defense or Department of the Navy position or policy, unless so designated by other authorizing documents.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This report was prepared by Gerald A. Klopp, Ph.D. with the assistance of Mr. Mark Hemenway. Mark Hemenway compiled the bibliography (Chapter 3) and the list of references (Appendix C). As part of the study team, Mark also participated in many of the interviews conducted by the study team. He prepared memos on interview results and provided exceptional consulting services as the study progressed.

This study also benefited from the assistance of Mr. Robert A. Clarke, AEPCO Contract Manager and Mr. John Noble, Commander Navy Recruiting Command contracting officer's representative. Mr. Noble made arrangements for the study team to visit organizations to conduct interviews of key personnel, scheduled meetings, reviewed draft products, and provided superb support in obtaining data and reference material.

## Foreword

This project started out with a sense of urgency on the part of the Government, requiring a very tight schedule of events, a massive data and information collection, specific requirements for producing an Enlistment Production System (EPS) model and performing analyses, a series of Study Advisory Group (SAG) meetings to present emerging results to the Government, and the requirement to produce a final report. All of this was to be accomplished according to a Statement of Work that was to guide the overall effort.

Every one of the scheduled SAG meetings was postponed (the first was also cancelled) at the request of the Government. At the second SAG meeting, the Government radically changed the scope of work and gave the study team new guidance. Following the third SAG meeting, the Government accepted the preliminary work and closed out the contracted effort prior to the completion of the original scope of work and the preparation of a final report.

The original scope of work was to look at the EPS as a system of systems starting with the recruiting systems, including the training systems, and concluding with the systems involved with the initial assignment of U.S. Navy recruits. At the second SAG meeting, the initial assignments requirement was suspended by the Government. Because of the premature termination of the work, this report does not contain all of the material or depth of material that was originally proposed by the study team. Because the study team felt that the material that had been collected warranted publication to make it available to the research community and other interested individuals, I took it upon myself to complete the report on my own time. The results of that effort are in the accompanying report.

This project is what I have characterized as "Investigative Analysis." This means that my role has been similar to a detective: seek out clues, interview subjects, review documents, and try to establish a pattern out of all of the information available. During the course of the investigation, it was my pleasure to have spoken to a number of individuals involved in the EPS. Their dedication to duty prompted their considerable cooperation in giving me the benefit of the insights that they gained over their tenure within the EPS. Without their thoughtfulness, this report would not have been possible.

Gerald A. Klopp, Ph.D.  
Senior Analyst  
AEPCO, Inc.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DISTRIBUTION Statement.....	ii
DISCLAIMER.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
Foreword.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
Executive Summary.....	xi
<b>REPORT</b>	
<b>1. INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 The Recruiting Environment.....	1
1.3 The Recruiting Responses.....	10
1.4 Scope of Investigative Analysis.....	14
1.5 Overarching Issue.....	15
1.6 Analysis Methodology.....	16
1.7 Overview of Report.....	20
<b>2. EPS Process Model.....</b>	<b>23</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	23
2.2 Core Process Management Model.....	27
2.3 Market and Environment.....	30
2.4 Marketing Sub-Model.....	30
2.5 Recruiting Sub-Models.....	33
2.5.1 Recruiting: Qualifying Leads Sub-Model.....	33
2.5.2 Recruiting: Prospecting Sub-Model.....	34
2.5.3 Recruiting: Missioning Sub-Model.....	35
2.5.4 Recruiting: Recruiter Selection and Training Sub-Model.....	37
2.6 DEP and Accession Scheduling Sub-Models.....	40
2.6.1 Select, Classify, and Contract Sub-Model.....	40
2.6.2 Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Sub-Model.....	44
2.6.3 Ship Sub-Model.....	46
2.7 Training Sub-Models.....	46
2.7.1 Training: Recruit Training School Sub-Model.....	47
2.7.2 Training: A-School Sources.....	54
2.7.3 Training: A-School Flow Sub-Model.....	56
2.8 Initial Assignment (Fleet).....	57
2.9 Policy.....	57
2.9.1 Enlisted Community Managers Sub-Model.....	57
2.9.2 Quota Management Sub-Model.....	58
2.10 Summary and Introduction to Chapter 3.....	58
<b>3. Annotated Bibliography.....</b>	<b>60</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	60

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
3.2 Literature Search.....	62
3.3 Annotated Bibliography.....	63
3.3.1 Attrition.....	63
3.3.2 Advertising and Marketing.....	64
3.3.3 DEP Management.....	65
3.3.4 Recruiting Incentives.....	66
3.3.5 Process Descriptions and Modeling.....	68
3.3.6 Recruiting Issues.....	70
3.3.7 Recruiter Management.....	72
3.3.8 Supply Studies.....	74
3.3.9 School Management.....	76
3.3.10 Technology.....	77
<b>4. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND FINDINGS.....</b>	<b>79</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	79
4.2 Some Background.....	80
4.2.1 CNRC Background.....	80
4.2.2 Policy and Practices Background.....	82
4.2.3 Navy Process Management and Control Background.....	83
4.2.4 RTC Training Background.....	84
4.2.5 Training Background.....	85
4.2.6 Some Army Recruiting Background.....	85
4.2.7 Army Recruiting Contractor Interview Background.....	86
4.2.8 High School Counselor Interview Background.....	87
4.3 EPS Interview Issue Overview.....	88
4.4 Interview Issues.....	91
4.5 What Literature Says About Some Causes for Issues.....	96
4.5.1 Personnel.....	96
4.5.1.1 Turnover.....	96
4.5.1.2 Recruiters.....	96
4.5.1.3 Career Recruiting Force (CRF).....	96
4.5.1.4 Leadership.....	97
4.5.1.5 Incentives.....	97
4.5.1.6 Civilian Employees.....	97
4.5.2 Process.....	98
4.5.2.1 Current Process.....	98
4.5.2.2 Goals/Mission.....	99
4.5.2.3 Losses.....	99
4.5.2.4 DEP.....	99
4.5.3 Consistency.....	100
4.5.3.1 Policy.....	100
4.5.3.2 Sales Organization.....	100
4.5.3.3 Team vs. Individual.....	101

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
4.5.3.4 Standards.....	102
4.5.4 Market.....	102
4.5.4.1 Analysis.....	103
4.5.4.2 Changing Attitudes.....	103
4.5.5 Program Evaluation.....	103
4.5.5.1 Evaluation Over Time.....	104
4.5.5.2 MOE, Metrics, Data.....	104
4.5.6 Research Capability.....	104
4.5.7 Resources.....	104
4.5.7.1 Funding.....	105
4.5.7.2 Manpower.....	105
4.5.7.3 Facilities.....	105
4.5.8 Process Control In-Process Review.....	106
4.5.9 Missions & Roles Connectivity.....	106
4.5.10 Schedule Conflicts Await Instruction.....	106
4.5.11 Information Connectivity Information Systems.....	107
4.5.12 Drug Testing Counter Productive.....	107
4.5.13 Near-Term vs. Long-Term Focus.....	107
4.5.14 Harmful Surges.....	107
4.6 Organization to Organization Issues.....	108
4.7 Traditional Approaches to EPS Problem Solving and Research.....	111
4.8 Conclusions.....	112
<b>5. EPS Metrics.....</b>	<b>115</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	115
5.2 Some Possible Metrics.....	115
5.3 U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Metrics.....	117
5.4 Some Conclusions on the Metrics.....	119
<b>6. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EPS.....</b>	<b>121</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	121
6.2 USMEPCOM Losses.....	121
6.3 EPS Total Losses.....	122
6.4 Some Cost Implications of Attrition.....	124
6.5 Some Concluding Remarks on Navy Attrition.....	124
<b>7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>126</b>
7.1 Summary.....	126
7.2 Conclusions.....	126
7.3 Recommendations: Station Missioning.....	128
7.4 Recommendations: Metrics.....	130
7.5 General Recommendations.....	130
7.6 Courses of Action.....	134
7.7 Closing Comments.....	137

## LIST OF APPENDIXES

A	Statement of Work.....	A1
B	List of Acronyms.....	B1
C	List of References.....	C1
D	Categorized List of Interview Observations.....	D1
E	Catalogue of References.....	E1
F	Organizations Visited.....	F1

## List of Tables

<b>Table</b>		<b>Page</b>
1	Generational Differences.....	6
2	Recruiting Choices.....	16
3	Web Site References and Site Sponsor.....	60
4	Navy Command Briefing References.....	61
5	Document Categories.....	62
6	Research Documents by Source.....	62
7	List of Attrition Study References.....	63
8	Advertising and Marketing References.....	64
9	DEP Study References.....	65
10	Recruiting Incentive References.....	67
11	Process and Model References.....	69
12	Recruiting Issue References.....	70
13	Recruiter Management References.....	73
14	Supply Study References.....	74
15	School Management References.....	76
16	Technology References.....	77
17	Interview Observations and Categories.....	88
18	Summary of Interview Observations by Organization and Category....	89
19	Ranking Interview Issues.....	90
20	Interview Issues.....	91
21	Interview Category/Subject Description.....	93
22	Organization to Organization Issues.....	108
23	Traditional Approaches to Meeting Goals and Consequences.....	111
24	Army Recruiting Metrics.....	118
25	Attrition Over Time.....	122
26	Breakdown of EPS Losses.....	124

## List of Figures

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Page</b>
1. Analysis Methodology.....	17
2. Project Updates and Task Relationships.....	19
3. EPS Command Relationships.....	23
4. EPS Sub-System Model.....	25
5. A Basic Input/Output Model.....	26
6. Core Process Management Model.....	28
7. Marketing Sub-Model.....	32
8. Recruiting: Qualifying Leads Sub-Model.....	33
9. Recruiting: Prospecting Sub-Model.....	34
10. Recruiting: Missioning Sub-Model.....	36
11. Recruiter Selection and Training Sub-Model.....	38
12. Recruit Select, Classify, Contract Sub-Model.....	41
13. Delayed Entry Program Sub-Model.....	45
14. Ship Sub-Model.....	46
15. Basic Training Sub-Model.....	47
16. A-School Sources Sub-Model.....	55
17. A-School Flow Sub-Model.....	56
18. Enlisted Community Managers Sub-Model.....	57
19. Quota Management Sub-Model.....	58
20. USMEPCOM Loss Model.....	121
21. EPS Attrition Model.....	123

## Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**ES 1. Background.** In the October 2000 Navy Anniversary issue of SEA\*POWER, then Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig stated, **“I believe that we are still infected by the ‘psychology of conscription’ more than a generation after our conversion to an all-voluntary force. We consider Sailors and Marines to be free labor, available for all manner of work that outside the military would be eliminated, simplified, automated, or performed by less expensive personnel.”** Mr. Danzig also met with the Commander, Naval Recruiting Command (CNRC) and requested that a study be conducted to evaluate the Enlisted Production System (EPS), consisting of recruiting, training, and initial assignment in the U.S. Navy. Later in 2000, CNRC contracted AEPCO, Inc. to “use the system description and the interrelationships from the study to identify improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPS.”

In the same publication, Mr. Danzig put forth the bottom line question: **“How can we ease the labor involved for our people while still assuring that the job’s done and done well?”** The primary issue for the EPS is related to Mr. Danzig’s observations on the military’s draft-era orientation: Should the orientation of the EPS process be changed or adopt an alternative strategy?

To address the primary issue, the analysis was conducted in three phases:

- **Phase 0: Initial Investigation and Data Collection.** During this phase, the study team collected information that was used to describe the current EPS. Activities during this phase included: literature search, structured interviews of EPS participants in individual or group settings, and recruiter surveys administered electronically.
- **Phase 1: Description of Existing Processes.** The objective of this phase was to describe the EPS using an Input/Output Process Model and the data collected during Phase 1. The Input/Output Process Model serves as a tool to help analysts identify anomalies, inconsistencies, discontinuities and inefficiencies that mark opportunities for system improvement.
- **Phase 2: Description of the Objective EPS and Identification of required changes and modifications.** During this Phase of the analysis, the study team identified potential enhancements to the EPS and used the Input/Output Process model (to be discussed below) to capture the impact of these improvements.
- **Phase 3: Review/Revision of Final Report.** This Phase was cancelled prior to its completion. A Compact Disk with all of the information collected and a copy of the initial draft of parts of the report was provided to the Government. However, the study team decided that since much of the draft report had been completed, it would complete the report. This final report was provided to the Government.

**ES 2. Scope.** EPS processes include the following subsystems and core processes:

- Marketing - identification of potential individuals interested in joining the Navy, active and reserve.
- Recruiting - the process of signing those individuals to a contract.
- Delayed Entry and Scheduling Training – the processes of holding a contracted applicant, scheduling an accession date to begin training, and providing transportation and initial processing at the Recruit Training Center or Reserve orientation.
- Initial Training - common core training (“boot-camp”) or reserve orientation training.
- Follow-on Training - scheduling and conducting specialized skill training required during first tour.
- Initial Assignment - relocating the Sailor to the first permanent duty station.

Note: since the Navy contract was cancelled prior to the fleet interviews, this part of the EPS could not be fully assessed.

**ES 3. Summary.** The study team evaluated a significant body of literature on the EPS. The topics dealt with in the 126 documents that the study team reviewed includes: attrition, advertising and marketing, command briefings, DEP management, Joint Service research, instructions, incentives, process descriptions and modeling, recruiting issues, recruiter management, school management, and technology. In addition, the study team conducted interviews of individuals in 36 of the agencies directly involved in the EPS. From these interviews, the study team constructed a list of 461 observations that met specific criteria established to assure that the focus of the analysis was on issues that cross EPS organizations, issues that have multiple observations, and issues that have some corroboration in the literature.

These 461 observations were categorized into 14 issue categories. From these categories, the study team determined that personnel and process observations ranked high as issues while drug testing, near-term vs. long-term, and surges ranked low as issues by the interviewed individuals. From these observations, a set of 29 issues were derived and ranked by evaluating the number of observations and the number of organizations where the observations were made.

The study team also looked at the 461 observations to find a set of recommendations that would address each of the 29 issues. The study group identified 40 recommendations that were grouped into 7 global recommendations, with each global recommendation having several components. The recommendations were also grouped into Courses of Action that could be undertaken by the Navy. Each COA progressively requires more organizational change, changes in the way that manpower requirements are obtained by the Navy, and possible increases in investment resources.

The literature reviewed generally looks to explaining or forecasting attrition behavior based upon socio-economic and demographic data. This research tries to find some



optimal trade-off of undesirable outcomes (e.g., the optimal DEP and attrition loss). Future research should focus on determining the reasons why so many individuals are leaving the Navy in increasing numbers. Only then will the Navy have the ability to effectively evaluate programs that can counter the problem rather than developing programs that try to take less qualified candidates and make them acceptable to the service.

#### **ES 4. Conclusions.**

- The EPS uses essentially the same processes and philosophies that were in effect when the Services drafted large numbers of citizens.
- The military increasingly is going after the higher mental category individuals that are also increasingly going to college. However, the military clings to the use of the ASVAB as the only official tool for classification.
- Although the basic structure of ratings and NEC has meaning to the military, it is alien to the civilian population. It is a system that was devised in the days of the draft and has been made more complex over the years to accommodate a growing technology required by the military.
- Training approaches remain essentially the same as when the draft was in place. There is no way for a student to "test out" of some particular training should the student have prior training in that area.
- Training should also be streamlined to account for training/ability that the individual brings. This is especially critical if the military continues to pursue the college and technical school market. The point is that training is made to be inefficient to enable the military to push everyone through at the same pace (which was the way it was during the draft when personnel and information systems were unable to cope with the individual).
- Current contracts have so much specificity that the military has lost flexibility in handling individuals that want to change their training. The point is, the military could allow civilian acquired training to have a real effect on the progress of the individual through training instead of forcing everyone through the same training that is aimed at the individual with no prior training or experience. It would also allow the military greater flexibility in determining the students that are qualified for the more technical courses. This would also facilitate the use of civilian standardized tests as an enlistment screen since actual performance on core courses would be available for classification.
- Increasingly, the military is competing for individuals with highly complex technical skills. However, the military is unable to compete with the civilian market. The result is that the military has a very high turnover in its technical skills, resulting in the need for a very expensive training program. If the technical skills were civilian, the expertise could be retained and the resources dedicated to maintaining an inefficient process could be freed for other use.
- There is also a real generational change that has been taking place at an accelerated rate. This means that the students that are making their way up through the civilian schools have expectations and behaviors that are very much different from the military.

- The study team also got the firm impression when discussing the EPS process with the more senior managers that the present recruiting problems are being solved since the indications are that the Navy will meet its recruiting goals for 2001. However, several enablers have significantly helped that effort: increasing unemployment, significant increases in recruiting resources, and increased in incentives. When these enablers are removed, recruiting will undoubtedly decline. Recruiting and retention costs are increasing because of growing competition for the same high quality individuals in the market place that the military needs for its growing high tech systems. This will continue to force the military into even more expensive solutions that will eventually price them out of the high quality market.

**ES 5. The Bottom Line.** The Navy really needs an outsider to look at all of its current processes and to make recommendations to align them with the modern times. Changes to the system up to now have mostly been adaptations to the processes established when we were fighting the Second World War. This means that some of the traditions that were formed during the draft era have to give way to the present situation. The present EPS is a very inefficient and ineffective system that forces the Navy to pump more and more resources into it to keep pace with manpower requirements. Without a thorough process review and appropriate changes in processes, the Navy is not likely to see a long-term success.

**ES 6. Recommendations.** The study team compiled a list of recommendations based on the literature review and interviews. The recommendations are categorized into three areas:

- Station Missioning. Recruiting activities at the station level should employ a true team concept. To accomplish this, the recruiting stations should be formed as a unit, trained as a unit, motivated through appropriate incentives as a unit, and managed as a unit. The Recruiter in Charge of the unit should be selected from stations that successfully met team goals and trained to be a leader of a team. Following that training, the Recruiter in Charge should train his/her team and accompany the team to a specific station to begin operations.
- Metrics. Metrics used to evaluate the EPS need to be outcome as well as process based to avoid sub optimization. Even though the collection and use of some of the EPS metrics is important, the reality is that the EPS in its present condition is probably unable to make much headway in the collection and use of such metrics due to a lack of research capability and funding. The Navy should establish a centrally managed organization, probably within the Navy Recruiting Command, to collect, analyze, and present EPS findings to EPS decision makers.
- A comprehensive set of 40 recommendations are given in the report covering the following issues (listed in order of importance):
  - Personnel
  - Process
  - Consistency
  - Market
  - Program Evaluation
  - Research

- Resources
- Process Control
- Schedule Conflicts
- Information Connectivity
- Drug Testing
- Near-Term vs. Long-Term
- Surges

These 40 recommendations are grouped into the following general recommendations in order of importance:

- **Conduct more research** (market, recruiter incentives, experiment with new programs, interview individuals at separation points, leadership focus on long term issues and solutions, and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of existing programs and processes).
- **Establish a Personnel Corps** (use retired Navy and/or former recruiters as civilian recruiters, use civilians in more management and leadership positions, increase the EPS civilian to military ratio to improve continuity, and manage the military rotations through the Personnel Corps to retain expertise).
- **Change outdated or counterproductive policies and practices** (eliminate recruiter drug testing, explore and implement the use of SAT and other standardized tests to classify individuals, increase DEP management and training opportunities, and unify recruiting physical, mental, and security standards).

**ES 7. Courses of Action.** The recommendations in this report cover a very broad set of changes, some of which will require significant effort by the Navy to accomplish and some of which can be accomplished by the EPS organizations. Recommendations have been grouped into five Courses of Action (COAs):

- COA 1: "Tweak" the system components using traditional approaches. This will provide marginal improvements to the EPS. The report lists specific recommendations applicable for this COA.
- COA 2: Select the option of a lower fill rate. This is one alternative that can be implemented entirely by a change in policy. The reality is that this essentially is being implemented by default, but the EPS is becoming more expensive and less efficient to maintain the official end strength requirements by pushing more people into the system only to have them prematurely leave. Even though end strength may decline, the number of manyears completed by enlistees could remain nearly the same if individuals that are known to have high probability of attrition are not allowed to enlist.
- COA 3: Minimal improvements/changes in organization interaction and some resource changes. This COA will take several additional changes over and above those in COA 1.
- COA 4: Organizational changes, same philosophical approach to the EPS, with moderate resource implications. This will require significant organizational changes and investment of resources in addition to the previous changes.

- COA 5: Organizational changes, different EPS approaches, and significant resource implications. This COA will require the most extensive changes in the EPS and require significant Navy philosophical changes.

The report documents some of the resource implications of the present inefficient and ineffective EPS. If the system is made to be more efficient and effective, resources could be changed in the long term. However, in the short term, it will take more resources and effort. Failing that, the system will continue to require increasing resources to maintain it. Consider the following analogy: a home that is not insulated costs more to heat and cool than an energy efficient house. It costs money to install insulation while simultaneously paying the heating and cooling costs. When the house is insulated, the return on investment is realized every year thereafter. The choice is either to continue to pay higher and higher energy costs or make an investment to make the house more energy efficient. The preliminary work in this report strongly suggests that the EPS house is costing more and more to maintain.

When reviewing the EPS model, one thing became apparent. If the EPS process were to be fully controlled by the Navy, there is a significant impediment to its success: MEPCOM is an organization that is part of the EPS process as well as being part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a major policy maker for the military services. This organization was the source of a great deal of the discussion that the study team encountered in the interview process. As long as the Navy is not in control of the entire EPS, it cannot really take control of the Navy EPS.

## Chapter 1 – Introduction

**1.1 Background.** In the October 2000 Navy Anniversary Issue of SEA\*POWER, then Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig stated, **“I believe that we are still infected by the ‘psychology of conscription’ more than a generation after our conversion to an all-voluntary force. We consider Sailors and Marines to be free labor, available for all manner of work that outside the military would be eliminated, simplified, automated, or performed by less expensive personnel.”** Mr. Danzig also visited the Commander Naval Recruiting Command (CNRC) and observed that the Navy’s enlisted acquisition system generally is flawed. He said that there needed to be a study to look at the Enlisted Production System (EPS) from recruiting through training into the first assignment in the fleet. These comments set the framework for the origin of the present study.

Mr. Danzig also identified other difficulties that the Department of the Navy (DON) is facing. Specifically, he felt that the Navy EPS has some serious flaws that inhibit completion of military service. Mr. Danzig stated in SEA\*POWER, **“Our Sailors and Marines are wooed by civilian employers and influenced by their non-Navy spouses’ careers. We need to let people do the jobs they are trained for and cut down on waiting time, unnecessary administrative burdens, and demoralizing career paths.”** Mr. Danzig gave several examples of current Navy practices that adversely affect the Sailor and some contemporary solutions to the problems:

<b>PROBLEM:</b>	After skill training school, Sailors spend months painting or cooking.
<b>SOLUTION:</b>	Fleet will be painted by civilian paint teams.
<b>PROBLEM:</b>	Lowest ship habitability standards in NATO.
<b>SOLUTION:</b>	The future Navy ship, the DD21, will take enlisted Sailors out of large birthing areas and put them into staterooms.
<b>PROBLEM:</b>	In an era when ships were isolated, whatever a vessel needed had to be provided by its crew.
<b>SOLUTION:</b>	In our era of broadband communications, however, a ship can benefit from the work of specialists serving ashore.

**1.2 The Recruiting Environment.** Clearly, Mr. Danzig has proposed some radical changes in the way that the Navy utilizes its human resources. Literature points to other problems that are putting increased pressure on the Navy to attract, recruit, train, utilize, and retain qualified Sailors. The Navy Personnel Research Studies and Technology (NPRST) published SAILOR 21: A Research Vision to Attract, Retain, and Utilize the

21<sup>st</sup> Century Sailor (14 December 1998) to outline a research agenda to address the growing problem faced by the military services. **“A strong economy and lagging compensation are making it increasingly difficult to recruit the people we need. Expanding missions are increasing operating tempos and time away from home. Retention of highly skilled Sailors and officers will continue to suffer. Thirty percent crew turnover per year cripples the ability of the Fleet to train and deploy as cohesive units. Key billets often go unfilled or remain gapped for months. Stove-piped, antiquated, and often inefficient personnel management processes make responsiveness to all of these problems piecemeal and difficult.”**

The present situation is a direct result of changes in the market while the military was preoccupied with a significant downsizing effort following the end of the cold war. Despite the downsizing effort, the military services faced an increasing operating tempo (OPTEMPO) with reduced budgets and reduced manpower. As competition for the now decreasing number of positions increased, the atmosphere within the military services became more competitive for retention. “Up or out” became more severe as the military needed to cull its upper ranks. “Zero defects” became the operational norm in evaluating individual performance. Obviously, in an organization that has to downsize, some method is need to force turnover if sufficient numbers are not departing of their own initiative. These conditions did not go unnoticed by the market that was more and more viewing the forced attrition of the military as less security for employment prospects, less rewarding from a monetary prospective, and more demanding of time and energy at the expense of family and personal time.

While the market has been changing, the military presence in the primary recruiting market has also declined. With the fall of Communism, the emphasis for the military was on downsizing. Recruiting goals were lowered because end strength had to be lowered in the downsizing effort. Military bases were closed and individuals (both civilian employees and uniformed military) saw their jobs eliminated in reorganizations and other downsizing actions. As a direct result of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), the U.S. Navy closed two of its three Basic Training Facilities.

The Recruit Training Center (RTC) became the Navy’s only basic training facility due to the closure of the Orlando and San Diego RTCs under BRAC in 1993. In arriving at the decision to close the two training facilities, the BRAC commission assumed that accessions for June to September would be 40 percent or less of annual accessions. Annual training loads have steadily increased from 47,577 in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 to 53,170 in FY2000, with an even larger requirement for FY2001. Increasing the size of a recruit division from 88 to 94 has already expanded RTC summer capacity, but this diminishes the quality of life for recruits and imposes an even larger burden on the RTC

training staff. Basic military training for the Navy recruit is 9.3 weeks. Additional training time is provided if the recruit enters one of the remedial training programs instituted at RTC to cope with increased recruit attrition.

In addition to closing and realigning facilities, Navy Recruiting Research and Development (R&D) was reduced to a very low amount. Recruiting and retention incentives and pay did not keep pace with the tremendous increases being seen in the civilian sector. Prior to the downsizing, the military could attract as many individuals as it needed and was not concerned with the first signs of a problem: the attrition rate for enlistees in the mid- to late-1980's hovered between 30-34 percent.

Job opportunities for youth in the 1980s were steadily improving, but job prospects for youth with no advanced training were limited. Additionally, the number of high school graduates that could afford or obtain funding to go to college was relatively low. This created a demand-constrained recruiting environment where educational incentives could successfully lure high quality college-bound high school graduates into the military. Through the 1990s, job prospects improved for youth and alternative funding sources for college increased significantly, creating more competition for the same market that the military services was interested in.

With the downsizing and demand-constrained military recruiting environment, the services responded by increasing its requirements for the "high quality" high school graduate and cut to a very low percentage the percentage of "low quality" individuals. Research identified the individuals that exhibit undesirable characteristics in the military: higher attrition rates, lower ability to learn complex technical material, and indiscipline problems. The "low quality" recruit is an individual without a high school diploma, someone who scores below the average on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), an individual with moral problems (as evidenced by a criminal record of arrests and/or convictions), and/or someone with minimal physical fitness capability. To increase the percentage of "high quality" recruits, the services increased physical fitness, mental aptitude, educational, and moral requirements. In 1980, 35 percent of the recruits were high quality, but the quota was increased to 74 percent in 1992.

With employment and college opportunities limited for a very large segment of the population, despite the growing inefficiency in recruiting and retention, this strategy worked well through most of the 1990s. Until FY 1998, the military services were successful in meeting recruiting goals. However, while the military services were "rightsizing," they were also not gathering and processing information on the changing youth market. Not only were more educational opportunities being presented to graduating high school seniors, students were also getting funding and opportunity to



attend college. The go-to-college rate for high school seniors increased from 60 percent in 1990 to 66 percent in 1998 and continues to grow as more funding and opportunity is provided by a variety of sources. This increase in go-to-college rate took place despite an increase in the average real tuition costs and fees that rose by 50 percent from 1985 to 1995.

Certainly part of the increase in go-to-college rate was due to more teen employment opportunities, but another driving factor was the availability of low interest educational loans. While the military enjoyed the ability to constrain enlistments in the early 1980s, it also enjoyed a “competitive edge” in providing a significant source of money for college through the GI Bill, loan forgiveness programs, and the ability to give bonuses for hard-to-fill positions. With more money available to teens in the 1990s, the competitive value of the military’s packages was severely eroded.

Employment opportunities for teens also have been improving. Civilian unemployment rate declined from 7.3 percent in 1992 to 4.7 percent in 1998 and even lower thereafter as the period of prosperity extended into the 2000s.

With more opportunities in the prospering civilian economy, the military saw attrition rates grow from 30 to 34 percent in the mid- to late-1980’s to 37 percent in 1994 and 1995 and continue to grow thereafter. For the Navy, the attrition rate rose to over 40 percent in FY2000. Attrition is also being experienced in the military’s Delayed Entry Program (DEP), which allows an individual to sign a contract for military service and wait (delay entry) for up to 365 days before entering the military service (also known as “accessing”). DEP attrition has been steadily increasing over the past several years (for Fiscal Year 2000, the DEP attrition was around 18 percent).

Literature is also pointing to the sources of the current recruiting, training, utilization, and retention problem faced by the military services: there is a significant change taking place in the target market. The target market is rapidly changing as the economy, educational systems, culture, demographics, teen health, and youth employment expectations change. According to a Point Paper prepared by Jim Larsen (ATTG-EO, dated 18 September 2000, SUBJECT: FY00-FY01 Recruiting Initiatives), **“Today’s teenager is less prepared for individual IET (Initial Entry Training) due to over fatness, under fitness, malnutrition (more colas, less milk; more fries, less vegetables), and less adult contact (Source: Center for Disease Control (CDC). Dramatically fewer veterans are in the direct influencer population as the WW II veterans die and age (Source: Veteran’s Administration (VA)). Markets are increasingly fragmenting (Alaska’s solution may not be Missouri’s solution).”**



The decline in the direct influencer population and a growing distrust of institutions has also had a negative impact on the military as a source of employment. As stated in the June 1999 edition of the Edison Herald, **"Some students at Edison refused to take the (ASVAB) because they are afraid they might be drafted into the Army. Some didn't take it because they didn't get a chance to, and others weren't interested."** Clearly, the market is changing and has some attitudes toward military service that simply are not true in this era.

As the military was losing its competitive edge because of a growing economy and more teen opportunity, the mindset of the target population was also radically changing. Current research shows the emergence of "generational changes." These generational changes are not present only between the market and the military, but are present within the services and market as well. A recent report (Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps, Leonard Wong, October 2000) states, **"Simply put, today's senior officers do not understand today's junior officers or their perspectives. Senior officers think they understand the world of lieutenants and captains, but many junior officers and others are convinced that they do not. Junior officers have become persuaded in increasing numbers that the Army's senior leadership is not connected to the reality of the trenches."** This "generational difference" has been found to be present in individuals that are at the same career point but differ in age by only ten years. If these generational differences due to only a decade of time produce such profound effects, then it should not be a surprise to find out that the entry-level market has a profoundly different view of military service than the leadership or even the mid-career individuals.

It is becoming apparent in the literature on generational changes that the military is building programs and policies that worked with a generation that no longer has the same values, motivations, and concerns. Whereas many people have heard the term "Generation X" (sometimes called "Xers"), the military has not effectively come to grips with this generation let alone coming to grips with the generations that follows. The literature talks about four distinctly different generations and alludes to a fifth generation. As summarized in Table 1 (source: Yankelovich Monitor 2000), each generation brings with it a different set of attributes. Following a summary of some of the attributes of the generations is the results of a survey of individuals toward some Army questions.

What Table 1 shows is that the different generations have different outlooks. Whereas the Matures value duty, victory, and teamwork (no doubt influenced by their sense of patriotism arising from World War II), the sense of what is important changed through the Echo Boomers. Each generation placed more importance on making money now. Each generation saw the military in less favorable terms and felt that the military recruiters were less trustworthy. Finally, the declining trend toward the view of the military also extended to the Army College Fund (ACF).

**Table 1. Generational Differences**

	<b>Matures</b>	<b>Boomers</b>	<b>Xers</b>	<b>Echo Boomer</b>
<b>Birth Dates</b>	1945 and prior	1946 - 1964	1965 - 1978	1979 - 1985
<b>Outlook</b>	Duty	Individuality	Diversity	Uniqueness
	Victory	Youth	Savvy	Digitization
	Teamwork	Self-Absorbed	Entrepreneur	Self-Invention
<b>Make money now</b>	14%	33%	40%	51%
<b>Army Survey:</b>				
<b>Positive to Army</b>	64%	47%	41%	35%
<b>Would enlist Army</b>	56%	45%	43%	23%
<b>Have fun in Army</b>	26%	17%	14%	13%
<b>Army College Prep</b>	60%	47%	42%	32%
<b>Believe Recruiter</b>	24%	17%	18%	14%

Although the Matures and Boomers are not in the market for enlistment, the information above shows that the older generations have a much more positive view of the Army as compared to the Echo Boomers who are starting to enter into the primary recruiting market. The Xers do not share the same sense of motivation that previous generations had. Some of the characteristics of Xers are:

- Relationships are important to them.
- They lack skills and ability to have true/meaningful relationships.
- They are visual oriented.
- They lack the ability to communicate feelings.
- They are skeptical of organized institutions.
- "Paying Dues" is an outdated concept to them.
- Paying them short-term dividends is key to their motivation (45% of 18-25 year olds plan to stay on current job two years or less).
- They are wary of commitment.
- They favor short-term commitments to small-scale projects with definable objectives and ending dates.
- They expect change; routine is out-of-date (choice is essential for 86% of 18-25 year olds).
- They need innovation and are easily affected by gimmicks.
- They have no respect for positional authority; respect must be earned by treatment.
- They eagerly embrace technology.

When asked about their view of the military in general (source: Yankelovich Monitor 2000), the younger generation feels:

- It's a 24/7/365 lifestyle, not a 9 to 5 job.
- If you make a mistake, you cannot move on after 6 months.
- You have less control over broad areas of your life.
- You can be ordered to engage in dangerous activities.

Perspective about the military is also important. The Monitor 2000 contains a picture of the Army's mainline tank, the M1 Abrams with the following caption:

**"One M1 tank: \$280 million; one loaded machine gun: \$65,000; one standard military plunger: \$1,000; cleaning the urinal with a toothbrush because there was a small scuff on your shoe: priceless."**

The Echo Boomers are moving into the prime recruiting market. A majority of them are going to college. Some of the characteristics of the people who are starting college this fall across the nation:

- They were born in 1982.
- They have no meaningful recollection of the Reagan era and probably did not know he had ever been shot.
- They were prepubescent when the Persian Gulf War was waged.
- They hold Black Monday in 1987 as the Great Depression.
- They were 11 when the Soviet Union broke apart and do not remember the cold war.
- They are too young to remember the space shuttle blowing up.
- Tianamen Square means nothing to them.
- Their lifetime has always included aids.
- They have never owned a record player.
- They may have never heard of a 9 track.
- The Compact Disc was introduced when they were 1 year old.
- They have always had an answering machine.
- The Vietnam War is as ancient history to them as WWI, WWII, and the Civil War.
- They have no idea that Americans were ever held hostage in Iran.

Source: [b0.ff3ad02.27b007fe@aol.com](mailto:b0.ff3ad02.27b007fe@aol.com), 5 February 2001.

Clearly, the importance of the role of the military in today's society has changed radically over the generations. The Matures saw patriotism and military service as a very important requirement for the national security that was being threatened by foreign governments in general and Communism in specific. They were accustomed to the draft and compulsory military service. On the other extreme, the Echo Boomers see no real global threat to the United States. Compulsory military service was replaced with the all-voluntary military and the number of veterans and their influence on youth has steadily declined. Whereas military service in the past was a way to get technical job training and skills and a way to finance civilian education through various versions of the G.I. Bill, the Echo Boomers now see the pursuit of financial gains as a primary motivating factor.

The DON has begun to look at its personnel system to determine actions that should be taken to attract and retain a quality civilian workforce capable of providing the human capital needed for the Navy to achieve mission excellence in the year 2020. DON commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration's Center for Human Resources Management (CHRM) to analyze the Department's civilian personnel system.

In its 18 August 2000 report, CHRM reported, **“The Navy’s current human resources (HR) system (laws, rules, technology, structure, and competence) is inadequate to operate in the world of 2020. If the system’s inadequacies are not addressed, the Navy can expect further degradation of its capability to perform needed tasks and ensure continuation of its military superiority.”** The report goes on to state, **“The DON workforce is becoming increasingly technical and scientific. This creates the greatest demand in the segment of the labor market with the greatest shortage. DON has not been able to compete effectively for top-level talent in the current setting, and competition is likely to get more intense in the future.”**

If, as Mr. Danzig postulates, the military still has a draft-era mentality, then surely there will be even more difficulty with the current generation of recruits. Under the draft system, the military was faced with taking in a large number of under educated individuals that did not necessarily want to be a part of the military establishment. Because of its growing needs for technically minded individuals, the military had to develop a system that would rapidly classify individuals that could be given technical training in a very short period of time. One of the key tools in that classification process was the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).

In addition to classification, the military services had to develop a very efficient way of processing large number of conscripted individuals through the entry system. However, this was a system that was not particularly interested in the individual’s desires. The needs of the military became the driving force in selection and classification. Many of the procedures established in those days of conscription are still in use today despite the tremendous changes educational achievements and increased technical skills in the population being recruited. The current process still presents to the enlistment candidate a list of Navy needs based on the candidate’s performance on the ASVAB.

**“Generation Xers are providing employers in the job market not only with higher levels of education, but also the highest technology skills and knowledge. Xers are seeking sophisticated and technologically advanced work, adjustable pay structures, fewer boundaries, and more flexibility I how and where the work is DONE” [sic]** (Source: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources Management in the Department of the Navy, National Academy of Public Administration, 18 August 2000, page 194).

Perhaps one of the most significant differences in the draft era and the all- volunteer era is the completion of an enlistment contract. This contract specifies a number of obligations that the enlistee agrees to (such as number of years of service, the type of training that will be received, and the job rating that the individual will receive upon completion of training). In exchange for this commitment on the part of the enlistee, the Navy may agree to provide certain incentives (such as a recruitment bonus that is paid

after completion of the training, educational programs such as the Navy College Fund or the G.I. Bill).

To counter the growing inability to attract sufficient numbers of high quality recruits, the Navy has come up with a variety of incentives and contract requirements. However, these incentives and contract requirements carry special obligations for the enlistee. When compared to the characteristics of the Xers above, it is clear that some of them run counter to their general characteristics. This could explain why individuals who sign contracts for these incentives do not necessarily complete their contracted service obligation.

- A higher bonus amount equals longer term of enlistment.
- Bonuses are given AFTER training is completed.
- Commitment is required during counseling session for a specific job, term, and other conditions.
- Longevity is the basic mechanism for promotion (e.g., positional authority).

Unless the trans-generational changes are taken into account in dealing with the present recruiting dilemma, analyses and policy will be based on data that do not adequately capture the relative variables. Several observations regarding the generational differences are appropriate to understand the difficulty of dealing with the present problem.

- Senior leadership generally comes from the "Matures" and "Boomers." Even these groups have differences in outlook.
- Junior leadership is mostly in the "Xers." The services are having a difficult time retaining this group (Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps, Leonard Wong, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000).
- The entry-level market is shifting to the "Echo Boomers" and the growing fifth generation (Yankelovich calls this the Me dot two – Me.2 generation). This generation differs from the previous ones and has not been as thoroughly evaluated as the Xer Generation.
- Economic research uses past data to predict future behavior. Past data does not take into account the generational changes. Thus, for example, econometric models that predict higher yields on higher enlisted bonuses for a future generation are based on a generation that is no longer the entry-level generation.
- Trans-Generational changes are going to continue to adversely affect recruiting. There does not seem to be much interest shown in the literature on understanding this and looking for effective means to deal with the changes.

The bottom line, according to Mr. Danzig is: **"How can we ease the labor involved for our people while still assuring that the job's done and done well?"** Certainly, the recruiting, training, and retention policies that were essentially put into place during the draft era when the military took in thousands of uneducated or undereducated individuals can no longer simply be adapted to today's complex situation.

Literature indicates that even with modifications, the present model no longer satisfies the needs of the Navy and will not accommodate the capabilities, desires, and

expectations of a new generation. As stated in a 1999 RAND Corporation Report (MR-984-OSD), **"...there are some indications that the current situation to some extent reflects ongoing and permanent changes in the civilian market. These changes suggest that the military will increasingly be competing with civilian post-secondary education institutions and subsequent skilled civilian employment for high quality youth."** It is clear to the study team that modifications of the existing draft-era system will not solve the present problem. Worse still, if predicted research results come to pass, the present (or even modified) system will continue to experience further decline.

**1.3 The Recruiting Response.** Over time, the military has learned through past research to tie resource levels to recruiting difficulty. Under this paradigm, decreasing unemployment, decreasing youth propensity, declining prime market population, and other variables were successfully shown to be related to the need for increased recruiting resources. However, with the period of drawdown, the resources were decreased because the military was not as interested in entry levels as it was in reducing the end strength. However, this resource paradigm persists to the present time.

According to the Government Audit Organization (GAO) (GAO/NSIAD-00-146), the Navy recently went to the past solution set to solve its recent recruiting dilemma by:

- Increasing the number of recruiters from 3342 to 4725 in 1999 and increased the number again in 2000 to be about 5,000 presently.
- Opened recruiting jobs to lower ranked (E-4) enlisted personnel.
- Substantially increased advertising from \$37.8 million in 1987 to \$67.3 million in 1999.
- Increased bonuses in the off-season periods (February to May).

However, according to the same report, **"the services do not yet know which of their recruiting initiatives works best. For example, the Navy does not know the extent to which each of the changes it has made to its recruiting program...contributed toward meeting its goal in FY 1999 and whether that strategy will work in the future."**

In addition to increasing resources, the Navy also instituted several other programs, some of which had positive effects on recruiting and retention and some of which had negative effects. Some of the changes that affect recruiting and retention include:

- Career Exploration Program (CEP) now administered primarily to Juniors and Seniors (NOTE: propensity for CEP participants is 21% higher than non-CEP participants).
- Increased the cap on Non High School Degree Graduates (NHSDGs) from 5% to 10% (+2,500 enlistees).
- Started DEP drug testing (eliminating those candidates that test positive from accessing prior to attending Basic training).
- Proposed a General Education Development (GED) advantage program (not initiated).
- Initiated a cooperative junior college program called Tech Prep by working out credit for military training that would be accepted by participating junior colleges



toward an Associates Degree. This program is not only unfunded, but there has been a loss of 40% of Educational Specialists (Ed Specs) that are needed to implement and refine the program.

- A DEP Scholarship Program has been developed and was submitted as an FY03 Budget initiative.
- Instituted "remedial" programs at the Recruit Training Center (RTC). These programs will be discussed below. (ACE, FAST, PASS, PT "0").
- Depleted the DEP pool to meet end strength requirements. Ideally, 42 to 45% of a recruiting year's objectives should be held in DEP to assure that a more even flow of recruits goes to the training base. In FY00, the DEP was estimated to be 28%.
- A selective re-enlistment bonus program was increased from \$20,000 to \$60,000, resulting in a 5.5 percent increase in retention rates in 2000 over the 1999 level (AP Washington, Dean Visser, AP writer).

The recruiting environment also contributes to the ineffective recruiting. According to a Recruiter Quality of Life Briefing (May 2000), only 24% of recruiters believe that the Enlisted Recruiting Orientation (ENRO) provides a realistic preview of recruiting duty. Additionally, many feel that the present forced turnover of recruiters and staff adversely affects recruiting operations. For a short time, recruiter transfers were slowed down to build the number of on-production recruiters. Once the number of 5,000 was reached, the normal training and transfer cycle was been resumed.

According to CNRC Marketing, the better quality leads are coming from the Internet. Also, according to the 1999 New Recruit Survey, 60 percent of the recruits who accessed the Internet use e-mail, but only 7 percent exchanged e-mail with their recruiters. Clearly, the Navy is not moving into technology as fast and effectively as the primary recruit market.

Some of the Navy programs actually run counter to the market expectations. The **"fragile group of young men and women needs to be understood. Not doing so will make little positive effect on trying to establish an effective DEP policy and may result in a program unable to allow and keep young men and women in Navy recruiting pipelines....the Navy is at the mercy of these recruits. If not given the attention they need, they will easily be 'turned off'"** (The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of the Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training, John D. Nell, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998, page 56). Increasingly, evidence is pointing to the Navy policy as a source of recruiting and retention difficulty. The Recruiter Drug Testing program is one such policy that actually turns away otherwise eligible and interested candidates because of behavior prior to their military contact. Some other conclusions in the report regarding market performance and Navy programs include:

- The Navy cannot force recruits to be "ready" for basic training (page 57).
- The average hours worked by individuals in the DEP was over 33 hours; hence, giving up work time to attend DEP meetings is costly for the DEPer (page 60).
- Average time in DEP for each recruit is 4.5 months.

One of the problems associated with having to access individuals into the Navy with short DEP transition time is a "surge" effect. Presently, about half of the recruits arrive at RTC in the four summer months June to September. This surge of enlisted accessions loads RTC heavily and overloads many follow-on schools, increasing backlogs of individuals Awaiting Instruction (AI) (Memo N793L, dated 18 October 2000, SUBJECT: Summer Surge of Enlisted Accessions and Recruit Training Command (RTC) Capability).

This is not to say that planning for processing and training recruits does not take place. Currently, the Navy uses the standard calendar for planning and executing its mission. For Navy recruiting, this means that goals are defined in terms of monthly quotas and progress is measured at the end of months or years. For example, Production Per Recruiter (PPR) is usually measured at the end of a month. Goals for shipping individuals to the Recruit Training Command (RTC) are also based on end-of-the-month goals. In addition to recruiting quotas, several other restrictions are placed on recruiting due to operational requirements. For example, since it is known that shipping recruits to RTC over a weekend and certain other periods (e.g., over national holidays) increases Awaiting Instruction time, restrictions are placed on shipment dates. Additionally, due to medical resource limitations and the need to form units with females, shipping of females is also limited to certain days of the week.

The Director, Military Personnel and Plans Policy (N13) establishes monthly shipping goals for CNRC. N13 does not wish to raise summer goals, which are within RTC capacity (N793L, dated 18 October 2000, SUBJECT: Summer Surge of Enlisted Accessions and Recruit Training Command (RTC) Capacity). This conflict, the need to increase recruit production during the summer months when high schools are graduating seniors on one hand and the need to have an even flow through the training facilities to provide more efficient utilization on the other hand, continues to be a source of irritation within the EPS.

This problem illustrates one of the dilemmas that the Navy faces in resolving present recruiting problems using traditional approaches. Indeed, according to a Naval Audit Service Draft Audit Report (1999-0042, dated 26 July 2000), **"We found that the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel) and the Director of Naval Training/Chief of Naval Education and Training did not have a policy or process that led to the identification of the need for a way to provide additional training capacity during the summer months. Not having a policy that results in a process to ensure that recruiting objectives are not negatively affected by a lack of summer capacity is a material internal control deficiency."** However, according to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), **"Most student-quota mismatches result from violations to the quota management and reservation process"**(CNA CRM 98-138, dated January 1999).

The Naval Service Draft Audit Report did provide some recommendations for change:

- Reduce FY2001 non-summer recruiting goals to achievable amounts.



- Increase summer goals to the amount then needed to meet the annual recruiting objective.
- Adjust recruit loading plans and training curriculum accordingly.
- Establish a policy requirement to periodically review training capacity to assure that recruiting goals will not be negatively impacted by a lack of summer training capacity.

Additionally, a Naval Audit Service Report (NAVAUDSVC P-7520.1, dated 26 July 2000) questions the Navy's ability to meet FY 2001 recruiting goals and recommends shifting off peak goals to the summer peak months to more fully utilize RTC's existing capacity. Clearly, these reports call for several non-traditional changes that will require the Navy to evaluate present policy that was essentially designed in a draft era to most effectively accommodate a steady flow of drafted individuals. However, unlike the draft era, the flow of recruits now is influenced by market conditions that have not been effectively taken into account in the current EPS.

RTC has instituted a number of programs designed to reduce growing attrition which is suspected to be caused by the increased rigor of basic training, the increased accession of recruits with research-proven higher attrition rates, and the increase in the number of recruits that exceed the Navy's physical and mental standards. These programs include:

- **Personal Applied Skills Streaming (PASS).** This program trains and mentors recruits who demonstrate social skill deficiencies, enabling them to more effectively deal with anger, stress, and low self-esteem issues. The program is intended to help the recruit to develop a positive self-image as well as to enhance the recruit's understanding in racial, gender, and cultural diversity. PASS also deals with authority, stress management, conflict resolution, goal setting, achieving goals, and problem solving.
- **Fundamental Applied Skills Training (FAST).** This program assists recruits with limited literacy or verbal skills by supplying them with proven study techniques and habits. The program prepares the recruit for the academic requirements of boot camp and the fleet. This program provides skill training in Navy vocabulary, reading comprehension, graphic aids, language fluency, and study skills. Recruits with an ASVAB Verbal Expression score of 42 and below, as well as those identified with poor study habits, academic performance problems, or English language difficulties are assigned to FAST.
- **PT-Zero (PT-0).** This remedial fitness program is designed to target recruits at risk for PT failure or sports-related medical injuries. Those recruits who cannot pass an abbreviated physical readiness test (PRT) during the first week of basic training are assigned to the PT-0 program for a three-week period with an opportunity to test out after one week. Individuals participating in the PT-0 program are reassigned from their initial recruit division to a new division (which is at approximately the same point of training when the individual entered ACE).

- **Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE).** This program was designed to provide non-high school diploma graduate (NHSDG) recruits the necessary basic academic and social skills to successfully complete boot camp. Recruits enrolled in ACE who do not have a GED diploma are afforded the opportunity to take the GED examination as part of their course of study. Individuals going into the ACE program are formed into an ACE division and progress through basic together.

Although commendable, these remedial programs should be closely scrutinized as the graduates enter the fleet and no longer have access to the same capabilities. Research should question the ability of short-term programs to effectively eliminate persistent deficiencies in recruits prior to enlistment.

**1.4 Scope of Investigative Analysis.** EPS processes include the following subsystems and core processes:

- Marketing - identification of potential individuals interested in joining the Navy, active and reserve.
- Recruiting - the process of signing those individuals to a contract.
- Delayed Entry and Scheduling Training – the processes of holding a contracted applicant, scheduling an accession date to begin training, and providing transportation and initial processing at the Recruit Training Center or Reserve orientation.
- Initial Training - common core training (“boot-camp”) or reserve orientation training.
- Follow-on Training - scheduling and conducting specialized skill training required during first tour.
- Initial Assignment - relocating the Sailor to the first permanent duty station.  
Note: since the Navy contract was cancelled prior to the fleet interviews, this part of the EPS could not be fully assessed.

This report assesses Navy Enlisted processes and sub processes. It focuses on the qualitative aspects of functions, roles, policies, tools and procedures and their relationships within these processes. Quantitative data, for example, may include recruit production (goals and accessions), DEP (entry and losses), and social/demographic (environmental) variables. In addition, an extensive amount of information was collected. This data, for example, includes regulations, Standard Operating Procedures, the Sailor’s Recruiting Handbook, focus group and interview results, and results of Navy Recruiting research. Although quantitative data was used in this assessment, quantitative analyses, modeling or simulation was not conducted. For example, the study team did not conduct a DEP loss study. However, DEP loss data was evaluated to determine the extent to which such information is available and used and the degree to which that information affects recruiting policy, goals, and procedures. Similarly, other quantitative data was

investigated to determine appropriate metrics for evaluating the present and future success of the EPS. This report is limited to the core processes described above.

**1.5 Overarching Issue.** As discussed above, the Navy processes are increasingly unable to attract the high quality recruits into the Navy that are needed to fill fleet manpower requirements. Certainly Mr. Danzig's bottom line question, **"How can we ease the labor involved for our people while still assuring that the job's done and done well"** is a question that needs to be answered. There is growing evidence that the treatment of recruits and Sailors is a contributing factor to the increase in attrition rates. However, as has been discussed, the answers to the retention and attrition problem tends to involve solutions that may no longer work, especially with the coming generation that has an expectation that changes will be made. The primary issue for the EPS, however, is related to Mr. Danzig's observations on the military's draft-era orientation:

**Should the orientation of the EPS processes be changed or adopt an alternative strategy?**

The Navy has many alternative courses of action available to it. We will discuss some of present courses of action and their consequences in Chapter 4 and present some recommended courses of action in Chapter 7 of this report. Choice of the course (or courses) of action will depend on a number of factors including resources. Since a growing percentage of the recruits are leaving the Navy, it should be clear that increasing levels of resources are needed just to maintain the present processes. This inefficient approach consumes more and more resources, making it very difficult to have the resources necessary to accomplish significant changes in policy, processes, and procedures. Additionally, as shown in Table 2 below, the number of choices available for change is large.

Table 2 shows some of the possible recruiting philosophies and the some of the variations in philosophies. For example, the recruiters can be military, civilians or contractors, or virtual recruiters (e.g., on-line recruiting). This does not mean that only one choice can be selected. Indeed, research has shown that the Army has successfully combined the use of military and contracted recruiters (contracted recruiters are being used as augmentation in hard-to-recruit areas to recruit non-prior service Army Reserve individuals).

For example, missioning, the process of assigning responsibility for recruiting goals, can be a team mission, an individual recruiter mission, or a combination of team and individual mission. The Navy presently functions under a team mission policy. We will discuss the implications of this philosophy and the reality of the process in Chapter 4. The Army, which had experimented with and abandoned team missioning, is now going back to team missioning with some improvements that it thinks will overcome the deficiencies of this philosophy. Similarly, the choices in Table 2 cover a range of choices for the Navy, with each choice having good points and bad points.


**Table 2. Recruiting Choices**

Recruiter:		
- Military	- Civilian/Contractor	- Virtual Recruiter
- Team Mission	- Individual Mission	- Individual & Team
- Replace after tour	- Replace low producers	- Replace only losses
- Individual Replacement	- Team Replacement	-
- Individual Training	- Team Training	- On-the-job training
- No Incentives	- Individual Incentives	- Team Incentives
"Fair" Production	Production minimum	Production Effective
Military Practices	Commercial Practices	
Human resource intensive	Resources = f(goals)	
Ethics neutral	Minimally monitor ethics	Closely monitor ethics
Anyone can recruit	High producers	Need expert sellers
Decentralized control	Central control	
Appropriate market	Fair market	Market if produces
Assigned market	Controlled market	Self-leveling
Few metrics measured	Production metrics	Leading indicator metrics
"Friendly"	"Harsh"	Competitive
Forced turnover	Controlled turnover	Retain expertise
Short-term focus	Short & longer focus	Greater span focus
Fixed Term Contract	Variable Term	

Some of these choices can be accomplished with only a change of policy while others will require a significant change in philosophy and could require investment of resources before return on investment is achieved. We will explore some of the resource implications in later chapters.

**1.6 Analysis Methodology.** The analysis methodology is shown in Figure 1 (next page). Two sets of information were collected. First, the results from a comprehensive review of literature, briefings, information papers, and other reference material was used to formulate a set of questions that would be asked of individuals throughout EPS organizations (the study team has collected and catalogued 126 references in Appendix C of this report). The references have been grouped into 13 categories (Attrition, Advertising, Marketing, etc.). Chapter 3 of this report will discuss the references, providing a short summary of key documents.

Second, a comprehensive set of interviews was conducted with individuals in 36 organizations from each part of the EPS. As explained in the Foreword to this report, the project was cancelled before the interviews of fleet Sailors could be accomplished. An EPS organization is not a separate command. For example, at CNRC, organizations included Marketing, Operations, Policy, and others. The list of organizations visited is shown in Appendix F of this report. The interviews resulted in a list of 461 observations that have been catalogued in Appendix D of this report.



**Figure 1. Analysis Methodology**

Using the 461 observations and the literature findings, an “Issue Screen” was developed. The purpose of the screen was to identify issues that cross EPS organizations and had multiple observations. The screening enabled the study team to reduce the number of issues to 29. The screening process also resulted in 14 categories of observations. The 14 categories were ranked from highest (the observations with the highest frequency by individuals from several organizations) to lowest (Personnel, Processes, Consistency, Market, Program Evaluation, Research, Resources, Process Control, Mission & Roles, Schedule Conflicts, Information Connectivity, Drug Testing, Near vs. Long Term, and Surges). The ordering of the categories of observations is the ordering that the study team determined based upon the screening of the 461 observations. Chapter 4 will discuss the issues in more detail.

The 29 issues were prioritized according to the screening criteria (number of organizations times number of observations). This allowed the study team to determine the issues that the interviewed individuals felt to be more important. Note also that the literature shaped the interviewing process and the issue evaluation process. Thus, the literature contributed to the assessment of the importance of the issues as well.

The literature and issues were combined in a “cause and effect chart” for each issue. The cause and effect chart lists an issue and the causes of the issue. Each issue is evaluated in terms of seven causes: process, people, policy, resources, measurement, market

(sometimes referred to as raw material), and environment. Each of these seven cause areas can contain one or more specific causes. Thus, the cause and effect chart allows the study team to combine the results of the literature search (which generally identified a number of problems and the variables associated with evaluating the problem) and the interview observations. The cause and effect charts are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.

From the 461 observations, a set of 40 specific recommendations was extracted. Each issue has at least one recommendation, but some issues have several recommendations. Also, some of the recommendations tend to be very similar. Accordingly, the recommendations were reduced to a set of seven recommendations, each of which has multiple parts. The recommendations were compared to the literature to assure that there is a consistency between what was determined from the interview process and what was determined from the literature.

Finally, the 40 recommendations were put into "courses of action." The courses of action start out with recommendations that would require few changes in policy, resources, and organizational structure to courses of action that could take a significant amount of resources to implement, require major changes in organizational structure, or require some change in policy. The recommendations, however, are expected to make the EPS more efficient and effective, thereby reducing resource requirements over time.

**1.7 Study Phases and Tasks.** The study was conducted in four phases (numbered Phase 0 through Phase 3). The original contract completion date was 15 August 2001, but the date was extended to 15 October 2001 because of difficulty in obtaining Government Furnished Information. Each phase of the study had specific tasks to accomplish. The phases and tasks are explained below. The project Phase, Task, and In-Process Review (IPR) relationships are shown in Figure 2 (next page). The changes in the IPR and other completion dates are also indicated in Figure 2.

**Phase 0: Initial Investigation and Data Collection.** During this phase, the study team collected information that was used to describe the current EPS. Activities during this phase included: literature search, structured interviews of EPS participants in individual or group settings, and recruiter surveys administered electronically.

**Phase 1: Description of Existing Processes.** The objective of this phase was to describe the EPS using an Input/Output Process Model and the data collected during Phase 1. The Input/Output Process Model serves as a tool to help analysts identify anomalies, inconsistencies, discontinuities and inefficiencies that mark opportunities for system improvement.

**Phase 2: Description of the Objective EPS and Identification of Required Changes and Modifications.** During this Phase of the analysis, the study team identified potential enhancements to the EPS and used the Input/Output Process model (to be discussed below) to capture the impact of these improvements.

**Phase 3: Review/Revision of Final Report.** This Phase was cancelled prior to its completion. A Compact Disk with all of the information collected and a copy of the initial draft of parts of the report was provided to the Government. However, the study team decided that since much of the draft report had been completed, it would complete the report. This final report was provided to the Government.

<b>Analysis Phase 0 &amp; IPR #1:</b>		<b>Analysis Phase 0 &amp; IPR # 2:</b>	
<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Tasks</b>
•Project/Study Plan Review	0	•Project Update	13
•Monthly Progress Reports	13	•Monthly Progress Reports	13
<b>IPR #1: 22 September 2000 (Cancelled))</b>		<b>IPR #2: 8 February 2001</b>	
<b>Analysis Phase 1 &amp; IPR # 3:</b>		<b>Analysis Phase 2 &amp; IPR #4</b>	
<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Tasks</b>
•Mapping/modeling current core processes	3	•Mapping/modeling current core processes	3,9
•Developing resource implications	2,7	•Resource implication matrix	2,7
•Identification of strategic process drivers	1&2	•List and verification of Strategic process drivers	12
•Analyzing of organization issues	3	•Mapping/modeling & Analytic Results on organizational climate	3,10
•Establishing metrics	4, 6, 8	•Results of analysis related to established metrics	6
•Determining the interactions	5	•Results of analysis and interference on the effects of interactions	11
•Monthly Progress Reports	13	•Recommendations for Follow-on Actions	All
<b>IPR # 3: 10 April 2001</b>		•Progress Report	13
		<b>IPR #4: 15 July 2001</b>	
<b>Phase 3 Review and Revision</b>			
•Final Draft Report	15 July 2001		
•Sponsor Review	15 August 2001		
•Final Report & Products	15 October 2001		

**Figure 2. Project Updates and Task Relationships**

**Task 0 [Study Plan].** Develop and present to the Study Advisory Group (SAG) a project/study plan that shows how and when the remaining tasks will be accomplished.

**Task 1 [Accession & Training Objectives].** Determine major objectives to support the accession and training mission and assess the validity of these objectives.

**Task 2 [Accession Management & Initial Training].** Examine and analyze current policies, resources, and constraints governing the recruiting, accession management and initial training operations and determine which remain valid.

**Task 3 [Management Model].** Develop a model mapping the command relationships to policies and procedures that describes the transformation of a civilian into a fully trained, fleet-ready Sailor.



**Task 4 [Research & Ongoing Studies].** Review research and ongoing studies to identify appropriate factors and their impact on the pipeline.

**Task 5 [Assess Process Impact].** Analyze the accession, initial training and initial assignment continuum at all stages to assess the impact of these processes on attrition, and on retention during the first term of enlistment and the duration of drilling commitment at reserve units.

**Task 6 [EPS Metrics].** Develop metrics that apply to entire EPS.

**Task 7 [Recruit/Recruiter Incentives].** Determine the effectiveness of incentive programs aimed at both the recruit and the recruiter to determine the impact they have on the processes and how changes to incentives impact the recruiting efforts (market).

**Task 8 [Investigate Business Practices].** Investigate business practices to include those of other service's recruiting and accession processes and pursue potential improvements to be made in the Navy's processes. Evaluate and incorporate relevant research and other studies to establish quality benchmarks by which evaluate the both current and future processes.

**Task 9 [Identify BP Changes & Impact].** Identify potential key business processes that can be modernized, streamlined, automated, or deleted. Integration of reserve and active recruiting processes should be considered as an option. Project impact on EPS metrics.

**Task 10 [Define Reengineered Process].** Define optimal organizational relationships, procedures, and tools that support the proposed reengineered processes.

**Task 11 [Obstacles to Implementation].** Identify potential obstacles to implementation.

**Task 12 [Process Gaps].** Define gaps between the actual and desired outputs throughout the process.

**Task 13 [Progress Reports].** Provide overall progress reports monthly to the SAG. Provide quarterly progress updates to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the SAG.

**1.7 Overview of Report.** One of the contract requirements for this project was to construct an EPS Process Model (the Statement of Work for this contracted effort is in Appendix A of this report). Chapter 2 discusses the model that was derived from briefing charts, reports, and other documents on the individual components of the EPS. For example, one briefing that the study team obtained had a verbal description of the recruiter selection and training process. The study team translated the verbal description into a model that shows the inputs, outputs, environment, and management controls that affect the process. The study team used other documents, supplemented with information



obtained during interviews, to construct other parts of the EPS process. These separate models were then joined together to form the Core Process Management Model discussed in Chapter 2.

The study team looked for information from two primary sources. The first source of information used by the study team was an extensive amount of information available in published research papers, briefings, and other documents. This information is summarized in Chapter 3. A list of references with pertinent information on the source and other information is included in Appendix C of this report.

The second source of information used by the study team was a series of interviews conducted at organizations that were part of the EPS (the organizations that the study team visited are shown in Appendix E to this report). From these interviews, an extensive set of information was gathered and reduced into 461 observations (which are included in Appendix D of this report). From these observations, a set of insights and recommendations were derived. Chapter 4 presents a discussion on the observations, insights, and recommendations. Each organization that was visited by the study team plays an important role in the EPS, so it was important to obtain sufficient information from the organizations to construct and validate the process model developed in Chapter 2.

The information obtained from the research literature as well as the interview observations provided invaluable information needed to evaluate the present metrics used in the EPS. Chapter 5 of this report provides some information on metrics used by the Army and proposes some for the Navy. Because the project was prematurely terminated, the study team was unable to thoroughly explore the metrics issue. However, the study team was able to conclude that there is an urgent need to establish a single point of contact for EPS data. Several EPS metrics that either need revision or some that need to be initiated are also discussed throughout the report. Again, this information was obtained through the interview process and literature review. End strength of the Navy, for example, is one metric currently being used to evaluate the recruiting effort. However, because end strength is computed on a single day (30 September), several processes are radically changed at that time to help to improve the end strength calculation. This change of process then creates several undesirable results in the EPS. Whereas Chapter 4 discusses this as an EPS issue, Chapter 5 discusses an alternative metric that will reduce the impacts of the presently used metric.


Chapter 6 presents some insights into the resource implications of the EPS. Some of the insights were directly available in the research literature, some were obtained through analyses performed by the study team, and some insights were derived from the interview issues (for example, resource implications due to the effect of EPS attrition became necessary as the study team researched the growing problem of DEP, training, and fleet losses of first term enlistments).

Finally, Chapter 7 presents some conclusions and recommendations. As with the issue development, the recommendations are derived from the organizational interviews and

literature. Each of the issues developed in Chapter 4 have one or more recommendations. However, some of the recommendations in the issues are similar. Accordingly, a smaller set of recommendations is derived by gathering the similar recommendations for the issues into a single recommendation.

## Chapter 2. EPS Process Model

**2.1 Introduction.** The EPS processes are performed by Navy Recruiting Command, Training Command, Operating Forces (e.g., the Fleet), and Policy organizations (Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN), and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as shown in Figure 3 (Source: Navy Recruiting Command Road Show Brief (undated)). The Operating Forces establish the requirements not only for the number of Sailors needed, the skills and ratings, and schedule for the requirements. CNRC's basic mission is to recruit quality men and women to serve in the Navy. The mission of CNET is to train the recruited men and women to required standards and to deliver them to the fleet. The ASN and OSD establish policy to govern recruiting and training in concert with established public law and regulations. The EPS Process Model that will be developed in this chapter expands on the basic command relationship model depicted in Figure 3. This model will concentrate on the processes and the functions performed by the EPS organizations.



**Figure 3. EPS Command Relationships**

The study team developed an input/output model to expand on the relationships between the EPS core processes that are illustrated in Figure 3. To develop the input/output model, several processes had to be evaluated: marketing strategies and research, recruiting (including training and development of recruiters, personnel selection and assignment, recruiter performance evaluation, and management and organization), individual recruit training (including initial entry and advanced individual), and initial assignments. Additionally, environmental conditions such as competition, unemployment, income, and high school graduation rates had to be considered. As indicated in Figure 3, the recruiting processes are also affected by policy, regulations, and

goals. These, too, will be included in the input/output model to give a more complete picture of the Navy EPS.


The purpose of developing such a model was to illustrate EPS relationships and to guide the study team in its collection of information on how well the relationships work and where there may be "organizational friction." In the short amount of time allocated to the study team to develop the model, we could not collect all of the data necessary to develop a predictive model. The Study Team needed to understand how these processes interact (e.g., how outputs of one become inputs to another, what inputs are shared, how environmental considerations affect each process, and what process controls accomplish the transformation of inputs to outputs). To gain such information, the study team conducted a thorough literature search and conducted interviews of individuals involved with the EPS sub processes.

Much of the process information was obtained from the organizations directly concerned with a specific portion of the process. For example, the study team obtained briefings from CNRC on marketing; a Price Waterhouse Cooper study Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Volume I (Final Report); a MEPCOM briefing on selection, classification, and contracting applicants; an RTC training processes; and many other studies dealing with processes. The documents and sources of information are catalogued in Appendix E of this report. Additionally, Chapter 3 of this report gives an overview of some of the references used by the study team.

However, there was no overall process model which tied these separate processes together. In addition, each of the many references used different models, presented results in different formats, and did not consider all of the aspects of the processes being evaluated.

Accordingly, the study team developed an overall process model that is described below. Additionally, this report expands the sub processes using a consistent format. While collecting process information, some actual data were obtained (e.g., the percentage of RTC graduates that go on to various advanced school training). The study team feels that if more of the data on the various processes were available, the model could be expanded to be of use in evaluating various recruiting strategies. Obviously, however, this assumes that future policy will use the present business practices. The results of our interviews and other data collections strongly argue against the use of present business practices.


The core processes (marketing, recruiting, DEP and Accession Scheduling, Initial Training, Follow-on Training, and Initial Assignment) are sub-systems in the overall Core Process Management Model. As shown in Figure 4 below, each sub-system requires certain functions to be performed. For example, Marketing has study, projections, and goal setting functions. Each function, in turn, has processes on how those functions are performed.



**Figure 4. EPS Sub-System Model**

In a few cases, the processes are laid out in formal regulations, but in most cases, the study team found that function processes were very dependent upon the individual (or group of individuals) directly involved with the function. With the high degree of turn over that is experienced in the EPS, it was very difficult to get a good understanding of the process in use. The study team also found that some of the individuals had heavy reliance on briefings prepared by his/her predecessor, meaning that evolution of processes became very difficult given the short term nature of assignments. Because of the difficulty in obtaining the sub-system functions and processes in the time allocated to the study team, we developed a more general Core Process Management Model.

The basic Input/Output model used by the study team is illustrated in Figure 5. The “building blocks” of the model consist of sub-systems, each of which has inputs that are transformed into outputs. The environment and policy affect the transformation of inputs into outputs as represented in Figure 5.



**Figure 5. A Basic Input/Output Model**

The characteristics of the Input/Output Model include:

- Multiple Sub-systems.** Each sub-system can be individually modeled. For example, the EPS consists of several core processes: Marketing, Recruiting, Delayed Entry and Scheduling Training, Basic Training, Follow-on Training, and Initial Recruit Assignment. Actually, these core processes are part of a sub-system that includes functions as well as processes. The tasks in the SOW (in parentheses below) allude to sub-processes: command relationships to policies and procedures (3); accession, initial training, and assignment continuum (5); business practices (8); key business process (9); and organizational relationships (10). The results of a process, in turn, may affect another (e.g., becomes an input or part of the environment of another) process. Some of the processes have built-in process control capabilities (e.g., regulations, goals, and other management control procedures). All of these facets of the process constitute the Process Characteristics.
- Multiple inputs and outputs.** Each sub-system can have multiple inputs, some of which may be the same for several sub-systems. Some outputs may also be inputs to other sub-systems. Inputs, which are controllable by the organization, would include objects such as positions/people, regulations, information, and programs. Outputs could be documents such as regulations and Standard Operating Procedures. Outputs could also be data or information such as recruit production, number of trainees graduated, research conducted, and sailors in DEP.

- **Environmental conditions.** Environmental conditions are not controllable by the process but nevertheless affect the process output. These include economic, education, political, social, demographic, market size, propensity to enlist, quality of market, and competition. The effect of environmental conditions may profoundly affect recruiting. With a record low unemployment rate and higher starting salaries, this environmental variable imposes a very severe negative effect on Navy recruiting. Also, individuals are increasingly less willing to serve. Part of a sub-system itself may deal with ways to minimize or account for environmental conditions. For example, recruiting goals may be assigned on the basis of the amount of unemployment, the number of high school graduates, the median family income, and the number of competitor recruiters in an area. Thus, although the conditions cannot be altered directly, they are accounted for in goal setting or other procedures. Additionally, some of the environmental variables may be influenced. Advertising, for instance, seeks to inform the public about military service and thus, affect the propensity to enlist. Research on the recruiting environment will also help the Navy to understand the market conditions and to develop strategies to exploit or alter market conditions.
- **Functions.** Each sub-system performs specific functions. In the example in Figure 5, some of the Marketing functions might be: performing a marketing study, determining market projections, and goal setting. Functions may be spelled out in Mission and Function Statements, other regulations, or Standard Operating Procedures. Processes are the means used to accomplish functions. Several procedures may be required to perform a single function. For example, the Goal Setting function may require the use of several processes in order to transform the inputs into outputs under the environmental conditions affecting the processes.
- **Processes.** Processes may involve people, organizations, computer systems, and information. Processes are characterized not only by their inputs and outputs, but their command relationships, tools used, and other metrics.


A key part to the model building effort is to identify the process inputs and outputs and to examine how the inputs are effectively and efficiently transformed into outputs. Management may establish goals (an output from some process) to provide the means for determining how well processes are working. These goals must also be reviewed and evaluated in terms of the inputs and outputs to determine if they are consistent with the overall system. For example, recruiting research has shown that time in DEP affects attrition. If the person spends too little time in DEP, attrition in the training base increases. On the other hand, if the person spends too much time in DEP, then DEP attrition increases. Clearly, DEP policy and attrition must be matched to assure that a long-term problem (training base loss) is not created to solve a present problem (accession goals).

**2.2 Core Process Management Model.** The basic Core Process Management Model is shown in Figure 6. The core processes (marketing, recruiting, DEP and Accession Scheduling, Initial Training, Follow-on Training, and Initial Assignment) are displayed in



the center sub-process diagrams with some modification and additions. The processes that affect policy generally are shown above the core process blocks and the environmental processes are shown below the core process blocks.

A Market sub-process block was added since the market is not only an input to the marketing sub-process, it is a very important sub-process as well. Some of the references deal with market research (several studies are summarized in Chapter 3). The core process DEP and accession scheduling consists of several sub-processes (select, classify, and contract; DEP management; and Shipping) that are controlled by two different organizations. Training includes basic training as well as several advanced schools. The initial assignment core process is represented by the Fleet sub-process block.



**Figure 6. Core Process Management Model**

We have added several other sub-process blocks to the model. The Recruiter Selection and Training process (upper left hand side of Figure 6) provides CNRC with its recruiters, an essential part of the EPS. Quota Management and the Enlisted Community Managers (upper right hand side of Figure 6) are processes whose output constitutes recruiting policy and goals. Note also that there are several other policy blocks in the model: Government Rules (which regulate or affect the environment) and Congress and DoD/Navy (which regulates or affect various aspects of the EPS). Finally, an Environment block is included (lower left hand side) to illustrate the role that the

environment plays on the EPS as well as to illustrate that all of the losses from the EPS affects the recruiting environment. We will discuss each of the sub-process blocks in Figure 6 separately in the following sections:

<u>Section</u>	<u>Sub-Model</u>
2.3	Market and Environment
2.4	Marketing
2.5	Recruiting
2.5.1	Recruiting: Qualifying Leads
2.5.2	Recruiting: Prospecting
2.5.3	Recruiting: Missioning
2.5.4	Recruiting: Recruiter Selection and Training
2.6	DEP and Accession Scheduling
2.6.1	Select, Classify, and Contract (Includes Student Test Program)
2.6.2	Delayed Entry Program (DEP)
2.6.3	Ship
2.7	Training
2.7.1	Training: Recruit Training School
2.7.2	Training: Advanced Training Sources
2.7.3	Training: A-School Flow
2.8	Initial Assignment (Fleet)
2.9	Policy (Includes Congress, DoD/Navy, and Government Rules)
2.9.1	Enlisted Community Managers
2.9.2	Quota Management

The presentation of sub-models is by EPS core process (with Market and Environment and Policy added) rather than by organization. It is also important to note that the amount of information available for the sub-processes varied immensely. While a very large amount of information from several sources was available on the Marketing and Recruiting processes, only limited information on several other processes was available. For example, the Ship sub-model (paragraph 2.6.3) was constructed from a USMEPCOM Command Overview Information Briefing and Quota Management (paragraph 2.9.2) was constructed from a Quota Management briefing on selection and classification. As is typical of briefings, there was no narrative accompanying the briefing slides.

One of the EPS core processes, Initial Assignment (represented by Fleet in the Core Process Management Model), has no sub-models since the scope of the contracted effort was changed by the SAG. Since the SAG eliminated this process, no fleet interviews, briefings, or other information was collected on the Initial Assignment process.

Before moving on into the sub-model discussions, one more observation on the overall Core Process Management Model (Figure 6) is in order. That observation concerns the “leakage” in the system. Once a contact is established with a potential enlistee (see the Marketing block), there are many places where losses occur: loss from the Recruiting process, Qualified Not Enlisted (QNE) and Not Qualified from the Select, Classify, and

Contract process, DEP loss, and fleet attrition. Indeed, when the sub-process models are inspected below, the places where losses occur will become even more apparent. We have already indicated that the literature discusses attrition extensively. Our analysis in Chapters 4 and 6 of this report will show that the EPS losses are extensive. These losses are the result of a system that is ineffective and inefficient, according to the interviews that we conducted (and confirmed by literature and our own investigation). We will discuss several recommendations on how to make the system more efficient in Chapter 7 of this report.

**2.3 Market and Environment.** The purpose of including this section in the report is not to try to model the very complex market and recruiting environment. Indeed, our search of the literature indicates that modeling and studies tend to capture the market and environment by inclusion of a few variables (i.e., economic factors such as median family income, several population counts based on race/ethnicity, and social factors such as go-to-college rates). Rather, the purpose of including this section in the report is to acknowledge the importance that the market and environment play in establishing the conditions under which the EPS functions. The enlistment standards set by Congress and the services govern the number of “ineligible” enlistees. For example, high school graduate, height and weight, mental aptitude, moral (felony arrests, convictions, etc.) requirements and/or limitations affect the quality and quantity of individuals that the Military Services can recruit. Retention policies also affect the recruiting and training mission. If retention is high, fewer individuals have to be recruited and trained. Conversely, when retention is lowered (as was the case when the military underwent a significant reduction in the early 1990s), the recruiting mission may be increased. We have commented on some of the findings in the literature on the market and environmental considerations.

**2.4 Marketing Sub-Model.** References: Briefing titled “Marketing Advertising Plans Division,” CNRC, dated 8/4/1999; Navy Advertising and Marketing Briefing titled “Navy Recruiting Advertising Update,” dated 19 September 2000; and Briefing titled “Navy Recruiting Advertising: Overview of Local Advertising and LEADS Division” (undated). The four divisions within CNRC accomplish the following Marketing functions: Advertising, Advertising Operations, Management Systems, and Public Affairs).

Before addressing the Marketing sub-model, several comments on Navy advertising are appropriate. CNRC has recently changed contractors (Campbell-Ewald). The objectives of the incentives-based contract are to:

- Increase Awareness/Favorable Attitudes
- Generate and Process Qualified Leads
- Drive Prospects to Local NRSs
- Place an emphasis on Contractor Performance

The contract is an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity, firm fixed price contract with provisions for expansions when unknown requirements arise. The contract provides for

incentives based on items that are important to Navy Recruiting. Contractor performance is reviewed on a semi-annual basis using objective and subjective incentive metrics as shown below:


Objective Incentive Metrics	Subjective Incentive Metrics
Qualified leads	Customer service and program management
Accession goal attainment	Teamwork, problem-solving, urgency
Accession bank improvements	Innovation and response to change
Brand awareness	6 areas if specialized recruiting concerns
Ad/Slogan/Logo recall	
Target's propensity to join Navy	
Male/female	
General enlisted/general officer	
Major diversity groups	

The subjective and objective, semi-annual, and other evaluations have a weighting scheme that provides the Navy with an overall metric to determine the contractor's performance on a yearly basis. Because so much of the advertising work is conducted by the advertising agency, we could not produce an advertising sub-model. However, according to CNRC, there are five phases that CNRC goes through in developing advertising:

- CNRC provides initial guidance to the advertising agency.
- After the agency develops an initial approach, CNRC receives the recommendations from the agency.
- Develop, staff, and approve the copy.
- The advertising agency produces the actual advertisement.
- The advertising agency places the advertisement (and monitors/collects information on audience reach and frequency of exposure data).

The Navy presently utilizes the following advertising media: Internet, radio, local cable television, national direct mail, local direct mail, national network television, public service television, magazines, newspapers, and promotional/collateral material (e.g., material produced by some other agency such as the Joint Recruiting Advertising Program (JRAP)). In addition to producing awareness about the Navy, a prime purpose of the advertising is to produce leads of individuals that have shown some interest in joining the Navy. These leads may originate from any of the advertising media listed above. Regardless of the source, lead processing is part of the Marketing function discussed next.

The Marketing process sub-model is shown in Figure 7. The enabling part of the marketing process is the Navy Advertising Lead Tracking System (NALTS), which is operated by contract to Marketing Technology Group (MTG). NALTS is a database for all advertising and lead tracking. This system tracks all information on local and national advertising efforts. It also houses the command zip code and Navy Recruiting Stations (NRS) territory information. Navy transitioned to the new NALTS system on minimal functionality on August 10, 2000. MTG also maintains the Navy's ZIP Code/Navy NRS database and performs some ad hoc programming tasks for small projects.



**Figure 7. Marketing Sub-Model**

The Navy uses two other contractors to assist in its marketing process. The Telemarketing Center operations are maintained by Affina and the Fulfillment Center operations are maintained by Hibbert.

Joint Service advertising also produces leads that are handled by the Marketing process. The Joint Recruiting Advertising Program (JRAP) and Joint Market Research Program (JMRP) were created in 1970s to support the military recruiting requirements of the All-Volunteer Force. JRAP is considered to be the DoD “corporate” advertising program. Its mission is to complement Service-specific “brand” advertising by raising and sustaining awareness of military opportunities for prospective enlistees, people who influence youth decisions to enlist, and 12-16 year-old youth (pre-prospects). With Service concurrence, the JRAP target markets for Fiscal Years 2000-2001 are influencers and pre-prospects. JMRP’s mission is to acquire, analyze and disseminate information on recruiting markets (prospects, influencers, pre-prospects) to OSD and the Services for use in their military recruiting and advertising programs. JMRP also manages studies in support of military recruiting.

Each of the 31 NRDs has a Leads Production Team (LPT) that performs the following functions:

- Local advertising planning and placement
- Process names on the leads list
- Track local advertising/postage expenditures
- Maintain automated LEAD tracking ZIP database
- Process direct mail
- Phone watch

Regardless of the source of a lead, it is sent to the NALTS database. The lead is screened and an appropriate response is dictated by a computer algorithm. Qualified leads are sent


to R-TOOLS for the appropriate recruiter to follow-up at the local level. The next section discusses how a recruiter processes and a lead that has been screened and qualified. An essential part of the process is periodic follow-ups by the appropriate recruiter.

Note from the Marketing sub-model that the Recruiting Stations obtain information from two sources, both of which are generated by NALTS: the first is R-Tools and the second is a daily consolidated lead file. From this lead file, the Fulfillment Center takes action if appropriate and a Prospect Card (P-Card) is sent to the appropriate recruiter. Note also that in addition to advertising media generated leads, Personally Developed Contact (PDC) leads also may enter the system through an individual recruiter. This information is also made part of NALTS and becomes part of the daily updates and reports that NALTS generates.

According to the Advertising and Marketing Division, there is a feeling that the better quality leads are coming from the Internet. These leads are also doubling each year. In FY 2000, 370,685 leads were generated, with 112,000 leads coming from the Internet, resulting in 21,000 contracts.

**2.5 Recruiting Sub-Models.** There are four sub-models discussed in this section: Qualifying Leads, Prospecting, Missioning, and Recruiter Selection and Training.

**2.5.1 Recruiting: Qualifying Leads Sub-Model.** References: Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Volume I (Final Report), Price Waterhouse Cooper and CNRC Navy Recruiting Command Road Show Brief (Undated). The process sub-model is shown in Figure 8.




**Figure 8. Recruiting: Qualifying Leads Sub-Model**

Leads can be received by the individual recruiter from two sources: a new lead can be delivered by the NALTS (through R-Tools with a computer-generated P-Card through the mail) or a Personally Developed Contact (PDC), walk-in, or referral. If the source of

the lead is NALTS, the recruiter enters the appropriate information into NALTS. The recruiter checks to assure that the lead does not duplicate any that he/she is working on and organizes the lead list into a schedule of activities that will be taken. If the source of a lead is NALTS, there may be required action that the recruiter has to take (e.g., a periodic update or contact).

The recruiter attempts to contact someone from each lead received. If possible, the recruiter tries to directly contact the eligible prospect. If the eligible prospect is not available, the recruiter attempts to get alternate points of contact such as a parent, other relative, or friend. The recruiter updates the working list and provides feedback on the disposition to the NALTS via R-Tools. If the recruiter makes contact, the prospecting process is initiated to provide more specific information on the lead.

**2.5.2 Recruiting: Prospecting Sub-Model.** References: Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Volume I (Final Report), Price Waterhouse Cooper and Navy Recruiting Manual-Enlisted (COMNAVCRUITCOMIST 1130.8F). The prospecting sub-model is presented in Figure 9.



**Figure 9. Recruiting: Prospecting Sub-Model**

The Navy Recruiting Manual-Enlisted provides the recruiter with an immense amount of information on recruiting. Chapter Two of the Recruiting Manual spells out the basic enlistment eligibility requirements and covers the first essential step of prospecting: Blueprinting. Since specific eligibility requirements must be met before an applicant can be considered qualified for enlistment (i.e., age, citizenship, Social Security number, high school graduation, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), number of dependents, physical, and civil requirements), the Blueprinting process is essential for the recruiter to determine the likelihood of a candidate to meet the enlistment eligibility requirements. Recruiters are guided in determining a candidate's eligibility by information obtained



from interviews, administering a prescreening mental test (e.g., the ASVAB pre-test), military records (if the candidate had prior military service), the Electronic Personal Security Questionnaire (EPSQ) and records check, and the Applicant Medical Prescreen.

After a successful Blueprinting, the recruiter will try to get an appointment to obtain further information or proceed directly into a session to obtain further information on the applicant. At several points, the applicant can simply terminate the process, fail to make appointments, show no interest in the Navy, or fail some particular requirement. If the applicant fails some specific requirement, there may be a waiver policy that the recruiter can use to get the applicant qualified (the Recruiting Manual informs the recruiter of the waiver policy and authorities).


At each stage of the process, the recruiter obtains additional information that will help to get the candidate ready for the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) appointment. The MEPS process will be discussed later.

It is important to note that the recruiter assesses the prospect's eligibility to enlist and discusses options available to the candidate. The recruiter is trying to sell the Navy, but does not sell a particular program or rating (these functions are performed by the Counselors as part of the Selection, Classification, and Contracting process). The recruiter is also preparing pre-enlistment documents (kit) and schedules the prospect for MEPS processing (ASVAB, Physical, Classification, Contract)

Once the prospect goes through the Selection, Classification, and Contracting process, the recruiter's focus changes to DEP management, which will be discussed later. The purpose of DEP management is to keep the contracted individual interested in Navy service until the date of accession arrives and to help the individual gain more understanding about the Navy and what will be experienced in basic training and other Navy assignments.

**2.5.3 Recruiting: Missioning Sub-Model.** Reference: CNRC (Code 3512) Point Paper dated 23 January 2001, SUBJECT: Enlisted Goaling Process Overview. The sub-model is shown in Figure 10.

According to the reference, CNRC's enlisted goaling process is a highly interactive and well-defined process. The process participants at the Navy Recruiting Districts, Regions, and national level make significant contributions to the success of the process. The process begins with a forecast of the New Contract Attainment (NCA) of Male High School Degree Graduate (HSDG) Mental Category I-III A (those individuals that score above the mean on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)). These recruits are considered to be supply constrained whereas the other NCA categories are demand constrained (public law limits the number of Mental Category IV, the lowest acceptable score).



**Figure 10. Recruiting: Missioning Sub-Model**

The mission (or goal) for each Navy Recruiting District (NRD) is determined using the following process:

- CNRC determines the national NCA objective based on current DEP position, Navy accession requirements, and the forecast of new contract production.
- Using demographic, econometric, recruiter resources, and new contract production, CNRC forecasts NCA for each NRD. These forecasts are then aggregated to the next-higher command, the Regions. This results in the production of a new contract forecast.
- Forecasting the different categories of recruits (non-prior service, Male HSDG I-III, Female HSDG I-III, etc.) at the NRD level requires the use of four factors. Two factors, Recruiter Manning and Population are forward looking. Another, DoD Accessions, consists of historical data. The fourth, production, is a combination of both future and historical data.
- Projected number of recruiters represents the factor with the most inaccuracy, accounting for a significant part of the forecast error. Historically, some NRDs are chronically over manned while others are under manned.
- CNRC builds a consensus with the Regions on issues such as potential market, available resources, and forecasted new contract production and assigns each Region a goal for new contract accessions.
- The Region recruiting missions are provided to the Operational Analysis Branch, which distributes the official Region goals in a letter (COMNAVRUITCOM 1131 and Goal Planning Matrix).
- For each Region, CNRC recommends NRD goals as well. Each Region uses a different approach to allocate the Region goal down to the NRDs. The approaches could take one or more of the following:
  - Use the recommended CNRC goals.
  - Use a multiple model approach.
  - Use the Standardized Territory Evaluation and Analysis for Management (STEAM) model (we will comment on STEAM below).

■ Use a District consensus approach.


The study team evaluated the STEAM manual. Our findings indicate that it is a very simplistic model that uses various simple weighted averages to break the mission down using historical data. While this approach may be useful as a gross allocation tool, it has, in the opinion of the study team, some good capabilities as well as several deficiencies:

- A good market rule is to support the customer base by spending effort and resources against the best market to ensure their continued production. STEAM appears to do that very well. New markets and growth areas, however, would present some formidable problems with the model since there would be a lack of data and the model would tend to drive the results to markets that have been successful in the past.
- Accession history is only from the previous year. This could mask trends either up or down. It could also amplify anomalies from the previous year.
- The system lacks a formal feedback/evaluation loop to see how assignments have worked out.
- The system uses "All Services" accession data in its calculations. Whereas this might account for the competition, it fails to account for Navy success or failure.
- According to the manual, all RINC's are considered to be production recruiters. However, our interviews indicate that many RINC's have no or very low production requirements. The inclusion of RINC's in the count of on board recruiters will cause the results to be off.
- The model does not allow for any analysis of what is happening in the NRD as far as changing demographics, economic shifts, etc.
- The one-year horizon does not allow for strategic planning for development of a given NRD.

We also note that our discussions with the Head of Research indicate that STEAM is being considered for revision. At the time of the preparation of this report, we were not aware of any model specifications.

**2.5.4 Recruiting: Recruiter Selection and Training Sub-Model.** References SNAPSHOT – A Look at the Process, Policies, and People With Recommendations, Scott Slocum, 17 April 2000 and Navy Recruiting Command Road Show Brief (Undated).

As indicated in the Core Process Management Model (Figure 6), all Navy recruiters originate from Sailors that have completed at least one tour in the Navy (e.g., the Fleet). The selection and training processes have been designed to assure that individuals selected for recruiting duty have been properly screened to assure that they represent the U.S. Navy in an appropriate manner and that their training provides the best capability that can be imparted in the time available for training. The recruiter selection, training, and advancement to CRF processes are illustrated in Figure 11.



**Figure 11. Recruiter Selection and Training Sub-Model**

The Recruiter Selection Team (RST) plays a very important role in the selection process. These RSTs were established and began their official duty in March 1998. The teams consist of CRF and recruiter detailers with the following duties and responsibilities:

- Interact with current selection and detailing process.
- Interface with the Navy Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) to identify potential volunteers.
- Provide Fleet Concentration Area Presentations to prospective candidates.
- Meet with shore eligible E-4s to E-6s in detailing window.
- Interview and Pre-screen volunteers for the following criteria:
  - No drug problems
  - No alcohol problems
  - No financial problems
- Brief classes of individuals about to separate from the Service to find recruiting volunteers who would otherwise separate.
- Review challenges/benefits of recruiting duty and provide information to commanders, potential recruiters, and other interested personnel.

RSTs are firmly established in permanent offices in San Diego, Norfolk, and Hawaii. Fleet Commanding Officer support of RST efforts is crucial to the long-term success of obtaining sufficient numbers of interested recruiter candidates.

If a candidate fails the pre-screen, he/she is returned to the (Fleet) detailers for assignment (or separation). The selection process stresses Navy appearance heavily. Accordingly, the next step in the process is the Commanding Officer's screen for the following attributes:

- Positive attitude
- Body fat standards
- Excessive tattoos/skin disorders

Following the Commander's screen and recommendation, the candidates are screened for medical conditions, problems concerning the individual, the individual's immediate family members, and finance difficulties. To aid the Commanding Officer in the certification process, all of these procedures are outlined in Chapter 11 of the Enlisted Transfer Manual. The RSTs are also available to assist the Commander in the screening and certification of recruiter candidates.

With the pre-screen and commander certification completed, the recruiter candidate's application goes to a Selections Board. Here, too, the RSTs have input and directly influence the ultimate selection of those individuals that will be selected to attend recruiter school. The RST works with the Detailers in writing orders. At this point, the screening and selection process ceases and the recruiter training process begins.

The recruiter candidate reports to the Navy Recruiter Orientation Unit (NORU) in Pensacola, Florida to attend the 25-day Navy Recruiter Orientation Course. The course has been designed to achieve the following training objectives:

- Foster cooperation and teamwork
- Provide role playing and problem solving concepts that are built upon each week.
- Provide training in the following areas:
  - Sales
  - Processing
  - Administration
  - Navy Standards
  - Recruiter Ethics and Prohibited Practices
  - Marketing
  - Leadership
  - Other, including: Public speaking, recruiter incentives, quality of life issues, financial awareness, and Recruiter Tools (R-Tools) computer software.

Approximately seven to eleven percent of the candidates fail to complete the course and are returned to the Fleet. The majority of the candidates that complete their training are assigned to a NRD, which assigns the individual to a recruiting station. The new recruiters are expected to complete Personal Qualification Standards (PQS) training within the first year following assignment. Failure to complete PQS or to perform satisfactorily results in reassignment to the Fleet.

After serving in a field recruiting capacity for at least 4 to 6 months, the recruiter is sent to a one-week Recruiter Refresher Training at the Recruit Training Center. This provides an interface among recruiters and between CNRC & RTC.

The NORU Commanding Officer serves under the Commander of the Navy Command and the organization is part of CNRC (not CNET). This enables the organization to provide CNRC with direct recruiting support of rapidly changing recruiting training issues. The NORU mission is:

- Enhance overall recruiting effectiveness and productivity through training.
- Provide initial, formal classroom-based training.
  - Recruiting and recruiting support.
  - Approximately 2500-3000 students per year.
  - 180-270 students onboard any given week.
- Field training (and formerly assessment).
- Refresher training.
- Life-cycle training (e.g., professional development).
- Leadership development (for example, for the CRF).
- Formulate and administer training policy, as delegated/directed by CNRC.


Some of the courses presented at NORU include: Enlisted Recruiter Training Academy (ENRA), Navy Recruiting Leadership Academy (NRLA), Enlisted Programs Officer (EPO) Course, Officer Programs Officer (OPO) Course, Officer Recruiter (OR) Course, Recruiter in Charge (RINC) Course, Career Recruiter Force Academy, Career Recruiter Force Academy (CRFA), Career Recruiter Force Continuum (CRFC), Chief Recruiter (CR) Course, Enlisted Processing Division Supervisor (EPDS), Enlisted Processing Assistant (EPA) Course, and Classifier Course.

NORU also maintains the National Training Team (NTT), which provides production and production support to CNRC; facilitates standardization of training policies, procedures, best business practices; keeps the "schoolhouse" current with field issues and assists in special projects for CNRC staff.

For the successful recruiters there is a chance to be selected for the Career Recruiter Force. Although there is supposed to be a formal training program for the CRFs, there are several hundred field CRFs with no formal training. Once selected and assigned to the CRF, the individual will continue to receive assignments with recruiter responsibilities until retirement or discharged from the Navy. It is possible for an individual to return to the fleet having been in the CRF.

**2.6 DEP and Accession Scheduling Sub-Models.** There are three sub-models discussed in this section: Select, Classify, and Contract; Delayed Entry Program; and Ship.

**2.6.1 Select, Classify, and Contract Sub-Model.** References: Navy Recruiting Manual-Enlisted (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8F) and USMEPCOM Command Overview briefing dated 14 November 2000. The Select, Classify, and Contract Sub-Model is shown in Figure 12.



**Figure 12. Recruit Select, Classify, Contract Sub-Model**

The Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery is a multiple aptitude test sponsored by the DoD and regulated by the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM). There are two versions of the ASVAB: production and student. The Navy uses the production ASVAB solely to test individuals specifically applying for enlistment. MEPS personnel at a MEPS site or a Mobile Examining Team (MET) administer and schedule only the current generation of the test. USAMEPCOM offers the Student ASVAB at no cost to secondary and post-secondary school students. Upon completion of the test, student scores are returned to the school counselors for use in curriculum planning, vocational and career counseling, and group assessment. Students receive descriptions of the subtest results and information concerning composite aptitude scores. The program also provides recruiters with access to the high school market and pre-qualified recruiting leads. When authorized by the school, MEPS provides recruiters the names, addresses, future plans, and classification scores concerning students tested in grades 11 and above.

USMEPCOM conducts several programs that administer the ASVAB to high school students. One of those programs is the Student Test Program (STP), which is administered to high school juniors and seniors. STP also contains a computerized career inventory questionnaire that allows a student to evaluate his/her career opportunities relative to mental abilities. As shown in Figure 12, the score that the student achieves on the STP can be used by a candidate to enable the candidate to bypass the Enlisted Testing Program or the student may elect to take the ASVAB over in the hopes of achieving a higher score. Students may retake the ASVAB because some Navy enlistment choices require higher ASVAB scores.

With the completion of the mental testing, the successful candidate proceeds to the Medical Occupational Examination. Some of the medical tests administered at the MEPS are: color perception, orthodontic review (retainer appliances or braces are not qualified for active duty), medical history (including allergies and seizure disorders), HIV antibody



screen, drug and alcohol test, physical fitness tests (which include height/weight screen and body fat test), and psychiatric/mental health history. If any anomalies are detected, the applicant may see a consultant for further examinations and tests or be referred for a service waiver. Each service essentially has the ability to waive many of the conditions. We will discuss waivers later in this section.

After the candidate completes the physical examination, he/she goes to the Service Liaison for further processing and records checks. Although the Navy Liaison Office is co-located at the MEPS, the office is under the command of CNRC. The Navy Liaison Office conducts a quality control review of the enlistment documents and performs the following functions:

- Administers specialty exams (e.g., typing)
- Processes enlistment and program waivers
- Provides an interface between MEPS and Navy in all processing matters
- Interviews prospect enlistee to insure accuracy of enlistment documents
- Prepares the prospect for the classification interview

As was discussed in the Recruit Prospecting sub-model and this sub-model, enlistment screening required at several points in the enlistment process since standards are of great concern to the Navy. While it would be desirable to enlist only those with no police record, no underage drinking, and no drug usage (which research shows have the highest payoff and fewest service-related problems), they are not available in the numbers required to meet accession requirements. The Navy, like the Army, Air Force and Marines, requires enlistment waivers for offenses with a conviction or other adverse adjudication. Navy Recruiting has policies in place for moral screening thousands of applicants in order to enlist those with a high probability of success.

The applicant is required to complete several forms that are used at various phases of the enlistment process for screening purposes. The SF-86 Personnel Security Questionnaire has the following uses:

- Documents police involvement and alcohol and drug abuse
- Used for in-depth interviews by recruiting processing personnel
- Used for MEPS Entrance National Agency (ENTNAC) Pre-Enlistment Interview (PEI)

The Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Screening Certificate has the following uses:

- Documents alcohol and drug abuse
- Explains the Navy's Zero Tolerance Policy

The Navy, like the Army and Marines, requires enlistment waivers for offenses with a conviction or other adverse adjudication. The Navy moral standards are in many cases more stringent than those of the Army and Marine Corps. Some examples of the differences in Service waiver requirements are:

- The Navy requires a waiver for 1 non-minor misdemeanor, while the Army does not (e.g., assault and battery, DUI, breaking and entering, theft under \$500).
- The Navy waives up to 2 non-minor misdemeanors, while the Army waives up to 4, and the Marine Corps waives up to 5.

- The Navy waives up to 5 minor misdemeanors, Marine Corps waives up to 9, and the Army has no maximum waivable number (e.g., disorderly conduct, minor in possession of alcohol, and vandalism).
- The Army requires drug waivers only for convictions for drug offenses.

Enlistment waivers are required for:

- Excessive traffic offenses (6+ in 1 year or 10+ in 3 years)
- 3 to 5 minor misdemeanors (e.g. disorderly conduct, loitering, simple assault/fighting . . .)
- 1 or 2 non-minor misdemeanors (e.g. shoplifting, assault and battery, DUI . . .)
- Any felony
- 2 or more alcohol-related offenses, self admitted use of illegal drugs other than marijuana, and past dependency on alcohol or drugs.

The “whole person” concept is used to evaluate applicants. Waiver approval has been delegated by CNRC to various levels of command, depending on the situation:

- CNRC review for felony, 2 DUI, and alcohol/drug dependency waivers.
- NRD Commander review for all other moral waivers for HSDGs.
- Recruiting Area Commander review for other moral waivers for non-HSDGs.

Once a candidate reaches the completion of the Navy Liaison Office review, if the candidate does not complete the enlistment process, the loss is referred to as “Qualified Not Enlisted” (QNE).

The candidate progresses to the Navy classifier who conducts a further quality control review of enlistment documents and performs the following functions:

- Interviews prospect for motivation and interests
- Offers Navy enlistment programs, ratings and incentives based on the prospects interests, qualifications and the needs of the Navy
- Prepares enlistment contract with guaranteed training and incentives
- Completes the enlistment contract

The candidate is given the opportunity for a Clean Slate “mini-Moment of Truth” at DEP-in and on ship day. The Select, Classify, and Contract process is completed when an individual is administered the oath of enlistment and either enters the Delayed Entry Program or “Direct Ships” to Basic Training. An individual takes the oath when the enlistee (“DEP in”) and takes the same oath when he/she goes on active duty in the Armed Forces. At the time that the individual is sworn into the DEP, the individual signs the first page of DD Form 4. This states that the applicant will return by the date listed for enlistment into the regular component of the Armed Forces. The period in the DEP is not creditable for pay purpose, but is counted toward any military obligation or commitment. When the applicant returns to ship, the oath of enlistment is administered and the rest of the DD Form 4 is completed and signed. This legally binds the applicant under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to the Service joined. The exception is if the individual is “same day processor” or a “Direct Ship.”

**2.6.2 Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Sub-Model.** References: Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Volume I (Final Report), Price Waterhouse Cooper; Navy Recruiting Manual – Enlisted (COMNAVCRUITCOMIST 1130.8F, Chapter 6: Delayed Entry Program); and The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of the Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training, John Dennis Nell, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998. The Delayed Entry Program Sub-Model is shown in Figure 13 (next page).


Delayed entry is the military status gained by enlistment into the Ready Reserve with the active duty or initial training postponed for up to one year. There are two types of delayed entry: Active Component Delayed Entry Program and Reserve Component Delayed Entry Into Training (DET). DEP/DET enlistment of non-prior service applicants in the U.S. Naval Reserve is effective for a period of eight years.

The Navy Recruiting Manual – Enlisted stresses that if a member of DEP refuses to ship, “recruiters will not address the issue of possible disciplinary consequences for failure to report to active duty, nor will the DEP member be told that it is Navy policy to order or force an unwilling member to recruit training or to any other form of active or reserve duty.” The manual describes methods for discharging individuals from the Navy Reserve following contacts with the DEP member to affirm the individual's desires and to re-motivate the individual “in a professional manner – free of coercion or intimidation.” The procedures generally also put specific timelines for any procedure (not just discharge) regarding DEP individuals.

Since the Recruiting Manual deals mostly with DEP discharges and other administrative changes, the study team turned to the Price Waterhouse Coopers report to model some of the key DEP functions. As shown in Figure 13, once an individual has been assigned to the DEP by the MEPS, according to Standard Operating Procedures, the recruiter must indoctrinate the individual within 72 hours. There are also requirements for the recruiter to make contacts with the individual to assure that the individual intends to ship on the contracted date. These contacts include phone contacts, face-to-face contacts, DEP meetings, and written correspondence.

The recruiter has to review the DEP on a monthly basis. The recruiter will use the contacts with DEP members to prepare a monthly certification of the status of everyone in the DEP. When changes to eligibility (which could be caused by the individual expressing a desire to drop out of DEP or change a job rating, receipt of information that negatively affects the security clearance, changes in training programs, etc.), the recruiter has to complete a DEP action report. The Recruiting Manual deals with the process of obtaining waivers, discharge, and obtaining a new job rating.

The study team also reviewed a study of DEP effectiveness based on a survey of Fiscal Year 1997 RTC Basic Training students. Chapter 3 of this report includes a summary of some recent literature on the DEP. According to the study, the average DEP time is 4.5 months.



**Figure 13. Delayed Entry Program Sub-Model**

The Navy has a program called Personal Qualification Standards (PQS) that is designed to effectively train and prepare individuals in the DEP for the rigors of basic training. However, with the average time in the DEP for each recruit being 4.5 months, there is not much training that can be accomplished. DEP participation is a key factor in predicting attrition. That point has been brought up many times in the literature. However, studies do not look into what the DEP training program did to prepare recruits for basic training. Some of the findings of the reference report include:

- 55% did not use DEP PQS while in DEP.
- 20% did not know if they used it or not.
- 65% of those who used the DEP PQS completed very little to none.
- Military drill, military rank and recognition, naval uniforms, and customs and courtesies were not taught to the majority of recruit. (39%-62%).
- 69% of unsuccessful trainees had not used DEP PQS.
- 53% of successful trainees had used the DEP PQS.
- 60% of unsuccessful trainees said that the DEP had not prepared them for basic training.
- 61% of DEP individuals agreed that the DEP could have prepared them better.


According to the referenced report, studies conducted over the past 15 years have considered the importance of DEP in lowering the probability of attrition, yet none have looked any further at what actually goes on in the DEP. However, part of the difficulty with having a DEP training program is that many DEP individuals are attending high school or have recently graduated. In the survey data sample, the average hours worked per week was over 33 hours, hence giving up work time to attend unpaid DEP meetings

is costly for individuals in the DEP. Another very important limitation of DEP training is that the Navy cannot force recruits to be “ready” for basic training.

The referenced study has the following conclusions:

- Training is not being conducted in the DEP.
- DEP PQS is not being utilized as a primary training guide.
- Over one third of sample indicated they were not told what to expect at basic training.
- One third of recruits felt that DEP did not prepare them basic training.

**2.6.3 Ship Sub-Model.** Reference USMEPCOM Command Overview briefing dated 14 November 2000. The shipping process is illustrated in Figure 14.



**Figure 14. Ship Sub-Model**

The recruit that is being readied to ship to basic training reports to the MEPS for a review of records, physical inspection, and the administering of the oath. The individual's records are inspected by the Navy Service Liaison (which is part of CNRC). If something happened (or something was discovered) between the last records check at the MEPS and the shipping date, a waiver may be required. The Navy Service Liaison is responsible for processing the waiver request.


MEPS personnel administer a physical inspection, which also includes a review of medical records. A final pre accession screening is given to the individual's records and the individual is sworn into the active duty and shipped to the Recruit Training Center for basic training.

**2.7 Training Sub-Models.** There are three sub-models discussed in this section: Recruit Training School, Advanced Training Sources, and A-School Flow.

**2.7.1 Training: Recruit Training School Sub-Model.** References: RTC Transportation Study: Summary Process Description dated 24 April 2000 and Navy Recruiting Command Road Show Brief (Undated).

The Recruit Training Center Basic Training sub-model is shown in Figure 15. The basic mission of RTC is to screen and equip the incoming recruits (in-processing) and provide training consisting of Shipboard Orientation, Military Orientation, and Physical Conditioning. The basic training sub-model consists of in-processing, recruit training, classification, order writing, and transportation and out-processing. The in-processing time at RTC is referred to as "P-days. Training time is designated by the week and day of training (e.g., day of training (DOT) 4-2 is the second day of the fourth week). As shown in lower portion of Figure 15, recruit losses (resulting in interrupted instruction hold or discharge from the Navy) occur throughout the process. RTC has instituted several remedial programs to lessen the attrition throughout basic training. We will discuss the sub-processes of the RTC model below (using Figure 15).

RTC can accommodate 16,168 shippers in a ten-week period, but they must be spread out appropriately. Divisions occupy space from the night their recruits arrive until the division graduates. On graduation day, a new division can occupy the compartment. Each division has 96 recruits, with three Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) to allow for 24-hour coverage. Since there are no extra RDCs, they frequently work 12-hour or longer shifts when one of them is not available for duty.



**Figure 15. Basic Training Sub-Model**

The number of shippers that RTC can accommodate depends on the number of divisions already occupying birthing space, so it varies from day to day as shippers arrive and graduations occur. The forming of new divisions is also limited by staff, schedule, and facilities requirements.

**In-processing.** In-processing is the first major process that the recruit encounters at Basic Training. The in-processing is done in the first week of basic. These days are referred to as “P-days” (processing days). The “P-days” consist of the following in-processing activities:

- P-A day – Arrival Day.
- P-R day – Receiving Day (first uniform issue, Montgomery GI Bill brief, life insurance brief, and banking brief)
- P-1 day – Principally medical and dental screening
- P-2 day – Shots, completion of medical and dental, and certification that the recruit is fit for duty
- P-3 day – Administration
- P-4 day – Division form-up day

The schedule for night that the recruit arrives at RTC (usually between 6:00 and 11:00 P.M.) includes the following activities:

- Welcome aboard brief (Rules/Regulations while at RTC)
- 5 minute call to let significant others know they are safe
- Ditty Bag issue (personal hygiene items, running shoes etc.)
- Urinalysis
- Turned over to Recruit Division Commander (RDC)
- Recruit sleep time

The schedule for P-A day includes the following activities:

- 0315 Reveille
- 0400 In line for morning breakfast
- 0530 Height, Weight check and Psychiatric Evaluation Test
- 0630 Haircuts
- 0730 Moment of Truth at RTC (and drug screening within 72 hrs). Recruits revealing undisclosed items or making allegations pulled for one-on-one interviews. Those flagged by psychiatric testing are sent to be evaluated.
- 1030 Lunch (sack lunch)
- 1130-1530 First medical screening
- 1530 Recruits turned over to RDC's, assigned barracks, berthing, RDC in-brief

The recruit must take a drug test within 72 hours of arrival at RTC. During P-A day, the recruit takes a urinalysis test and then goes through the Moment of Truth (MOT) interview process. Those recruits that successfully complete the MOT screening move on to uniform issue. By that time the results of the urinalysis test are available. If the drug test results are negative, the recruit goes through a check to see if he/she is still medically/dental qualified to remain in Navy. If still medically/dental qualified, the recruit proceeds to week 1, day 1 of recruit training. . Recruits with special program guarantees (i.e., Nuclear Field, Cryptology, Electronic Warfare, Information Specialist) are separated from the rest of the group and sent to their respective program managers.

In-processing gets complicated for the recruit that fails any of the checkpoints. If the



recruit fails MOT or a screen discloses that the recruit is morally or medically disqualified, the recruit can only continue if a moral or medical waiver is granted. Failure to receive a required waiver or a positive result from the urinalysis test leads to a recommendation for entry-level separation. Once the recommendation for entry-level separation is made, the recruit can only continue if the recommendation is overturned. Otherwise, the recruit is discharged from the Navy.

Moment of Truth (MOT) is a very important part of the quality assurance process that takes place during the recruit's first day at boot camp. A CNRC Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) representative gives a 20-30 minute presentation to a group of newly arrived recruits about the importance of accurate and complete disclosure in the Personnel Service Record (PSR). The recruits are then provided with the opportunity to disclose additional information or correct known errors or inaccuracies in the PSR. For those who disclose errors or prior non-disclosed problems on their PSR, a MOT review is conducted by the RQAT. About twenty percent of the recruits go to the RQAT review process with about fifty percent of these going on to a formal, one-on-one interview with an RQAT member. Information on all interviewees is entered into an internal RQAT database (ACCESS) with follow-up action/results.

In FY99, of the 10% of recruits that actually underwent a formal MOT interview, 71% required only additional documentation, 21% needed enlistment or program waivers, and the remaining 8% were discharged from the Navy. For the majority of discharges, the reason was non-disclosure of drug usage and police problems, with a small percentage discharged due to dependency problems.

Since RQAT has the same waiver authority as the Commanding Officer of a Navy Recruiting District, most waivers are immediately addressed. About 15% of the cases require waiver approval from higher authority. Only 2% of recruits that were interviewed during MOT actually are found still fit for Navy duty, but no longer eligible for the original guaranteed program. These recruits must be reclassified on 4-2 Day of Training (DOT). A large percentage of recruits (32%) that were interviewed during MOT are referred to medical or psychiatric evaluation.

RTC has developed several remedial programs to deal with recruit deficiencies that normally resulted in separation from the service. These programs include: Fundamental Applied Skills Training, Academic Capacity Enhancement, Physical Training prior to the start of recruit training (PT-0), and Personal Applied Skills Streaming.

FAST is designed for students with an ASVAB verbal expression (VE) score of 42 or lower, double academic failure, or ship's officer referral. It provides remedial academic skills training in reading, language, and mathematics. The average class size is 50 males and 3 females. The average length of the class is 10 days, but the length varies from 7 to 28 days, depending on the individual's performance. Recruits with a VE score of 42 or less are pulled from their division on the first day of training (referred to as 1-1 day) and will remain in the program until it is successfully completed. Upon completion, the

recruits are placed in the next division forming up. This means that the boot camp stay is extended by the amount of time required to successfully complete the course.

The ACE program is designed to enhance a non-high school graduate recruit's academic ability. It provides training in goal setting, decision-making, and different modes of adult learning. The average class size is 32 males and 3 females. The course length is one week. All recruits with a High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3) education code ending in the following codes are required to attend the course:

- 1 = NHSDG/HP3
- 7 = HSG/HP3 (Correspondence School, Independent Study)
- C = HSG/HP3 (Occupational program certificate)
- E = HSG/HP3 (GED)
- J = HSG/HP3 (High School certificate of attendance)

Recruits attend the one-week ACE between P-4 day and 1-1 day. Upon completion of the course, the recruit is joined with next company that starts basic training. This adds one week to the recruit's basic training time.

In addition to FAST and ACE, RTC has several physical fitness tests and milestones that must be achieved before the recruit is allowed to progress. PT-0 is administered on P-3 day. Additionally, the recruit must pass PT-2 before going on to the culminating exercise called Battle Stations. If the recruit does not pass PT-2 prior to his/her departure date, the recruit is sent to a Physical Fitness Training Unit (PFTU) until successful completion or a determination is made that the recruit cannot pass the test. The PTFU provides focused remedial fitness training and identifies problem-training areas.

PT-0 is a baseline fitness test. Medical and physical fitness screening is completed on P-3 day of training. Recruits who fail this screening enter the program on 1-2 day of training. PT-0 is designed to target recruits at risk for PT failure or sports related medical injuries by offering preventive remedial training. The average PT-0 class size is 33 males and 20 females. The length of training is between seven and twenty-one days. The PT test consists of the following:

- Sit – Reach (passing score required)
- Push-ups (Satisfactory score required)
- Sit-ups (Satisfactory score required)
- 1 ½ mile run (Satisfactory score required)

Each recruit must score satisfactory in each area above. Satisfactory is determined by current active duty requirements for the recruits age/gender group. If a recruit fails the medical pre screen or any portion of test, they enter the PT-0 Remedial Fitness Unit (RFU), which is designed to increase the aerobic base/fitness level. The recruit will remain in a hold status until deemed to be fit to return to training. The schedule of training while in the RFU is as follows:

- Monday, Wednesday, and Friday
  - Aerobic base run/walk
  - 30 minute aerobic walk

- Tuesday and Thursday
  - Strength and conditioning
  - 30 min aerobic walk

Unlike FAST, ACE, and PT-0, the PASS is an on-going process of identification of recruits with deficient coping skills. PASS deals with awareness, beliefs, purpose in life, making personal choices, personal power, and service to others. Once a recruit is determined to need to develop better coping skills, recruits are recommended to PASS by the Ship's Officer. PASS teaches the following skills:

- Anger Management Skills
- Emotional Coping Skills
- Self Esteem Skills
- Social Skills (dealing with cultural diversity)

The average PASS class size is 24 males and 2 females. The length of program is six days. Upon entering the program, recruits are placed on a one-week hold and rolled back into a new division upon successful completion. After it is determined that no other training technique will correct the deficient coping skill, the recruit is recommended for PASS. Some of the reasons for a recruit being assigned to PASS include:

- Refusal to train, disruptive behavior
- Low self-esteem or lack of motivation
- Poor anger management or dealing with authority
- Inability to deal with cultural diversity

**Training.** Throughout the military training courses, the recruit learns a number of battle skills. Battle Stations, the grand finale of basic training, combines all of the training conducted in into one evolution. Battle Stations must be completed for the recruit to graduate from basic training. It is conducted in the recruit's eighth week of training. To be eligible to graduate from Battle Stations, the recruit must have passed a number of training milestones, including:

- Must be 3<sup>rd</sup> class swimmer,
- Pass PT-2,
- Pass academic test 4, and
- Pass gun qualification.

Recruits who fail Battle Stations are placed in a Battle Stations Hold Unit, which provides remedial fitness training for recruits. Battle Stations must be completed by the day of departure from basic training. After three unsuccessful attempts to pass Battle Stations, recruits are processed for possible separation. There are two phases of the remedial training (referred to as "Prequal").

- Prequal Phase I and Phase II are conducted Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.
- Prequal I consists of a 1.5 mile run conducted in full Battle Station gear with tennis shoes.
- Prequal II consists of a 1.5 mile run conducted in full Battle Station gear with boots.

- Upon completion of Phase II, recruits are scheduled to run the next available Battle Stations.

RTC has other remedial and special care programs for recruits. The Non-Qualified Swimmer (NQS) program provides remedial swim training for recruits unable to qualify as third class swimmer during recruit training. The maximum surge population for this course, which averages one week, is three recruits.

The Recruit Convalescent Unit (RCU) provides for the care and training of recruits with minor medical problems. While enrolled in this program, the recruits Follow their parent division's training schedule while being housed in special programs. When fit for full duty, the recruits are returned to active training with their parent division. The maximum surge population for the RCU is 115 male and 100 female recruits. The average stay in the RCU is approximately 50 days.

For those recruits that are unable to participate in training due to illness, the Medical Hold Unit (MED HOLD) provides for the administration and care. Recruits are placed in MED HOLD when the medical staff determines that medical hold recruits can heal and will return to training. Once placed in MED HOLD, the recruit is in an Interrupted Instruction Hold until fit for duty. The maximum surge population is 20 male and 40 female recruits. The average stay is approximately 40 days.

**Classification.** Recruit classification takes place during the fourth week of recruit training (on DOT 4-2, as shown in Figure 15). Classification starts with the pretype process. During pretype, classifiers review the recruit's service record for potential disqualifiers, the yellow card containing program requirements, and the recruit's white card containing medical information. Classifiers verify the recruit's service record for completeness and note the requirement of a waiver request if a waiver is required for program eligibility.

The recruit then undergoes a pre-interview brief that provides the recruit with general information about enlisted occupations and Navy careers. The pre-interview briefing covers A-School location, program length, advancement guarantees, enlistment bonuses, Recruiter Assistance Program (RAP), extension requirements, leave policy, transportation, program specific information, and job strand and aircrew rate selection.

A three to ten minute one-on-one classification interview takes place for recruits still meeting program requirements. The classifier interviews the recruit, answers questions, verifies program eligibility, and confirms A-School reservations in the PRIDE computer system. If a special security clearance is not required, the recruit's record is made available to the order writing process. A recruit wanting to switch from an original program guarantee to a critical program is sent to a reclassification interview.

A recruit undergoes a reclassification interview for one of three reasons:

- Recruits that are disqualified for the original program guarantee must be reclassified (this includes those who fail or drop out of the A-School at the Great

Lakes Service School Command). The classifier reviews the recruit's service record for the annotated disqualifiers and uses PRIDE to make an offer from the job availability list. Currently, the classifier offers available program/rates that PRIDE shows for which the recruit is eligible. After the recruit accepts a job offering, the classifier books the new program/rate in PRIDE.

- GENDET (General Detail), recruits can be offered only available critical program/rates that PRIDE identifies the recruit eligible. Currently, these critical program/rates are only identified from a paper list provided by the Quota Management Office. If the GENDET accepts a job offering, the classifier books the new program/rate in PRIDE; otherwise the recruit remains a GENDET.
- Some recruits still qualified for their original program/rate ask for a reclassification interview. If the classifier can qualify the recruit for an available and more critical program/rate, the recruit completes the reclassification process. Otherwise, the recruit keeps his/her program guarantee.

If the recruit no longer meets program requirements, a waiver is submitted if the disqualification can be waived. If a waiver is granted the recruit proceeds to the one-on-one classification interview. If the disqualification is not waiverable or the waiver is not granted, the recruit proceeds to the reclassification interview.

The reclassification interview takes about 30 minutes and results in a new program for the recruit or possible separation. GENDET recruits can be reclassified into A-School programs and some A-School program guaranteed recruits are reclassified into GENDETS. If the reclassification results in a breach of contract issue, a legal determination process takes place and separation may occur.

**Order Writing.** Order Writing is the fourth major basic training sub-process shown in Figure 15. This process is initiated when the yellow card is passed from classification for Order Writing. Much of the order writing process is fully automated. Data obtained from the recruit's yellow card are entered into the Source Data System (SDS). If the recruit is made available for A-School and the school does not involve multiple course bookings, order writers use the automatic availability process that initiates the automatic processes within the Navy Training Reservation System (NTRS) and the Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS) and generates order production files. Hard copy orders should be received back from SDS within 24 to 72 hours. If the recruit is a GENDET or requires multiple course bookings, the order writers use the manual availability process using EAIS.

The Transportation Division needs location information four weeks prior to recruit departure for a Military Air Group Movement request. The order verifications clerk uses the yellow card to input order availability information into the Standard Training Activity Support System (STASS). This process takes place after either the manual availability process or the automatic availability process, as appropriate.

Orders should be received within 24 to 72 hours from SDS through the automatic availability process or 24 to 48 hours from EAIS through the manual availability process.

Frequently, it takes longer. When the recruit departure date gets to be 21 days or less, order writers begin tracking the status of outstanding orders. If the orders are not found in the system, the order writers have to invoke the manual availability process. Once orders are received, they must be checked for accuracy. If an error is found, the order writers request a correction. All correct orders are then sent to Recruit Transfers Division on 6-4 day of training.

**Transportation and Out-processing.** Transportation and Out-processing, the fifth major sub-process for basic training, is shown as the last process in Figure 15. This sub-process actually starts with the transportation division personnel obtaining a destination report four weeks prior to the recruit's departure. If there are 21 or more passengers, transportation personnel request a Commercial Air Movement (CAM). The Navy Passenger Transportation Office (NAVPTO) validates the information in the CAM request and submits it to Government Movement Service (GMS) in Washington, D.C. Both tasks are performed using an automated travel system (Sabre). NAVPTO receives a list of bids and accepts proposal through GMS. If a list of bids is not received, NAVPTO arranges charter transportation through the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) via the Internet. NAVPTO arranges ground transportation to the airport and at final destination and enters complete CAM information into the computer.

If there are fewer than 21 passengers in the destination report, individual reservations must be made but not until orders are received. When the individual orders are received, transportation division personnel send the orders to the Commercial Travel Office (CTO) for booking. After the CTO makes the airline reservations, transportation division personnel receives and verifies that the information is correct or makes appropriate corrections. The CTO prepares the tickets that are sent to the ticket order pickup. Occasionally, there is a period of waiting for orders. Waiting for orders to be received becomes time-late within 24 hours before departure.


As shown in Figure 15, about 75 percent of the RTC graduates go directly to A-school while the remaining 25 percent go to the fleet. However, as will be discussed in the next section, there are several paths for a student to go to A-school.

**2.7.2 Training: A-School Sources.** References: Navy Recruiting Manual – Enlisted (COMNAVCRUITCOMIST 1130.8F, Chapter 3: Program Requirements) and Analysis of Student Not-Under Instruction Time in Initial Skills Training, CNA, January 1999. The sources for A-school students are shown in Figure 16. Some of the RTC graduates go to Job-Oriented Basic Skills (JOBS) training, some RTC graduates go directly to the Fleet, and others go to the Navy Aircrew Candidate School (NACCS). Approximately three percent of the JOBS individuals ultimately go to A-school.

The Navy Recruiting Manual states that JOBS is a skill enhancement program that upgrades literacy and job-related skills. JOBS is designed to train individuals who do not otherwise meet specific ASVAB test score requirements to qualify for initial skill or Class "A" School training. The JOBS entrance criteria are based on the ASVAB "A" school formula with a 30 point waiver window. JOBS is composed of seven curriculum



aggregates or strands, which address 46 Class “A” Schools. Individuals who do not meet normal Class “A” School ASVAB score requirements but who are highly motivated, possess the potential to improve, and meet JOBS selection criteria, can be accessed with a JOBS “strand” guarantee.



**Figure 16. A-School Sources Sub-Model**

Term of enlistment in the JOBS program is for a period of 4 years active and 4 years in the Individual Ready Reserve, resulting in an 8-year military service obligation. Should an applicant accept assignment to a 5-year obligation or 6-year obligation A-School, an agreement to extend the enlistment is required. The applicant must sign a 12-month extension for a 5-year school guarantee program and a 24-month extension for the Advanced Electronics Field/Advanced Technical Field. All JOBS applicants are enlisted as either a Seaman, Airman, or Fireman. JOBS strands are used to determine the appropriate ratings.

RTC graduates that attend NACCS are enlisted into the Aircrew Program. This Program is a 5-year enlistment program that guarantees an initial flying assignment as a flight crew member in either fixed wing aircraft or helicopters and provides for training via various Class “A” Schools. Applicants must volunteer for flying duty and be capable of passing a Class II swim test and an aviation flight physical. Applicants must be made aware that their entrance physical examination will be re-verified for flight qualifications at the RTC and the Aircrew Candidate School.


Individuals that will go to A-School in the Aircrew rating (e.g., rescue and non-rescue swimmers) take a few classes at NACCS in Pensacola, Florida prior to going on to their official A-School training. This school has specific physical requirements that the student must meet in order to progress to the A-School training. Additionally, applicants must meet clearance and reliability standards since A-School attendance requires a



SECRET clearance. Enlistment term of service and other requirements are listed in the Navy Recruiting Manual. Aircrew personnel are transferred from one phase of training to the next without undue delay. Trainees are normally assigned to Class "A" School immediately after completing of NACCS and/or RSS. The normal training cycle for Aircrew personnel is:

- Recruit Training (Great Lakes IL).
- Naval Aircrew Candidate School (Pensacola).
- Rescue Swimmer School (Pensacola-Rescue Swimmers only).
- Class "A" School (Pensacola).
- Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) (various locations).
- Initial squadron assignment.

**2.7.3 Training: A-School Flow Sub-Model.** Reference Student Flow in Initial Training (SFIT) Model, CNA, January 1999. Following graduation from basic training, most of the sailors (about 75 percent) attend an A-school. Although these schools have different processes, the basic training flow tends to be similar as shown in Figure 17.



**Figure 17. A-School Flow Sub-Model**


Student processing receives students from several sources. The largest source of input for A-school is RTC. Other sources are fleet and other Navy and non-Navy organizations. When the students are not attending courses, they are in a hold status pending the resolution of the situation. Security clearances, for example, can place a student in a hold status until the clearance process is completed. Some students fail a part

of the training process and can be “recycled” to other courses or discharged from the Navy. The graduates of A-school go to the Fleet or follow-on training.

**2.8 Initial Assignment (Fleet).** Since this process was eliminated by the SAG, no fleet interviews, briefings, or other information was collected on the Initial Assignment process.

**2.9 Policy.** There are many, many laws, DoD/Navy regulations, and organizational regulations, operating procedures, instructions, and other documents that affect the EPS. Some of the documents that were provided to the study team are documented in Appendix C to this report. In the short period allocated to the study effort, the study team could not obtain, let alone read and comprehend most of the documents that affect the EPS. Instead of trying to understand the processes as related in these documents, the study team developed two key processes that directly affect the EPS. Additionally, the study team was able to find some reference material that enabled us to develop the Enlisted Community Managers and Quota Management sub-models. These two sub-models are discussed below.

**2.9.1 Enlisted Community Managers Sub-Model.** Reference Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training, NPRDC, May 1993. As shown in Figure 18, the Enlisted Community Managers calculate the enlisted accession required to maintain the community inventories.




**Figure 18. Enlisted Community Managers Sub-Model**

These (automated) calculations are based on several inputs, including: school capacity, locations, and length of courses; end strength constraints (which include pay grade restrictions); projected losses (school, fleet, and other attrition); programmed changes; and projected enlisted personnel authorizations. The resource sponsors may also impose

a constraint on the amount of money available for recruit acquisition and training. When the number of recruits required to achieve the projected end strength requirements exceed the resources available through the resource sponsors, a special meeting is held to adjust the accession requirements. Further adjustments on recruit input may be imposed due to anticipated growth or end strength reductions. Once the number of recruits is determined, the GENDET requirements are determined. The results of this process are provided to the Quota Management Office (next section), which determines and loads the accession requirements into the automated information systems used by CNRC.

**2.9.2 Quota Management Sub-Model.** Reference “Quota Management Office, Selection and Classification” Briefing (undated). As shown in Figure 19, the QMO receives its input from the Enlisted Community Managers and projects A-School ratings and C-School advanced training requirements. The Training Agents conduct a feasibility study to determine if the total quota requirements can be funded. The Training Agents work with the Resource Sponsors to develop the Student Input Plan. This plan has the student quotas that will be required to fill the projected training seats (provisions are made in the calculations for expected losses in the training program). QMO prepares a memorandum to the Commander of the Navy Recruiting Command to provide guidance on recruit quotas as well as restrictions (e.g., females, non-high school graduates, etc.). Once the time phased recruiting goals are loaded into the appropriate automated reservation systems, QMO monitors the program and may make adjustments periodically as the training and recruiting goals change.



**Figure 19. Quota Management Sub-Model**

**2.10 Summary and Introduction to Chapter 3.** The EPS is a very complex process. To gain an understanding of how that process functions, the study team had to contact many individuals in each of the organizations directly involved with the process and go through an immense amount of literature. The study team conducted interviews with individuals to obtain information on the process as well as to obtain their opinion on how

the process works. The study team points out the following observations gained during the interview process on the process:

- There are very few resources available on process practices. Some processes are explained in a few regulations. A few EPS organizations had some process reports, but the focus, formats, and methodologies of the reports were substantially different (they were obviously not designed to form a comprehensive picture of the overall EPS). In many cases, the processes were in the form of briefings. Briefings also did not show a concern for the overall EPS picture. Several process review studies were conducted, but the final reports remain in perpetual draft form (e.g., the RTC Transportation Study).
- Process organizations frequently have their own agenda on process change, with little concern for how their process affects other parts of the process. Although the sub-process managers no doubt are sincerely trying to make their process better, there is no systematic review of the effects of sub-process changes across the EPS. Several of the remedial programs at RTC, for example, may have the result of reducing RTC attrition, but may result in attrition from the training base or the Fleet. There is no single agency responsible for the over-all process or monitoring the changes in the EPS due to sub-process and other changes.
- The process is command oriented, resulting in the constant turn-over of military personnel who lack adequate background not only in the particular sub-process they are assigned to, they also lack background in the overall EPS.
- Turn-over of key personnel hampers efficient process evolution. In many cases, process functions are dependent upon the individual (or group of individuals) directly involved in that function. Because of the high turn-over, it was very difficult to get a good understanding of the processes used.
- The processes tend to remain essentially unchanged over time because of the short-term focus of newly assigned personnel. These individuals initially concentrate on learning what their predecessors did. Consequently, the processes are not evolving as conditions change.

As shown above, the study team consulted a large number of references as well as conducted a number of individual interviews involved in the EPS. Chapter 3 of this report summarizes some of the key findings in the references consulted and Chapter 4 of this report presents the results of the study team interviews.

### Chapter 3. Annotated Bibliography

**3.1 Introduction.** A variety of sources were used to obtain data for this analysis. A complete bibliography is located in Appendix C. The references included a keyword search of the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) database. Source documents were selected from the results of that search. Keyword searches were performed for Navy Recruiting, Army Recruiting, Air Force Recruiting and Marine Corps Recruiting for the years 1996 to the present. The search produced the following results:

- Army- 124 documents
- Navy- 68 documents
- Air Force- 24 documents
- Marine Corps- 16 documents

DTIC studies were selected by title and abstract using subjective criteria to distinguish reports that addressed potential Navy EPS issues. Army reports that address system level issues similar to those encountered by or shared with the Navy were selected. Since DTIC documents for the Marine Corps or Air Force were budget related or addressed Marine Corps specific recruiting issues, no Air Force or Marine Corps documents were selected for this study.

In addition to DTIC studies, the study team investigated information available on Internet Web Sites. Analysts visited a variety of websites to obtain documents, satisfy specific information needs and to observe the production values, message and content of recruiting-related sites. Some of the Web Sites appropriate to the scope of this study are listed in Table 3.

**Table 3. Web Site References and Site Sponsor**

WEB ADDRESS	SITE SPONSOR
<a href="http://nardic.nrl.navy.mil/pubs.htm">nardic.nrl.navy.mil/pubs.htm</a>	Navy Publications s On Line
<a href="http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/">neds.nebt.daps.mil/</a>	Navy Electronic Directives System
<a href="http://www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil">www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil</a>	Navy Acquisition Business Management
<a href="http://www.armedforcescareers.com/">www.armedforcescareers.com/</a>	Armed Forces Careers.com!
<a href="http://www.bupers.navy.mil">www.bupers.navy.mil</a>	Bureau of Naval Personnel
<a href="http://www.cna.org">www.cna.org</a>	The CNA Corporation
<a href="http://www.cnet.navy.mil">www.cnet.navy.mil</a>	Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET)
<a href="http://www.cnrc.navy.mil">www.cnrc.navy.mil</a>	Navy Recruiting Command
<a href="http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/cnrc/info/rst/ghl.htm">www.cnrc.navy.mil/cnrc/info/rst/ghl.htm</a>	Government Leased Housing for Recruiters
<a href="http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/noru">www.cnrc.navy.mil/noru</a>	Navy Recruiting University
<a href="http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/regionnorth/newengl and">www.cnrc.navy.mil/regionnorth/newengl and</a>	NRD New England
<a href="http://www.directory.navy.mil">www.directory.navy.mil</a>	US Navy Locator
<a href="http://www.dmdc.osd.mil">www.dmdc.osd.mil</a>	Defense Management Data Center: Career Exploration Program (CEP) and Recruit Market Information System (RMIS)

Continued on the next page.

**Table 3. Web Site References and Site Sponsor (Continued)**

<b>WEB ADDRESS</b>	<b>SITE SPONSOR</b>
<a href="http://www.dt.navy.mil">www.dt.navy.mil</a>	Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)
<a href="http://www.mpm.osd.mil/m-state.htm">www.mpm.osd.mil/m-state.htm</a>	Joint Integration and Requirements Office-
<a href="http://www.navmac.navy.mil/">www.navmac.navy.mil/</a>	Navy Manpower Analysis Center
<a href="http://www.navy.mil">www.navy.mil</a>	US Navy
<a href="http://www.navyjobs.com">www.navyjobs.com</a>	Navy Recruiting Web site (for Potential Recruits)
<a href="http://www.navystlouis.com">www.navystlouis.com</a>	NRD St Louis
<a href="http://www.ncts.navy.mil/nol/alpha.html">www.ncts.navy.mil/nol/alpha.html</a>	Navy On-Line, Index of Navy Web Sites
<a href="http://www.nhrc.navy.mil">www.nhrc.navy.mil</a>	Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA
<a href="http://www.nprdc.navy.mil">www.nprdc.navy.mil</a>	Navy Personal Research, Studies and Technology (NPRST)
<a href="http://www.nps.navy.mil">www.nps.navy.mil</a>	Naval Postgraduate School
<a href="http://www.ntcgl.navy.mil/">www.ntcgl.navy.mil/</a>	Naval Training Center, Great Lakes
<a href="http://www.ntsc.navy.mil">www.ntsc.navy.mil</a>	Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD)
<a href="http://www.rand.org">www.rand.org</a>	RAND
<a href="http://www.showcase.cnrc.navy.mil">www.showcase.cnrc.navy.mil</a>	CNRC Showcase
<a href="http://www.usarec.army.mil">www.usarec.army.mil</a>	US Army Recruiting Command
<a href="http://www.usnwc.edu">www.usnwc.edu</a>	Naval War College

Briefings and reports provided by Navy sources provided yet another source of information for this study. Throughout the data collection phase of this project, individuals and agencies provided command briefings, issue briefings, and copies of internal reports and studies. Command briefings are listed Table 4 below (some of the briefings did not indicate the author).

**Table 4. Navy Command Briefing References**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>AUTHOR</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>DATE</b>
Navy Recruiting Districts CO/XO List		CNRC	Undated
CNRC Study Program: Proposals, On-Going, Completed		NRC	8/21/00
Inspector General Overview Brief		NRC	9/28/00
Career Recruiting Force- Overview Brief		CNRC	10/2/00
NRC Enlisted Recruiting Policy Code 356 Overview Brief		CNRC	Undated
Studies and Analysis Program		NPRST	Undated
NRC Career Recruiting Force- Brief		CNRC	10/02/00
POC/PXO JAG Brief		CDR Brenda Lyles	10/02/00
NRC Road Show Brief		CNRC	Undated
Enlisted End Strength Planning: N132C- Brief		BUPERS	Undated
Evaluation of the DoD Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Career Exploration Program	Laurence, Janis H and Peter F. Ramsberger	Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, VA for Defense Manpower Data Center	10/99
US Military Entrance Processing Command (Brief)		USMEPCOM	11/15/00
Naval Training Center Initial Skills Training		RTC	Undated

Study Team members also conducted a number of site visits and personal interviews at EPS sites. A list of the visits is shown in Appendix F. The observations resulting from the site visits are summarized in Appendix D and evaluated/summarized in Chapter 4 of this report.

**3.2 Literature Search.** The database for this project includes 126 documents in addition to interview notes. These documents are classified into categories as shown in Table 5. Those DTIC documents that were not selected as appropriate references for this study were classified as budget related or narrowly focused on specific time sensitive issues.

**Table 5. Document Categories**

<b>CATEGORY</b>	<b>TOTAL DOCUMENTS</b>
Attrition	7
Advertising and Marketing	4
Command Briefings	13
DEP Management	6
General and Joint Service	9
Instructions	21
Recruiting Incentives	10
Process Descriptions and Modeling	15
Recruiting Issues	20
Recruiter Management	9
Supply Studies	6
School Management	3
Technology	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>126</b>

Research from Navy sources constitutes the largest part of the database for this study. A summary of those references by category and source (less Command Briefings and Navy Instructions) is shown in Table 6.

**Table 6. Research Documents by Source**

<b>CATEGORY</b>	<b>SOURCE</b>				
	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>GAO</b>	<b>RAND</b>	<b>Other</b>
Attrition	2		5		
Advertising and Marketing	3				1
DEP Management	5	1			
General and Joint Service		4			5
Recruiting Incentives	7			3	
Process Descriptions and Modeling	15				
Recruiting Issues	11	4	4	1	
Recruiter Management	5	1	2	1	
Supply Studies	3				
School Management	2	1		3	
Technology	3				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>



**3.3 Annotated Bibliography.** This section provides abstracts of source documents selected for their relevance to issues identified during our investigation. Abstracts are arranged according to the subject categories shown in Table 6 above (with the exception of General and Joint Service studies).

**3.3.1 Attrition.** Recruit attrition rates at each stage of the enlistment and initial training process are high. This creates an obvious cost problem for the Navy. Training and support costs for these prospective sailors are lost on their departure from the system. More importantly, from an accessions point of view high attrition rates during initial training have the effect of increasing the accession goals in an already difficult recruiting environment. They also generate last minute changes in pipeline quantities, which in turn create management problems for the school system. As early as 1997, the GAO recognized the importance of attrition reduction to an overall strategy for fixing the recruiting problem. Table 7 contains a list of attrition studies used as references for this study.

**Table 7. List of Attrition Study References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR / PUBLISHER	DATE
Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save DOD Millions of Dollars GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102		GAO	3/97
Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel GAO/NSIAD-97-39		GAO	1/97
Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (Testimony) GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109		GAO	3/98
Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (Report) GAO/NSIAD-98-117		GAO	3/98
Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD's 1999 Survey of Active Duty Members GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110		GAO	3/00
Summary of DEP Attrition History		CNRC	3/01

The GAO report titled, DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel, used DMDC data, interviews with recruiting personnel, and interviews with separating recruits in all three services to determine potential cost savings from reduced attrition rates, to evaluate the adequacy of DOD data, and to determine the reasons for separation during initial training. The study found that substantial savings are possible if the attrition rate is reduced. The primary reasons for separation in the first 6 months is poor screening for drug use, medical conditions, and motivation. The major finding, however, was the lack of quality data by which the services could accurately assess the reasons for separation. Separation codes used in completing the forms are inconsistently applied by the services and reflect only official reasons for leaving. The lack of data also prevents the services from establishing realistic attrition goals and from developing effective plans for attrition reduction.

In the report titled DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems, GAO analysts look more closely at DMDC attrition data. They determined that the largest proportion of attrition occurs during the first 6 months of service. The remaining separations occur uniformly across the first term of enlistment. Approximately 30% of attrition during the first 6 months is due to failure to meet minimum performance criteria. The next highest reason for separation is due to medical disqualifications. However, the separation codes are not applied uniformly across the services and the implications of these findings are difficult to assess. Analysts also found that recruiter selection and incentives were critical to the recruiting process.

**3.3.2 Advertising and Marketing.** Advertising is a key element of the recruit marketing strategy. Effective advertising creates the image that recruiters will sell and prepares potential candidates for that message. Assessment of current advertising programs and testing of new ideas is critical to an aggressive and growing service recruiting effort. For most of the period evaluated in this study, the Advertising Agency conducted its own assessment and testing programs. This, no doubt, helps to explain the lack of study documentation. The advertising and marketing references used in this study are shown in Table 8.

**Table 8. Advertising and Marketing References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/PUBLISHER	DATE
An Econometric Approach to Evaluate Navy Advertising Efficiency	Wittenburg, Sven-Olaf	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	3/96
2000 NAES Topline Wave XXXV		NRC	7/00
Marketing to Youth: Understanding and Communicating with Gen "Y"		Campbell-Ewald Advertising	2/01

Development of a media budget and plan to allocate spending on advertising placement is a perennial problem for commercial and government organizations. An Econometric Approach to Evaluate Navy Advertising Efficiency is a 1996 study by Wittenburg. Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate optimal levels of advertising budgets and placement strategies. Impression and reach data from the advertising agency and recruiting production data from the Navy Recruiting Districts during the period from October 1991 through March 1995 were included in the analysis. Difficulties in data collection and processing prevented completion of the analysis.

The Navy Advertising Effectiveness Study (NAES) is conducted annually. The 2000 NAES Topline Wave XXXV report results from the first year of the "Navy Life" advertising campaign begun in September 1999. Generally positive results are reported in the study report. The new Navy campaign is "successful in being intrusive, despite an increase in competitive spending" and "it shows potential to reinforce prospects perceptions of the Navy in the intended strategic directions." Significant increases in unaided and total advertising awareness are reported. However, "a lower proportion of Caucasians and Hispanics claimed to 'take action' by contacting a recruiter or seeking further information."

**3.3.3 DEP Management.** The Delayed Entry Program is an important accession management tool. It allows the Navy to control the supply of personnel entering schools and thereby synchronize the supply and demand for training seats. In an ideal world, recruits are placed in DEP status and released into the EPS pipeline when seats become available at their desired schools. In reality, however, individuals change their minds, experience medical problems, consume drugs, commit crimes, and otherwise become ineligible for enlistment. The attrition flow out of the recruiting pipeline begins in DEP.

Early in the program, observers discovered a correlation between attrition and time in DEP. This allows the analysts to develop models to forecast attrition rates and thereby anticipate additional accessions to replace losses and to project student loads for initial and follow-on training. It also enables them to “manage” DEP by finding optimal retention rates and screening recruit intake. Unfortunately, most of the analysis reviewed for this study is statistical. Questions about individual reasons for attrition appear to be of little interest. This characteristic is striking. No one seems to ask the question, “What is it about DEP that motivates people to leave the Navy?” or “How can we make DEP better?” Indeed, the appearance is that, despite the inefficiencies of the recruiting process, the solution to DEP loss is simply to predict and replace the loss. Obviously, replacing losses forces an increased burden on the EPS in general and the recruiter in specific. The DEP related study references are listed in Table 9.

**Table 9. DEP Study References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR / PUBLISHER	DATE
Analysis of Enlisted Recruiting Patterns Within the Department of the Navy	McGregor, James, A.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	12/97
Analysis of Navy Delayed Entry Program and Recruit Training Center Attrition	Knox, Bryant W.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	6/98
Forecasting Future Accessions and Losses from the Delayed Entry Program	Milch, Paul R. and Lyn R. Whitaker	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	3/96
Optimal Recruiting Strategy to Minimize US Navy Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition	Simpson, Paul Glenn	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	12/97
The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of the Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training	Nell, John Dennis	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	3/98
US Army's Delayed Entry Program: A Survival Study	Vales, Jeffrey S.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	6/94
US Navy's Delayed Entry Program: Effects of its Length on DEP Loss and First Term Attrition	Matos, Rafael E.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	3/94

LT Knox, the author of Analysis of Navy Delayed Entry Program and Recruit Training Center Attrition uses logistic regression and decision tree centered analysis to model DEP and boot camp attrition. The results of the model suggest that recruits who accept incentives prior to DEP have a lower probability of not completing their term of enlistment. Those with low AFQT scores, no high school diploma, or long DEP period have a 97 percent probability of leaving the program. Further testing of the model,

however, indicated that the model is a predictor of DEP attrition for a group of enlistees and is not a good predictor of individual attrition.

In his study, Optimal Recruiting Strategy to Minimize US Navy Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition, Simpson formulates the DEP placement problem for nuclear program candidates as a nonlinear program that minimizes relative recruiting cost. The lowest cost is assigned to recruits in the DEP length with the lowest probability of DEP attrition. The results of the study show that the annual contract objective (at the time of the study) did not account for expected DEP attrition and therefore did not support the successful attainment of the accession goal.

LT John Dennis Nell's report examines the effectiveness of the Navy DEP program in preparing recruits for basic training in the study, The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training. Data were obtained from a survey administered to recruits at the Great Lakes Recruit Training Center during calendar year 1998. LT Nell found that training is not being conducted in the DEP and that over one-third of recruits reported that they had not been provide information on what to expect at basic training. Although statistical studies have found that DEP participation has a significant effect on attrition, "not one study looked into what the DEP did to prepare recruits for basic training."

In Forecasting Future Accessions and Losses from the Delayed Entry Program, authors Milch and Whitaker calculate conditional probabilities of accession or loss given time already spent in DEP for the US Army Recruiting Command. Results of the forecasts were accurate on an annual basis but were much less accurate on a monthly due to seasonal variations in DEP populations.

The study US Army's Delayed Entry Program: A Survival Study attempts to predict US Army DEP survival rates based on time in DEP, contract length and other variables.

In another report, LT Rafael Matos used 298,920 enlistment contract records to analyze the effects of gender, education, AFQT score, time in DEP and attrition timing to investigate the relationship between the DEP period and attrition during the first two years of enlistment. In general, DEP attrition is directly proportional to DEP length. First term attrition decreases with DEP length up to 8 months. Non-high school graduates have the highest post DEP attrition levels.

**3.3.4 Recruiting Incentives.** Recruiting incentives are used to influence the recruiting market in accordance with Navy accession needs. Incentives are used to appeal to desirable market segments (i.e. high quality high school graduates), to encourage responses to specific programs or recruiting needs such as specific ratings or career fields, and to entice recruits to accept specific shipping dates . Incentives are attractive because they can be fielded quickly and targeted to specific Navy accession needs. Research in this area seems limited and restricted to high-level statistical analysis. There is a marked absence of studies evaluating the effectiveness of specific Navy Recruiter

incentives. The references listed in Table 10 provided information for the conduct of this study.

**Table 10. Recruiting Incentive References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
An Assessment of Recent Proposals to Improve the Montgomery G.I. Bill, DB-301-OSD/FRP	Asch, Beth J., C. Christine Fair, and M. Rebecca Kilburn	RAND	2000
Analysis of the US Navy Goal-Based Recruiting System	Pry, David W.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	6/96
Attracting College-Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options, MR-984-OSD	Asch, Beth J., M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Jacob A. Klerman	RAND	1999
Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment Incentives (Briefing)	Kraus, Amanda, Henry Griffis, and Peggy Golfen	CNA	8/00
Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment Incentives, CRM D0001428	Kraus, Amanda B.N., Henry S. Griffis, and Peggy A. Golfen	CNA: Alexandria, VA	8/99
Educational Benefits Versus Enlistment Bonuses: A Comparison of Recruiting Options, MR-302-OSD	Asch, Beth J. and James N. Dertouzos	RAND	1994
Tech Prep and the US Navy, CRM D0000399.A1	Golfen, Peggy A. and Darlene H. Blake	CNA: Alexandria, VA	7/00

An Assessment of Recent Proposals to Improve the Montgomery G.I. by Asch, Fair, and Kilburn assess the potential costs and benefits of 5 congressional bills designed to expand the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits. The authors found that existing MGIB benefits have fallen behind tuition costs. MGIB enrollment rates were found to be around 90%. Therefore problems associated with the program should be attributed to benefit levels. Evidence suggests that the proposed benefit enhancement will generate an increase in high quality enlistments. At the same time, the proposed benefits can be expected to cause a small, offsetting decrease in first term attrition and reenlistment. In spite of the expected benefits, these proposals remain costly relative to other recruiting tools such as advertising, enlistment bonuses, and additional recruiters.

Attracting College-Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options by Asch, Killburn, and Klerman uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), Montgomery Bill data files, and DMDC data to investigate the relative attraction of various policy options for attracting college bound youth. The results of the study suggest that the military will increasingly be competing with civilian post-secondary educational institutions and subsequent skilled civilian employment for high quality youth. Five tracks leading to college degrees are identified. The "enlisted then college" and "concurrent service and college" tracks are the two most common tracks, however most individuals obtain their education after separation. The Montgomery GI Bill Fund is the most popular college benefit program. The study notes that this incentive was designed to be used by the individual after

separation from active duty. The study also points out that although enrollment in college funding programs is high, few individuals obtain a degree by this route. The authors suggest several policy alternatives including: expanded recruiting on 2 year college campuses, targeted recurring college drop-outs, and the implementation of enlistment-college-enlistment tracks.

In their study Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment Incentives, Kraus, Giffis, and Golfin investigated the relative importance of various incentive packages for respondents in high, medium, and low propensity categories. Data were collected from a mail survey of 4,400 high school students and 600 community college students. Four incentive components were tested: a Navy job, a financial incentive (enlistment bonus or Navy College Fund), specified length of obligated service, and college credit for Navy training. The study concludes that preference for incentive alternatives varies with propensity to enlist. Length of obligation and college related incentives have more appeal for medium propensity students while Navy job assignments have more appeal for high-propensity students. In general, the offer of college credits for Navy training has the highest overall positive impact on propensity, while increasing tour lengths has a uniform negative effect.

Educational Benefits Versus Enlistment Bonuses: A Comparison of Recruiting Options by Asch and Dertouzos analyses the results of two controlled field experiments by the Army. Separate tests were conducted for the educational enlistment bonus components. Enlistment bonuses increased all high quality enlistments by 5%. The Army College Fund benefit increased high quality enlistment by 8.7 %. Additionally, the enlistment bonus was very effective in motivating recruits to switch specialties. Bonuses shifted the term of service to longer obligations while the educational benefit shifted the term of service toward shorter terms. Both the Army College Fund and bonuses increased the rate of completion of terms of service, but reenlistment rates were reduced. However, net man-years served remained relatively constant for the bonus group while man-years fell slightly for the educational benefits group.

During the 1998-1999 academic year, the Navy recruited only 316 of 520,000 Associate Degree graduates. The Navy Tech Prep program is designed to take advantage of an existing model for penetrating this important recruiting market. Tech Prep and the U.S. Navy by Golfin and Blake reviews the Navy's Tech Prep program. Tech Prep is a Federal program established and funded under the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Technical Education Act. It is designed to encourage cooperation between high schools and community colleges to provide opportunities for qualified students to pursue high school diplomas and two-year degrees. The Navy version provides for credit for Navy technical training and placement of qualified participants. Initial agreements covered only the nuclear field (NF) and the advanced electronics/computing field (AECF). The program promises significant recruiting and retention benefits. However, it is not currently funded.

**3.3.5 Process Descriptions and Modeling.** The EPS is a complex process involving a number of organizations, a multitude of interfaces, and much potential for inefficiency. Much work has been done to document EPS business processes. While there are many



opportunities to improve these processes and enhance their efficiency by studying the process in isolation of other processes, there is a risk of sub-optimization. The references listed in Table 11 provided information for developing the EPS model that is presented in Chapter 4 of this report.

**Table 11. Process and Model References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
A Functional Analysis of Consolidating the Navy And Marine Corps Recruiting Commands	Hammond, Anne G.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	6/00
Allocation of Recruiting Resources Across Navy Recruiting and Metropolitan Areas	Jarosz, Suzanne K. and Elizabeth S. Stephens	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	3/99
An Exploratory Cost Analysis of Navy Recruiting Stations	Munoz, Patricia	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	6/97
Development of a Navy Recruiting Vehicle Budget Model	Gundayao, Jenniffer D.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	12/97
Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training	Dr Margaret Barton, SRA Corp	NPRDC	5/93
Low Quality Recruit Report (LQRR) Process- Information Paper	CDR Fitzgerald	CNRC 001	Undated
New Recruit Processing- Process Definition		RTC	
Quota Management Office- Selection and Classification Brief		QMO	
Recruiting Issues (Briefing)	Henry Griffis, Peggy Golfen		Undated
Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Vol I (Final Report)	Price Waterhouse Coopers		11/15/98
Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Vol II (Functional Economic Analysis)	Price Waterhouse Coopers		11/15/98
Sailor 21: A Research Vision to Attract, Retain and Utilize the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Sailor	Murray Rowe, Tech DIR, NPRDC 901-874-4640 Rowe@nprdc.navy.mil	NPRST	12/14/98
A Strategic Human Resource Management System for the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century		Naval Personnel Task Force, Dept of the Navy	2001
Users Guide to Quota Management Analyst		SRA International	Undated

Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training by Dr. Margaret Barton, SRA Corp is a detailed model of the activities of managing Navy accessions and skill training from recruiting through C-School.

The two volumes of Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems document the results of a Business Process Review conducted as a prelude to a Navy Recruiting Command initiative to improve recruiting information systems. Price Waterhouse



Coopers and the Navy Recruiting Command partnered the study. The report recommends the development of a new, integrated recruiting information system.

Sailor 21 presents a vision for leveraging the potential of Internet, data management, and personnel assessment technologies in the service of accession, training, retention, and assignment of sailors in the Navy of the future. A research plan is proposed to achieve this vision.

A Strategic Human Resource Management System for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century published by the Naval Personnel Task Force, Dept of the Navy, describes a year 2020 vision for Navy Human Resource Management (HRM). Recommendations include realignment of HRM strategies and structure to support the goals of the operational forces.

**3.3.6 Recruiting Issues.** The recruiting function is the foundation of the EPS. However, it also faces a number of unique challenges derived from the nature of its mission as the bridge between the Navy and the civilian culture. Table 12 lists the limited Navy research that was available for this study.

**Table 12. Recruiting Issue References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
A Summary of Navy Recruiting Efforts in Community Colleges in FY 1997, CRM 97-139	Golfin, Peggy	CNA: Alexandria, VA	3/98
Building and Retaining the Career Force: New Procedures for Accessing and Assigning Army Enlisted Personnel- Final Report	Campbell, John P. and Lola M. Zook, ed	US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences	8/96
Draft Audit Report: Increasing Navy's Likelihood of Achieving Fiscal Year 2001 Recruiting Goals, NAVAUDSVC P-7520.1		Auditor General of the Navy	7/26/00
Issue Paper: Reengineering DoD Recruiting	Thomas, James R.	Rand Arroyo Center: Santa Monica	1997
Major Factors Affecting Recruiting: Making them Work for the Army	Harris, Lee A. LTC, USA	Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies: Washington, DC	6/00
Military Downsizing: Balancing Accessions and Losses is Key to Shaping the Future Force, GAO/NSIAD-93-241		GAO	9/93
Military Personnel: First Term Recruiting and Attrition Continue to Require Focused Attention, GAO/T/NSIAD-00-102	Rabkin, Norman J.	GAO	2/00
Military Personnel: Services Need to Assess Efforts to Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition, GAO/NSIAD-00-146		GAO	6/00
Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed, GAO/NSIAD-95-22		GAO	12/94

Continued on the next page.

**Table 12. Recruiting Issue References (Continued)**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>AUTHOR</b>	<b>SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER</b>	<b>DATE</b>
Overview of ARI Recruiting Research	Borman, Walter C., Kristen Horgan, and Lisa M. Penny	US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: Alexandria, VA	
Rethinking Navy Manpower and Personnel	Quester, Aline O., James L. Gasch, and Peggy Golfin	CNA	6/96
US Army Recruiting: Problems and Fixes	Jones, Reuben D. LTC, USA	US Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA	12/99
US Navy Recruiting Command Snapshot: A Look at the Process, Policies and People with Recommendations	Slocum, W. Scott	CNRC	4/17/00

Draft Audit Report: Increasing Navy's Likelihood of Achieving Fiscal Year 2001 Recruiting Goals, NAVAUDSVC P-7520.1, by The Auditor General of the Navy assess the impact on accession goals of capacity restrictions at the Great Lakes Recruit Training Center.

Issue Paper: Reengineering DoD Recruiting author James R. Thomas proposes the consolidation of the Services recruit leads generation activities and the application of telemarketing techniques to take advantage of technology driven efficiency while releasing recruiters to the field.

In his report, Major Factors Affecting Recruiting: Making them Work for the Army LTC Lee Harris uses YATS data and the results of interviews, surveys, and focus groups with personnel at every stage of their military career. He uncovered a number of startling findings. Young people are being discouraged from military service by misinformation received from peers and influencers. Young people are not aware of the positive aspects of a military job. While the impact of influencers on enlistment decision remains strong, the decreasing percentage of those with military experience and knowledge is declining. Active duty soldiers are often the worst advocates for military service. Given the increasing invisibility of the military, every opportunity for exposure, especially advertising is critical.

The testimony of Norman J. Rabkin is found in Military Personnel: First Term Recruiting and Attrition Continue to Require Focused Attention, GAO/T/NSIAD-00-102. The report summarizes the progress made by the Services in improving first term recruiting and attrition performance. The Services increased recruiting efforts in a number of areas. However, progress against first term attrition is hampered by the lack of quality data. Although all Services, including the Navy, have taken steps to solve recruiting problems, they lack the tools necessary to measure that success or to identify which initiatives are successful and worthy of repetition.

The study documented in GAO/NSIAD-95-22, Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed was undertaken in response to Congressional concerns over cost savings achieved by recruiting organizations during the post cold war draw down period. The study found that all Services had reduced their recruiting efforts, but had resisted organizational changes that would produce even greater efficiency. Recommendations of the GAO study include: reducing first-term attrition in order to reduce accession requirements; streamlining the recruiting bureaucracy; reviewing recruiter quota and incentive systems; develop new strategies for locating, and managing local recruiting offices.

The study titled, Rethinking Navy Manpower and Personnel by Aline Quester et al sets out to answer the questions: Are there better ways of doing business? and Can we improve our sailors' quality of life? Recommendations of the report include expanding recruiting efforts in the Community College Market, enhancing the sailor housing entitlement, realigning NECs, and more creative uses of home basing strategies for fleet personnel.

In his paper US Army Recruiting: Problems and Fixes LTC Rueben D. Jones, U.S. Army, a former Military Enlistment Processing Station (MEPS) Commander, suggests a number of strategic changes to the recruiting process. These changes include: appointment of a recruiting "Czar" to unify responsibility and authority over the recruiting mission, developing a comprehensive manning strategy for the next decade, modernizing administrative processes, improving customer (candidate) service throughout the recruiting process, developing an investment strategy for influencing, and preparing America's youth for military service.

CAPT W. Scott Slocum (U. S. Navy Retired) is currently serving as Deputy Commander of CNRC. His study, US Navy Recruiting Command Snapshot: A Look at the Process, Policies and People with Recommendations, is a wide-ranging overview of existing recruiting processes and issues. His recommendations cover the entire spectrum of recruiting challenges from organizations and structures to the use of technology.

**3.3.7 Recruiter Management.** The success of the Navy's recruiting effort ultimately lies with the individual recruiter. The recruiter is the Navy's representative to potential enlistees and to influencers at home and at school. The recruiter makes contact with prospective recruits, does the administrative work to get them qualified, and closes the deal. Recruiter management includes recruiter selection and recruiter incentives and motivation. Given the importance of the recruiter in the recruiting process that diverts a significant amount of Navy manpower from sea duty, research on recruiter effectiveness seems rather limited. The Recruiter Management references used in this study are listed in Table 13 (next page).

The results of the 1999 CNRC Recruiter Quality of Life Study Oct-Dec 1999 show a marginal improvement over FY 1998 in some areas. However, the results also show that more sailors feel forced into duty than previous year, that only 24 percent of the recruiters

believe that recruiter training is realistic, and that less than half of respondents felt that training provides a realistic view of recruiting duty.

**Table 13. Recruiter Management References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
1999 CNRC Recruiter Quality of Life Study Oct-Dec 1999		NRC	5/00
An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the US Army Recruiter Incentive Program to Motivate Recruiters: a Survey of Enlisted Recruiters	Coronado, Christine A.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	9/99
Analysis of the US Navy Goal-Based Recruiting System	Pry, David W.	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, CA	6/96
Encouraging Recruiter Achievement, MR-845-OSD/A	Oken, Carole and Beth Asch	RAND	1997
Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and Incentive Systems GAO/NSIAD-98-58			1/98
Navy Recruiters and Motivation: A Survey of Enlisted Recruiters	Emerson, Ellen H.	Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA	3/01

The most recent study of recruiter attitudes is a 1999 study of Army recruiters authored by student at the Naval Post Graduate School, LT Christine Coronado. The study is based on a survey of 2,000 Regular Army, on-production recruiters and Station Commanders. Survey results were analyzed to determine what intrinsic and extrinsic incentives motivate recruiters to meet mission requirements and what incentives motivate recruiters to exceed mission requirements. In general, the author concluded that current incentives (awards, performance reviews, and reassignment to career recruiter status) do not motivate recruiters to meet or achieve production goals. Intrinsic incentives like time-off, meritorious promotion, and choice of follow-on assignment scored the highest for motivating recruiters to meet or exceed production goals. These results apply across demographic groups. Command pressure is uniformly perceived as a disincentive. The fact that most (64.1 percent) of respondents did not volunteer for recruiting duty explains to some extent resistance to Service related incentives.

In spite of the ready availability of detailed data, the study team analysts found an almost complete lack of Navy recruiter productivity analysis. Lieutenant Commander David Pry analyzed six years (1990-1995) of district production data in his study, An Analysis of the Navy Goal-Based Recruiting System. He concluded in this report that CNRC had not met its recruiting goal for 4 out those 6 years and that only 20% of Navy Recruiting Districts were achieving their assigned mission requirements. During his investigation, he discovered that individual goals are increased when recruiters meet monthly objectives, in effect penalizing them and discouraging overproduction. Lieutenant Commander Pry proposes a goaling system that incorporates recruiter input and rewards recruiters for accurate forecasting.

A 1996 RAND report, Encouraging Recruiter Achievement surveyed the incentive and goading systems used by each military service. However, the study stopped short of evaluating the relative merits of the programs.

The 1998 GAO report titled DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and Incentive Systems addresses a number of recruiter management issues. The study authors met with representatives from Service training schools, recruiting commands, recruiter teams, and Service recruiter schools to collect data on recruiter selection, training, performance measures, and incentives in the military Services. The study found that recruiter selection and screening processes ensure that recruiters are selected from among the best noncommissioned officers, but does not necessarily ensure that those selected possess the necessary communications and interpersonal skills required for recruiting success. Screening for these traits should begin in the selection process and continue through recruiter training. The results of a 1996 survey indicated that recruiter job performance was at an all time low. Nonetheless, recruiters are working a record number of hours. The use of quarterly floating goals was suggested as an alternative to the current system of monthly goals.

In her 2001 study titled Navy Recruiter Incentives and motivation: a Survey of Enlisted Recruiters Lieutenant Commander Ellen Emerson discusses the results of an on-line survey of 1079 recruiters. She finds that intangible incentives such as medals, promotion opportunities were reported as having the strongest motivational effect. A positive command climate was ranked the most important factor for motivation.

**3.3.8 Supply Studies.** These studies address the supply side of the recruiting process. As such, they attempt to measure the size and the characteristics of the civilian population that represents the pool of potential recruits. That definition is expanded somewhat in this case to include studies that analyze the attitudes and characteristics, which motivate individuals to enlist. Given the importance of supply side issues to the recruiting processes and the changes occurring in that environment, research seems to be limited. However, the cost of collecting and analyzing data from such a large sample may be prohibitive. The Supply Study references used in this study effort are listed in Table 14.

**Table 14. Supply Study References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
Enlistment Decisions in the 1990's: Evidence from Individual-Level Data, MR-944-OSD/A	Kilburn, Rebecca and Jacob A. Klerman	RAND	1999
Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps	Wong, Leonard	US Army War College	10/00
Military Recruiting Outlook: Recent Trends in Enlistment Propensity and Conversion of Potential Enlisted Supply, MR-677-A/OSD	Orvis, Bruce R., Narayan Sastry, and Laurie McDonald	RAND	1996

Continued on the next page.

**Table 14. Supply Study References (Continued)**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>AUTHOR</b>	<b>SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER</b>	<b>DATE</b>
Modeling the Individual Enlistment Decision: Analysis of the Career Decision Survey	Sticha, Paul J, C. Mazie Knerr, Robert A. Ramos, and Ani DiFazio	US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: Alexandria, VA	9/99
New Recruit Survey (Brief), September 1999		NRC	9/99
Recruiting Trends and their Implications for Models of Enlistment Supply, MR-847-OSD/A	Murray, Michael P. and Laurie McDonald	RAND	1999
Youth Attitude and Values Study		Campbell-Ewald Advertising	2/01

Kilburn and Klerman use 1992 and 1994 National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) data to re-estimate a 1980's model of enlistment choice in their study, Enlistment Decisions in the 1990's: Evidence from Individual-Level Data, MR-944-OSD/A. Analysis results show that factors affecting enlistment decisions had not materially changed between the 1980's and 1992. For high school seniors, those factors include: AFQT score, mother's schooling, family income, number of siblings and marriage plans. For working candidates, those variables include wage related variables, and unemployment status.

Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps by Dr Leonard Wong addresses a growing cultural conflict between senior and junior officers. This conflict is reflected in attitude differences that arise from generational expectations differences. They are the source of significant leadership challenges.

Military Recruiting Outlook: Recent Trends in Enlistment Propensity and Conversion of Potential Enlisted Supply, MR-677-A/OSD by Orvis, Sastry, and MacDonald uses YATS data from 1993 and MEPCOM enlistment data through FY1995 to investigate trends in enlistment propensity for all military services. The time frame reflects the impact of a sudden increase in accession requirements following the post cold war period of reduced recruiting effort. This study found that the supply of potential high quality recruits is relatively constant, a decline in propensity increases the difficulty of conversion and leads to shortfalls in monthly recruiting performance. The authors recommend increases in advertising, educational benefits and the number of recruiters to meet short-term needs for increased production.

In their study titled, Recruiting Trends and their Implications for Models of Enlistment Supply (MR-847-OSD/A), authors Michael P. Murray and Laurie McDonald use 1990's U.S. Census bureau Public Use Micro Data Area (PUMA) to validate a 1980's enlistment supply model. Results for the Navy model were inconclusive but seemed to show continuance of 1980's trends.

Modeling the Individual Enlistment Decision: Analysis of the Career Decision Survey by Sticha et al describes the results a nationwide telephone survey of 1,808 youth aged 16 to



21. The results of the survey showed that positive attitudes towards the military, physical fitness, and recent family relationships are positively associated with enlistment. Attitudes toward job security and concerns about long enlistment terms were good predictors in the attitude area. Good academic performance in high school reduced the likelihood of enlistment. The survey also confirmed the utility and accuracy of a 4-minute word knowledge test designed to identify individuals with either high or low aptitude.

**3.3.9 School Management.** Managing RTC and A School student load are essential to the efficient operation of the EPS. The impact of surges and unbalanced accessions falls almost entirely on schoolhouse. The complexity of the quota management process and seasonal variations in accession rates present a particular challenge. Table 15 lists the School Management references used in this study.

**Table 15. School Management References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
Analysis of Student Not-Under-Instruction Time in Initial Skills Training: Trends, Causes, and Proposed Fixes, CRM 98-138	Belcher, Steven, Valerie C. Reinert, and Catherine M. Hiatt	CNA: Alexandria, VA	1/99
Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training (With Appendices)	Margaret Barton, SRA Corp	NPRST	5/93
RTC Transportation Study - Summary Process Description (Draft)	Sabre Inc, DRC	CNET	4/24/00
Student Flow in Initial Training (SFIT) Model, CRM D0001931.A2	Belcher, Steven, Theresa H. Kimble	CNA: Alexandria, VA	9/00
Training Continuum and Readiness Modeling: Task Technical Development Plan	Ilia Christman NPPDC Code 111 901-874-4645	CNET Code TR215	7/12/99

Inefficiencies in student flow management result in non-productive student time. Student Not-Under-Instruction (NUI) time is costly in momentary terms and causes morale problems for sailors in these categories. Analysis of Student Not-Under Instruction Time in Initial Skills Training by Steven Belcher and Commander Valerie Reinert identifies the major causes of NUI time in initial skills training and recommends strategies for reducing it. NUI categories included in this study are: Awaiting Instruction (AI), Awaiting Transfer (AT), and Interrupted-Instruction (II). A wide range of solutions is identified. An Excel Spreadsheet-based model for estimating AI time for a specific course schedule is described in the Belcher/Reinert study report.

Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training by Dr. Margaret Barton documents existing accession processes. Seven workshops were conducted to identify and validate activities comprising the following functions: Manage Navy Accessions, Manage A-School Training, and Manage Advanced Skill Training.

Stephen Belcher and Theresa Kimble discuss a computer model of student flow in Student Flow in Initial Training (SFIT) Model. The SFIT model uses a PC based



simulation model to track the weekly flow of students through RTC and A-school training. The objective of the model is to assess the impact of policy changes on student flow. This capability will enable users to forecast student flow problems, identify potential bottlenecks and design effective corrective action. The authors found that the quality of input data on course quotas, size, and schedule present obstacles to the effective use of the model. This report does not document any effort to validate the model against actual data.

The Sabre Inc report, titled RTC Transportation Study: Summary Process Description (Draft) identifies priority shortfalls in existing quota management and recruit processing activities.

A major research effort is now under way at NPRST to document and model this complex process. This effort is documented in the Training Continuum and Readiness Modeling Task Technical Development Plan Prepared by John Bouzios and Illia Christman.

**3.3.10 Technology.** The Internet and personal computers in general represent a major force in today's culture, particularly among members of the Navy target audience. The importance of integrating this new technology with the Navy recruiting process was emphasized in interviews at Headquarters CNRC and in many of the recruiting initiatives now being fielded. Advertising and Marketing (Code 82) indicated that Internet leads were doubling annually and accounted for a large percentage of the total national leads last year. However, as listed in Table 16, our literature search uncovered only three Navy studies addressing this issue. Furthermore, in spite of the recognized importance of the Internet, none of these studies attempt to determine or measure the impact of technology strategies on accessions.

**Table 16. Technology References**

TITLE	AUTHOR	SPONSOR/ PUBLISHER	DATE
Effectiveness of the Navy's Cyberspace Recruiting Efforts During CY 1998	Golfin, Peggy and Michael Y. Katz	Center for Naval Analysis: Alexandria, VA	6/99
Technology and Navy Recruiting, CAB 97-60	Golfin, Peggy A., Scott E. smith	CNA: Alexandria, VA	10/97
The Use of Internet Technology in Navy Recruiting: The Online Recruiting Station (ORS)	Dodge, R. Nicholas	Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey	3/99

Golfin and Katz summarize the results of 4-month test of Internet recruiting in Effectiveness of the Navy's Cyberspace Recruiting Efforts During CY 1998. Although the test was limited, results were positive. "The question is not whether the Navy should continue to invest in the Internet as a recruiting and awareness tool, but how fast" was one of the conclusions of the study. The study highlights the need for adequate staffing and support of any cyberspace effort.

Technology and Navy Recruiting by Golfin and Smith is a 1997 briefing report that summarizes the findings of a Technology Task force established in 1996. The briefing report makes recommendations in three areas: Internet recruiting through advertising and the use of internet employment sites, the enhancement of Showcase/Intranet capability, and the development of multi-media recruiting tools for use in the field.

Commander Dodge's study, On-line Recruiting Station, proposes that an on-line system be designed as a supplement or alternative to the current recruiting system. The prototype proposed by Commander Dodge would allow the prospective candidate to investigate Navy opportunities and environment, qualify for a rating using an on-line version of the ASVAB, and interact with a Navy recruiter to ask specific questions. The on-line format supports a variety of interactive tools for communicating with prospective recruits. A focus group conducted with High School students indicated a positive response to the interactive aspects of the system.

## **Chapter 4. Analysis of Issues and Findings**

**4.1 Introduction.** The EPS is a large and complex system involving many separate organizations, processes, and procedures and a plethora of interfaces. Our literature review and data collection interviews with key players in that process confirms that the challenges and opportunities faced by the system are equally complex. There is no shortage of issues, documented and undocumented. Nor does the Navy lack recommendations for addressing these issues. It is clear from our research that the greatest shortfall is the ability to sort out and organize both issues and recommendations and the willingness of the Navy to explore and test non-traditional solutions to recurring problems. We will help to sort out the issues in this chapter. Having done so, the sorted issues will become a way of organizing the recommendations in Chapter 5.

Appendix E of this report contains a list of the organizations that the study team visited. Within these organizations, the study team interviewed individuals with some management responsibility (typically heads of the organizations with additional support personnel providing additional information). Prior to the interview, material provided by CNRC, information obtained from the Internet, and/or information obtained from completed or on-going studies was used to formulate a set of questions to ask the respondent to guide the interview process. As information was obtained, other questions may have been asked to help to clarify or expand a particular response. The individuals being interviewed were also asked if they had any briefings, standard operating procedures, regulations, or other documents that explain their organization's mission, functions, and services or products. Material provided on organization mission, functions, and services or products was used to construct the process model developed in Chapter 3 of this report.

In the course of the interview, the study team was provided additional references, sources of information, or other individuals to contact. The study team found that the Navy middle and senior management readily provided information and support and, for the most part, supported our study efforts and findings and encouraged us to press on. They provided invaluable information and sources and opened other avenues from which the study team obtained additional information.

The opinions that were collected from the individuals being interviewed were first collected in the form of transcripts that were provided to the organization for review, comment, and clarification. Some information on topics such as organizational structure, mission, etc. was also collected during the interviews. From these transcripts, the pertinent observations were extracted. Appendix D to this report contains a list of 461 observations that resulted from the interviews.

The 461 observations were compressed into 29 issues that will be discussed below. Some of the issues identified in this chapter and some of the recommendations given in chapter 5 may have already been resolved. Other issues are persistent ones that appear in the literature repeatedly and will require non-traditional changes to adequately address. Many issues will also take a significant effort by several organizations to be resolved.

**4.2 Some Background.** The review of literature alerted the study team to a variety of persistent problems that date back several years. The study team also made several overall observations during the interviews, some of which are not reflected in the issue assessment in the next section, and some of which were taken from the research references.

**4.2.1 CNRC Background.** The study team had the opportunity to visit most of the CNRC elements and discuss a variety of items with several individuals from each organization. Some of the information gained through these interviews provides some insight into the issues that arose from the CNRC interviews:

- There did not seem to be much awareness of what the individual's counterpart in other Military Services are doing.
- There did not seem to be a concern for monitoring or evaluating trends. Rather, the focus tended to be on current issues.
- There is a new Navy advertising agency. The type of contract is a type with various incentives for the advertising agency vs. a strictly cost type of contract. It appeared to the study team that even with this change, the Navy would have trouble with effective use of the advertising results for the following reasons:
  - There is no in-house ability to do advertising research.
  - The military personnel are rotated through advertising without any prior experience.
  - There is little in-house media production capability (this affects the ability of the advertising agency to communicate with CNRC).
- There is a new source for youth demographics (Yankelovich Market Survey, which replaces the Youth Attitudinal Tracking Survey – YATS). However, due to a lack of research capability, the study team saw that the boxes of information that were arriving at CNRC were not being evaluated.
- Many programs are being evaluated and initiated, but there is no apparent individual/organization to track changes.
  - It was difficult to tell which ones made a contribution to the recruiting effort.
  - The conditions to test initiatives prior to implementing or tracking changes were not set up prior to implementing.
  - Many programs were simultaneously implemented across the command, so even if tracking data were collected, it would be very difficult to determine which programs were causing any effect.
- There is an insufficient CNRC research capability. This contributes to the following outcomes:
  - CNRC is dependent upon CNA and NPRST for their research needs. These agencies typically program their work in advance and have many clients to service. This means that projects tend to be of long duration and initiation of an ad hoc study means that some other programmed work has to slip.
  - There generally is a lack of Navy Operations Research capability. This results in the lack of ability to look at Operations and Processes effectively.

CNA and NPRST do not have an extensive Operations Research capability as well.

- The focus of CNRC is on making mission; not on setting up the conditions to test the effectiveness of programs. As a result, inefficient and ineffective programs may be funded.
- Plans and Policy of CNRC, which contains the Research capability, is now part of Operations. This causes the focus of the organization to be on current production, with little focus on on-going issues. We note the needs for changes in this organization:
  - Plans and Policy used to be a separate element within CNRC until the relocation of the command to its present location in Tennessee.
  - Recruit Operations does need its own ability to do Operations Analysis.
  - CNRC also needs the ability to look at mission, trends, and processes.
  - The Army model provides both; Operations and Program Analysis and Evaluation are two separate elements within the command, each of which has its own analysts.
- The Navy Recruiter training course is five weeks long. We compare this to the Army's Recruiter training course:
  - The Army has a seven-week training course.
  - The Army course has a one-week Recruiter Exercise.
  - The Army uses contracted civilians for the reserve recruiting mission.
  - The Army used to have civilian employees that did Army Reserve recruiting.
- Roll-outs (individuals not shipping on a contracted date) account for almost 50 percent of school losses.
  - Roll-outs are not accounted for in the Quota Management Model.
  - CNRC overbooks some training seats to lessen the likelihood that Roll-outs will cause a shortage.
- Training and Recruiting need to be better synchronized (this is more of a problem with schools that do not have a new class starting each week).
- There was a general feeling that NRAMS will take years to develop and implement and that it will be obsolete when it is implemented.
  - Competition for funds will make it difficult to develop a Navy-specific system.
  - This system competes with Joint Accession Group (JAG) efforts to build a similar system for all Services to use.
  - "Army Passing on Notes" by George I Sefers, Federal Computer Week (FCW), 9 September 2000 (FCW.com) on the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) indicates that Microsoft and Nexor demonstrated the functionality of a system developed from existing software for about \$50,000 in several months, but the Army had already spent millions of dollars and years of time trying to develop its own system.
- The formal command inspection program was abolished in January 2000 to remove the "intrusive inspections."
  - The National Training Team (NTT) now conducts limited inspections.

- The NTT number of teams and resources available have been significantly reduced.
- NTT is now part of the Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU).
- Inspections help to identify process errors and provide remedial training to correct problems.

We note that the Army Recruiting Command has an extensive Program Analysis and Evaluation (and Research) capability. As stated in SNAPSHOT, **“USAREC has a Red Cell (Strategic Planning Division) that tracks the other services and runs comparisons with their recruiters.... The Red Cell has graphic proof that Army and Navy are competing for the same market.”** Clearly, lack of research ability and diversion of resources into inefficient and ineffective programs will have a very adverse effect on Navy recruiting in specific and the EPS in general.

**4.2.2 Policy and Practices Background.** The study team also reviewed some of the recruiting practices and policy in effect at the time of our interviews. Several of our findings provide insight into the interview observations:

- End strength of the Navy is measured on 30 September of each year.
  - This encourages surges at the end of the year to help the Navy to make its end strength requirements.
  - This encourages the Navy to “pillage DEP” to increase shipping rates at the end of the fiscal year.
  - This encourages the Navy to bring in lower quality sailors at the end of the fiscal year at one time. This puts a large burden on RTC specifically (it has limited resources for remedial training) and the training community in general.
- There are few opportunities for civilian development/progression:
  - Density for civilians is low in many organizations.
  - There is no career path to many of the top civilian positions.
  - It is difficult for civilians to get time/funds for training.
  - There are few developmental training opportunities for civilians.
- There are several types of surges experienced within the EPS:
  - CNRC ships 50 percent of its recruits in the summer months (June to September). RTC has limited facilities and personnel to handle the surges.
  - The full capacity of the training base is underutilized.
  - Surges at RTC will affect other training schools and the fleet (this “bunches” the output of the schools rather than providing graduates when the fleet has vacancies).
  - Rotation of fleet sailors affects the recruiter training cycle (this tends to cause summer time reassignments).
  - There are more A and C schools than the single RTC basic training institution, so the effects of RTC surging is dampened as the graduates go to other training schools.
  - Some easy-to-fill positions are filled early in the Fiscal Year (e.g., Yeoman). This means that the entire supply of graduates is made available early nearly simultaneously.

- Not following the shipping schedule for school graduates means that the fleet goes undermanned and affects the quality of life for other fleet sailors that have to take up the work not performed by the vacancy.
- There was a general feeling that there are more problems in enlistment at the end of a month when the Military Entrance Processing Station are flooded with applicants. There was also a feeling expressed that many recruiters are well aware of this and use the condition to get certain applicants through the system.

Each problem is perceived by different observers to have different causes and solutions. We note that the literature, too, contains some conflicting findings. One example on quota management and training capacity is presented. A Center for Naval Analyses study (CRM 98-138, dated January 1999) contains a finding: **“Most student-quota mismatches result from violations to the quota management reservation process.”** Quotas tend to be determined on the basis of level loading training seats to maximize the use of resources. In a Naval Audit Service Draft Audit Report (1999-0024 dated 24 July 2000), one view was expressed: **“We found that the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel) and the Director of Naval Training/Chief of Naval Education and Training did not have a policy or process that led to the identification of the need for a way to provide additional training capacity during the summer months. Not having such a policy that results in a process to ensure that recruiting objectives are not negatively affected by a lack of summer capacity is a material internal control deficiency.”** The report then provided several recommendations to overcome the deficiency:

- Reduce the FY 2001 non-summer recruiting goals to achieve amounts.
- Increase summer goals to the amount needed to meet the annual recruiting objectives.
- Adjust recruit loading plans and training curriculum accordingly.
- Establish a policy requirement to periodically review training capacity to assure that recruiting goals will not be negatively impacted by a lack of summer training capacity.

**4.2.3 Navy Process Management and Control Background.** The study team interviewed individuals from a variety of organizations dealing with process management and control. Sections 2.11 and 2.12 of this report cover some of the processes that the study team reviewed. Some of the findings and background from these interviews and appropriate literature include:

- No one in the Navy knows all of the personnel processes used.
- Turnover of military personnel hurts Navy personnel.
- There is a small community of Navy individuals with a personnel background, but they have to be “engineered” to get them to the right assignment.
- Many of the Enlisted Community Managers are on their first tour in personnel positions. It takes a long time for them to learn their functions.
- The Navy needs to have a uniformed corps of personnel doing Human Resources work.



- The lack of the Human Resources ability means that much time is spent in explaining fundamental manpower things to senior officers that have personnel-related duties.
- The Navy needs to do some testing on a civilian career force.
- There is no longevity in the force. The system works extensively in 3-year cycles. Things must happen on an individual leader's watch, so long term efforts generally are not undertaken.
- There is a need to develop a long-range plan, provide a reasonable period of evaluation with appropriate metrics, and then experiment.

**4.2.4 RTC Training Background.** Whereas the first challenge to the EPS is to get the recruit through DEP and access the individual, the second challenge is to get the recruit through the recruit training. There are several references that provide good background material on the RTC situation:

- Recruits are treated different than they would be in civilian training:
  - They are kept up all night during in-processing
  - They must keep silent for an appreciable length of time while in basic training.
  - They are prone to falling asleep.
  - They get considerably different treatment from the recruiters than they do while at RTC (Source: SNAPSHOT)
- GAO/NSIAD-00-146 study on attrition at RTC shows some of the reasons for the recruit attrition:
  - Performance problem (PT test, attitude, adjustment) attrition is 34 percent (RTC has developed several remedial programs to deal with these areas to reduce attrition).
  - Medical/physical attrition is 26 percent.
  - Fraudulent/erroneous enlistment attrition is 23 percent.
  - Other attrition is 17 percent.
- Surges of enlisted accessions during the summer months loads RTC heavily and many follow-on schools, increasing backlogs of sailors Awaiting Instruction.
- The Navy has hired Sabre Government Solutions to conduct a Study, RTC Transportation Study: Summary Process Description. They have provided a draft report dated 24 April 2000 (that apparently will remain in draft) that lists the top 10 problems and process improvement opportunities for RTC. The areas of recommendations (in parentheses) include:
  - Classification (1, 3, 4, 5, and 9)
  - In-Processing (2)
  - Transportation and Out-Processing (6 and 10)
  - Order Writing (7 and 8)
- A June 2000 GAO/NSIAD-00-146 report concludes that **“Navy officials have not collected data on how many enlistees who enrolled in these remedial programs ultimately completed their first tour of duty. Therefore, the Navy cannot determine whether such programs are only delaying rather than preventing early separation.”**

**4.2.5 Training Background.** In addition to RTC, the study team visited several organizations involved in training management, research, and policy. Unlike our visit to RTC at Great Lakes, Illinois, the study team did not visit any other school. However, we did interview individuals that have direct contact with the Navy schools. Some of the training background information that the study team encountered included:

- Misalignment of fill means that some school/instructor resources are underutilized or extra classes have to be scheduled at increased cost (we could not get any specific information on costs over time, but apparently this is becoming a much more common occurrence).
- When there are more A-school graduates than C-school seats, some graduates are sent directly to the fleet (they are, therefore, not as well trained and additional cost is incurred if the individual is subsequently sent to C-school).
- Misalignment of fill resulted in 50 percent more Aviation Technician (AT) students in FY00 than what was planned for. Other areas have similar misalignment of fill.
- Scheduling Navy personnel for other Service's schools has to be done manually since the Services have different information and quota management systems.
- There are several fields where a general civilian designation (e.g., Administration) the present Navy code (e.g., Yeoman) could be used:
  - The process that groups ratings is called Core and Strand method.
  - Administration field, for example, could bring Core courses together and take Strand (or specialty-producing) training after Core courses are completed.
  - To work, the C-School would have to be selected early in A-school (not presently possible).
  - The Navy would also have to know specific fleet requirements (apparently this is a problem now in that only the number of positions is known in the planning process).
- If there is a difficulty in making assignments, Await Training time increases.
- Detailers are turning over so much that they do not have time to look into the future. Rather, they tend to look at the supply of graduates and current requirements. Also, each of them is new to the personnel area, so therefore, they spend time simply learning their job.

**4.2.6 Some Army Recruiting Background.** W. Scott Slocum reported in his SNAPSHOT study at "...The Red Cell has graphic proof that Army and Navy are competing for the same market." Literature also indicates that the Army and Navy are competitors in the same market. Thus, the study team decided to review Army Recruiting literature (some of which is reviewed in this study report) and to visit the Army Recruiting Command. We spoke to Colonel Greg Parlier, Director of the Program Analysis and Evaluation (PAE), U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The following information provides some background that for the study findings in this report:

- The Army is changing from individual recruiter missioning to team missioning.
- The incentives and definitions of successful teams (e.g., metrics) have been agreed to in advance of initiating the team missioning concept.

- USAREC has a separate Enlisted Standards Directorate to track recruiter problems.
- Recruiting Operations has its own set of Operations Research Analysts for day-to-day production analysis.
- PAE has about 50 analysts to conduct trend and other analyses.
- PAE is organized in three Divisions:
  - Strategic Management Division (which looks at new technology and concepts)
  - Research and Plans (which conducts internal studies and monitors external studies)
  - Marketing and Mission (which develops the recruiting mission and conducts market zone analyses)
- The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 mandated a test of outsourcing in 10 company regions:
  - Plans have been completed for eliminating all military recruiters in 10 company regions that will participate in the test.
  - There will be several contractors (avoids the situation where a single poor performing contractor can make the test fail).
  - The test is scheduled to begin on 1 October 2001.
- Many of the programs needed to enhance military recruiting run counter to the current culture; for example:
  - The Air Force uses a recruiter selection screen to avoid selecting recruiters that are not likely to be successful.
  - The Army management will not allow such a screen (many of the Army recruiters are "detailed").
- PAE is looking at setting up an "Experimental Force" for field testing innovative concepts.
- USAREC has established a Center for Army Recruiting Lessons Learned (CARLL) for collecting completed studies and other pertinent information.
- In our December 2000 interview, the Director of PAE summed up the challenge for USAREC: "...We cannot sustain the level of resources available in FY00...we need to evaluate what worked and did not work."

**4.2.7 Army Recruiting Contractor Interview Background.** On 27 November 2000, the study team interviewed Colonel (Retired) Donald Tarter, who is the contract administrator of the contractor (MPRI) that has three USAREC contracts. In his military career, Colonel Tarter has had about 12 years of experience with Army Recruiting, including: Director of Operations at USAREC, USAREC Inspector General, and a MEPS Commander. It is also important to note that USAREC used civil service employees in the early 1980s as Reserve Recruiters. The purpose of the three contracts is to:

- Augment U.S. Army Reserve Recruiting (Mission is to recruit 1300 Non-Prior Service soldiers per year).
  - MPRI hires civilians (usually former military).
  - Contractor receives a fixed amount per recruit.

- The civilian recruiter receives about 50 percent of salary on a per recruit basis, with the other 50 percent being a fixed salary.
- The Army provides the automobile, phone, computer, and office space.
- USAREC IG investigates any recruiting irregularities; contractor takes any action to discipline or remove contracted recruiters.
- USAREC trains the recruiters (if needed).
- Most recruiters are former military recruiters (this allows the contractor to look at the applicant's production record prior to hiring).
- This has been considered to be a successful program and may be expanded.
- Provide contracted Guidance Counselors and Army Liaisons at the MEPS.
- Provide secretaries for recruiting companies.

**4.2.8 High School Counselor Interview Background.** In his report, Major Factors Affecting Recruiting: Making Them Work for the Army, LTC Lee A. Harris (Army War College, 10 May 2000) stated, **"Keeping influencers connected to the Army, through educating them about America's National Military Strategy, the Army's role and missions, and the benefits that it provides young people, will help them view the Army in a more positive light."** To gain a better understanding of the High School market, the study team conducted short interviews of counselors in 6 cities (three in Andover, MA and three in Indianapolis, IN). We wanted to see what one very important group of influencers thought about military service. The following background information is provided:

- A large percentage of students plan to go to college upon graduation from High School
- High School students are not very interested in taking the ASVAB (since colleges do not use it for admission).
- The tests that counselors push are the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (PSAT) for Sophomores and the SAT for Juniors and Seniors.
- Schools do provide an opportunity for the Career Exploration Program, administered by USMEPCOM, but typically have few students participate due to disinterest in the test.
- The counselors have problems in scheduling more tests since the schools have to administer mandated graduation-qualification tests. There is not much time left in student schedules for more tests after the qualification tests, the PSAT, and SAT are administered.
- The most prevalent comment that the study team heard was that the counselors either did not see Navy recruiters much or they did not know the difference between the Service Recruiter uniforms.
- Many of the counselors were not aware of incentive programs offered by the Military Services (some knew that the Services had some kind of education and bonus program, but were not aware of any specific points).
- Frequently, a single counselor was designated as the "Military Liaison." The study team felt that this was a contributing factor for the lack of knowledge about the Military.

**4.3 EPS Interview Issue Overview.** In performing our analysis of issues obtained from literature and interviews, we determined that the main sources of problems could be categorized into 14 areas as shown in Table 17. We will discuss the analysis of the issues that resulted from our interviews. We will then show some of the cause and effect relationships that resulted from our analysis.

**Table 17. Interview Observations and Categories.**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Personnel	107
Process	72
Consistency	40
Market	35
Program Evaluation	34
Research	32
Resources	30
Process Control	19
Mission & Roles	19
Schedule Conflicts	16
Information Connectivity	16
Drug Testing	15
Near-Term vs. Long-Term	14
Surges	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>461</b>

Appendix E to this report gives the location, dates, and organizations visited by the study team. Table 18 (next page) shows the breakdown of responses by organization and category of issue. This table shows that the study team interviewed individuals involved in most of the EPS (with the exception of the Sailors in their first assignment in the fleet). Organizations include many of the CNRC elements (including NORU, which trains the new recruiters and two Navy Recruiting Districts), the policy organizations (Navy, WASH D.C. elements), the training community (RTC and CNET), the research community (Center for Naval Analyses, NPRST, and NETPDTC), and the testing, screening, contracting, and classification organization (MEPCOM). The study team also visited guidance counselors at several school systems (three Indianapolis and three Boston high schools) to gain an understanding of how guidance counselors view military service in general and Navy service in general. Finally, the study team discussed recruiting with COL Greg Parlier, Director of the Program Analysis and Evaluation (PAE) at Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky and the director of a contract between the U.S. Army and MPRI (at Fort Knox, Kentucky) for recruiting non prior service U.S. Army Reserve soldiers.

Inspection of Table 18 shows that some organizations had a lot of observations covering a wide spectrum of topics (e.g., NORU and RTC Processing & Operations). Some organizations (e.g., CNRC Medical Programs and Judge Advocate General) had few observations.

**Table 18. Summary of Interview Observations by Organization and Category**

	Personnel	Process	Consistency	Market	Program Evaluation	Research	Resources	Process Control	Mission & Roles	Schedule Conflicts	Information Connectivity	Drug Testing	Near-Term vs. Long-Term	Surges	TOTAL OBSERVATIONS
<b>CNRC (HQ):</b>		1	1								1				3
- CRF	5	2					1		2				1		11
- Enlisted Recruiting		13				1	2		2	4		1			23
- Plans/Policy		3	2		6	8	1	1	3			4	3		31
- Educational Specs		4					2						1		7
- Marketing	2	1				3	3	1	3						13
- Cyber Space e-Recruiting		1					1								2
- Information Systems	3	1	1						1		4				10
- Inspector General					1		3	6			1				11
- Personnel & Logistics	5	1	6		4		1	3	1		1		1		23
- Operations	5	7		12	1			2			1			1	29
- Officer Programs	2			1			1		1						5
- Medical Programs						1									1
- Judge Advocate General					1										1
<b>NPRST</b>			1												1
<b>Navy, WASH D.C.:</b>															
- Enlisted Bonus		1	3		2		1		1						8
- Quota Management Office		1	2			2	2				1				8
- Research & Analysis	4	1	1			1	2								9
- NRC – Wash Detachment	5	5	8	3	4	4		2							31
- Navy College Program		1		1	5			1		3				3	14
- DoD Accession Policy					3										3
- Enlist Strength	8									1			6	1	16
Center for Naval Analyses	3	3			1		1		1	1	1			1	12
<b>RTC:</b>															
- Processing & Operations	6	9	3	6		1	1	1		3	1		1	2	34
- Recruit Quality Assurance Team		2					1								3
- Chief of Staff Training		2	2		1							1			6
<b>MEPCOM</b>	1	1	4				1				2				9
<b>NORU</b>	29	3	5	4		3	4	1			2	2		3	56
<b>CNET</b>	3	4					1		1	4	1		1		15
<b>NETPDTC</b>		1				1	1								3
Indianapolis NRD	18	1	1									7			27
Boston NRD XO	1					1									2
Indianapolis HS Counselors				3											3
Boston HS Counselors				5											5
MPRI, Fort Knox	7	1			4	1		1	3					1	18
USAREC Dir, PAE		2			1	5									8
<b>Total</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>461</b>



The study team recognizes that the issue categories were arbitrarily determined and that they are not mutually exclusive. Process and Process Control, for example, could have very well been combined into a single category. Other categories have several areas. As shown in Table 19, Personnel, for example, has six subject areas that the study team identified. The product of the number of organizations (Orgs) and observations (Obs) was used to determine the Rank Score. The last two columns give the relative rank of the Subject area based on number of organizations (Org Rank) and observations (Obs Rank).

**Table 19. Ranking Interview Issues**

Category	Subject	Number of Orgs	Number of Obs	Rank Score	Weighted Rank	Org Rank	Obs Rank
Personnel	Turn-over	11	25	275	2	3	2
	Recruiters	9	18	162	5	6	5
	CRF	4	15	60	21	24	14
	Leadership	3	9	27	26	27	26
	Incentives	2	8	16	28	28	27
	Civilian Employees	2	3	6	29	29	29
Process	Current Process	12	32	384	1	2	1
	Goals & Mission	6	15	90	17	18	13
	Losses	9	11	99	11	7	20
	DEP	5	11	55	22	22	23
Consistency	Policy	7	17	119	8	10	8
	Sales Organization	7	14	98	12	13	16
	Team vs. Individual	5	11	55	23	23	24
	Standards	7	11	77	18	14	21
Market	Analysis	6	18	108	9	15	6
	Changing Attitudes	5	13	65	20	21	17
Program Evaluation	Evaluation Over Time	10	19	190	4	4	4
	MOE, Metrics, Data	8	12	96	14	9	19
Research	Capability	8	20	160	6	8	3
Resources	Funding	15	17	255	3	1	7
	Manpower	6	9	54	24	20	25
	Facilities	4	4	16	27	26	28
Process Control	In-Process Review	7	15	105	10	11	10
Mission & Roles	Connectivity	6	15	90	15	16	11
Schedule Conflicts	Await Instruction	7	14	98	13	12	15
Information Connectivity	Information Systems	10	15	150	7	5	9
Drug Testing	Counter Productive	4	13	52	25	25	18
Near-Term vs. Long-Term	Focus	6	13	90	16	17	12
Surges	Surges Harmful	6	11	66	19	10	22



From Table 19, it can be seen that the Current Process and Personnel Turn-over tend to be the highest rank under each of the three ranking schemes. Funding Resources were commented on by the most organizations (giving it a ranking of one under Org Rank), but received a moderate number of observations (15), resulting in a weighted ranking of three (and a ranking of 7 by number of observations only).

Civilian Employees was ranked last under all three ranking schemes. This is probably a reflection of the low number of civilians in management and leadership positions within the EPS. What is not apparent from Table 19 is that most of the observations on Civilian Employees came from civilians.

An interesting observation concerns the low ranking of Manpower Resources (24 on using the weighted rank) and Turn-over of Personnel (weighted rank of 2) and Recruiter Personnel (weighted rank of 5). The issue of Personnel does not revolve around the number of personnel (otherwise the Manpower Resources would have had a smaller weighted rank). Rather, the issue revolves around the ability of the personnel to perform their job with all of the turn over experienced within the organizations. The inexperience and other observations regarding recruiters are partially explained by turn over as well as the lack of sales expertise, low rank, and the selection process.

**4.4 Interview Issues.** The interview issues, in order of the weighted scores (number of observations times number of organizations) are shown in Table 20 below. The rationale for constructing the issue wording will be explained

**Table 20. Interview Issues**

Rank	Category	Subject	Issue
1	Process	Current Process	The current EPS process is outdated, inefficient, changes too frequently, and is not oriented toward a civilian market.
2	Personnel	Turn-over	The forced turn-over in the military personnel system hurts the system, results in instability in the EPS, and uses military personnel that lack specific personnel experience in essential EPS processes.
3	Resources	Funding	The EPS lacks sufficient funds and funding authority to carry out essential programs.
4	Program Evaluation	Evaluation over time	There is a lack of evaluation of on-going and new start programs.
5	Personnel	Recruiters	The use of enlisted recruiters takes skilled resources from the fleet and puts the sailors into positions for which they lack experience, exposing the most junior recruiters to additional personal problems.
6	Research	Capability	The entire EPS has an insufficient research capability.
7	Information Connectivity	Information Systems	Lack of capable, interconnected, EPS Information Systems hurts processes, inhibits effective communication, introduces errors, requires manual reentry of data from one system to another, is not sufficiently funded, and typically is exacerbated by individual organization efforts to update capability.
8	Consistency	Policy	Policy is ineffective in dealing with the civilian market and changes are made without analytical underpinnings and lack follow-on analyses.

Continued on the next page.

**Table 20. Interview Issues (Continued)**

Rank	Category	Subject	Issue
9	Market	Analysis	There is a critical need to conduct better market analysis and to use the analysis more effectively in decision-making processes.
10	Process Control	In-process Review	In-process inspections that have been downsized and eliminated should be reinstated and expanded.
11	Process	Losses	Losses are being experienced system-wide and the losses are not getting sufficient management attention.
12	Consistency	Sales Organization	Recruiting is not an effective sales organization.
13	Schedule Conflicts	Await Instruction	Await Instruction time increases due to schedule conflicts that are not being resolved.
14	Program Evaluation	MOE, Metrics, & Data	There is a lack of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and metrics to measure EPS success and a lack of data collection for on going program evaluations.
15	Mission & Roles	Connectivity	Several Navy EPS-related organizations are not efficiently connected (e.g., Active and Reserve, Navy Academy, and CNRC and CNET chain-of-command) and CNRC Plans and Policy has the wrong organizational connectivity.
16	Near-Term vs. Long-Term	Focus	The focus of management is on today; there is little long-term focus on future issues.
17	Process	Goals & Mission	Recruiting goals are not made available in a timely manner, are not efficiently loaded into the information systems, and are not consistent because they change without regard to the time necessary to adapt to the change.
18	Consistency	Standards	Difficulties arise across the EPS because standards across the EPS are not consistent.
19	Surges	Harmful Surges	The surges that occur across the EPS are harmful to the efficient operation of the system.
20	Market	Changing Attitudes	The recruiting market is rapidly changing, but there is not an effective research program to study the changing attitudes of the market.
21	Personnel	CRF	The CRF is out of touch with recruiting, is not focused on the recruiting mission, lacks sufficient leadership experience, and is ambivalent toward contemporary recruiting issues.
22	Process	DEP	Recruits lack training and management while in DEP.
23	Consistency	Team vs. Individual	Recruiting teams are trained, evaluated, incentivized, and behave as individuals.
24	Resources	Manpower	Lack of an appropriately sized, trained, and experienced personnel system hurts the EPS.
25	Drug Testing	Counter Productive	Navy drug testing policy shifts extra work/responsibility onto the recruiters and is ineffective in dealing with the civilian market.
26	Personnel	Leadership	The military EPS leadership experience is limited to Navy-to-Navy operations and tends to use politically correct/safe policy.
27	Resources	Facilities	The EPS is lacking sufficient, appropriate facilities.
28	Personnel	Incentives	The EPS is not addressing appropriate (recruiter and recruit) incentives.
29	Personnel	Civilian Employees	EPS civilian employees are not properly managed and used and there is little concern for career development, training, and progression.

The construction of the actual issue in Table 20 was formed by using key words used by the interviewed individuals. For example, the Issue ranked number one uses the terms: outdated, inefficient, changes too frequently, etc. As will be explained using Table 21, these key words were taken from interview results.

Appendix D to this report contains a list of the 461 observations collected in the organization interviews. As shown in Table 21, the observations are separated into 14 categories (Personnel, Process, Consistency, etc.). Under the Personnel category, Turnover is one subject that was discussed. The observations that pertain to Turnover are shown in the right hand column.

Continuing to go down the rows in Table 21 to the Process Category, the Current Process includes a description labeled Outdated. Note that one of the Observation numbers is Mk22. This means that Market observation number 22 addresses the Outdated Current Process. Thus, observations under different categories will include an indication of the category using the following abbreviations:

<b>Interview Observation Category</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Interview Observation Category</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>
Personnel	Per	Process Control	PC
Process	Pr	Mission & Roles	MR
Consistency	Co	Schedule Conflicts	SC
Market	Mk	Information Connectivity	IC
Program Evaluation	PE	Drug Testing	DT
Research	Re	Near-Term vs. Long-Term	NT
Resources	Re	Surges	Su

**Table 21. Interview Category/Subject Description**

<b>Category/Subject</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Observations</b>
<b>Personnel:</b>		
Turn-over	Military lacks EPS experience	5, 18, 19, 22, 45, 69, 72
	Instability due to turn-over	31, 32, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 93
	Forced turn-over hurts personnel system	20, 21, 50, 55, 64, 65, 68, 70, 97, 103
Recruiters	Taken from fleet mission	25, 40, 38, 78, 89
	E-4s bring extra problems	1, 3, 62, 63, 71, 94
	Lack sales experience	23, 24, 47, 56, 61, 95, 99
CRF	Out of touch with recruiting	13, 26, 42, 44
	Not focused on recruiting mission	14, 35, 37, 39
	Lack leadership experience	16, 36, 48, 49
	Ambivalent	27, 28, 43
Leadership	Political Correctness, play is safe philosophy	98, 100, 101, 102
	Experience limited to Navy-to-Navy operations	46, 66, 67, 76, 77
Incentives	Not addressing effective incentives	33, 34, 58, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81
Civilian Employees	Not properly managed/used	9, 10, 96
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	2, 4, 8, 25, 41, 51, 53, 54, 70, 92, 104, 105, 106, 107

Continued on the next page.

**Table 21. Interview Category/Subject Description (Continued)**

Category/Subject	Description	Observations
<b>Process:</b>		
Current Process	Inefficient	6, 7, 32, 40, 69, 70, 71, 72
	Outdated	1, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 39, 40, 44, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 67, Mk22
	Changed too frequently	51, 52, 53
	Military is not oriented to civilian market	2, 30, 31, 46
Goals/Mission	Not made available in timely manner	8, 26, 28, 48
	Not properly loaded into system	25, 27, 34, 36, 37, 58
	Not consistent	16, 33, 35, 37, 61
Losses	System-wide; not getting management attention	17, 18, 29, Per83, Per86, Per91, PE6, PE7, PE9, PE25, Co10
DEP	Recruits lack training while in DEP	9, 43, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, Pr16, PE22, Mk8, Su10
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	2, 11, 12, 13, 57, 59
<b>Consistency:</b>		
Policy	Policy changes without analytical underpinnings	14, Rh17, Rh21, PE1, PE2, PE28, PE32, DT12, Re24, PC15, MR16, Pr53
	Ineffective	3, 30, DT10, DT13, Per101
Sales Organization	Recruiting is not an effective sales organization	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 24, 26, 27, 28, 35, MR6, Per65, Pr45
Teams/Individual	Recruiting teams behave as individuals	6, 13, 19, 29, Per33, Per80, Per81, PC17, PC18, Pr57, Pr59
Standards	Standards are not consistent	8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, 31, 32, 33
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	22, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40
<b>Market:</b>		
Analysis	Need better market analysis	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30
Changing Attitudes	Need to study the changed attitudes of market	7, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	4, 5, 6, 12, 16, 21, 24, 35, Pr11, Pr12, Pr55
<b>Program Evaluation:</b>		
Evaluation over time	There is a lack of PE over time of on-going programs.	1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33
MOE/Metrics/Data	There is a lack of MOEs and metrics to measure success. Lack of data collection.	6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 32 21, 25, 26, 30
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	2, 4, 11, 19, 34

Continued on the next page.

**Table 21. Interview Category/Subject Description (Continued)**

Category/Subject	Description	Observations
<b>Research:</b>		
Capability	System has insufficient research capability	1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	10, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
<b>Resources:</b>		
Funding	Lack sufficient funds and funding authority (Includes Research budget)	1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28
Manpower	Insufficient number of trained personnel hurts system performance	6, 10, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30
Facilities	System is lacking sufficient facilities	9, 11, 13, 30
<b>Process Control:</b>		
In-process review	In-process inspections not done, downsized, and/or eliminated.	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	11
<b>Mission &amp; Roles:</b>		
Connectivity	Navy components not connected.	1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15
	Wrong Recruiting Plans & Policy connectivity	7, 16, NT10, NT11, NT12, PE17
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19
<b>Schedule Conflicts:</b>		
Await Instruction	Await Instruction increases due to schedule conflicts	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	13
<b>Information Connectivity:</b>		
Information Systems	Lack of Information Systems hurts process	2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 12
	- Manual reentry of data	1, 5
	- Introduces errors	15
	- Individual organization efforts	7, 11, 14
	- Inhibits communication	9
	- Not fully funded	8, 10
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	2, 16
<b>Drug Testing:</b>		
Counter productive	Drug testing shifts extra work and responsibility to recruiters	1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13
	Policy is ineffective in dealing with civilian market	3, 4, 10, 14
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	4, 5, 15
<b>Near-Term vs. Long-Term:</b>		
Focus	Focus of management is on today; little long term focus	

Continued on the next page.

**Table 21. Interview Category/Subject Description (Continued)**

Category/Subject	Description	Observations
<b>Surges:</b>		
Harmful Surges	Surges occur across the EPS system	1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11
	Effects of surges are harmful to EPS	4, 7, 9, 12
ALTERNATIVES	Some alternative strategies	1, 5, 6

In the interview process, individuals would frequently offer suggestions of alternatives for various topics. Following many of the Category/Subject areas in Table 21 is an ALTERNATIVES item. The observations for this item form the basis for the recommendations that are discussed in the next chapter.

**4.5 What Literature Says About Some Causes for Issues.** The study team explored the literature and reviewed the interview results to determine some of the causes and effects of the issues.

**4.5.1 Personnel.** Under the Personnel Category are the subjects of Turnover, Recruiters, CRF, Leadership, Incentives, and Civilian Employees. These subject areas are discussed separately below.

**4.5.1.1 Turnover.** Turn-over of military personnel creates a situation where individuals are constantly learning the old way of doing business. The three-year cycles of military personnel, coupled with a lack of training and past personnel experience, results in little longevity in the force. We found that most frequently, individuals that were asked questions about their particular job turned to briefing charts, memorandums, or other documents produced by their predecessors to obtain the requested information. The lack of Standard Operating Procedures, regulations, or other guidelines inhibits the ability of a new person to learn the responsibilities of a particular position. This was especially noticeable in Detailers and in CNRC Advertising and Marketing, where two-thirds of the Production and Media individuals are new to Advertising and Marketing. Additionally, since management also turns over rapidly, there is a built in bias at preserving the status quo (a near-term perspective) and against evolving the organization.

**“Many of the ECMs are on their first tour in personnel positions. It takes a long time for them to learn their functions”** (Source: CAPT Steve Conn, U.S. Navy, Head of Enlisted Strength and Advancement Plans, 26 October 2000 interview).

**4.5.1.2 Recruiters.** The Navy does not appear to have come to terms with the college recruiting issue. Increasingly, the Navy is turning to lower experienced E-4's that have not been trained to recruit effectively in that market. Our review of literature points to the conclusion that recruiters also lack the computer skills that the recruiting market increasingly is in use; specifically use of the Internet.

**4.5.1.3 Career Recruiting Force (CRF).** The CRF is not viewed across the EPS as productive enhancements to the recruiting process. In his SNAPSHOT A Look At The Process, Policies, and People with Recommendations (April 17, 2000), Scott Slocum

stated that there is a need to **“bring back excellence in the CRF community.”** A year later, the study team finds that there apparently has been no progress, as viewed by the individuals being interviewed, in changing the image of the CRF.

**4.5.1.4 Leadership.** **“Many of the programs needed to enhance recruiting run counter to the current culture”** (Source: Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, U.S. Army Recruiting Command). Alternatives considered tend to be traditional.

**4.5.1.5 Incentives.** The literature talks extensively about recruit incentives and has very little to say about recruiter incentives.

In An Analysis of the Effectiveness of U.S. Army Recruiter Incentive Program to Motivate Recruiters: A Survey of Enlisted Recruiters (NPS, September 1999), the following findings were presented:

- Current incentives do not motivate recruiters to meet or exceed their goal.
- Factors that do motivate recruiters include time off awards, Meritorious Promotions, Choice of follow-on assignments, and family support. In our discussions with some of the recruiters and the NRDs, we note that the promotions are restricted to a quota system and that time off awards are not accompanied by reduced mission (this means that when the recruiter takes time off, it generally has to be made up because the same mission remains but there is less time to accomplish the mission).

Recent studies question the return on investment of the Montgomery GI Bill, one of the military's strongest incentives available. In Attracting College Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options (RAND, 1999), one conclusion regarding recruiting incentives is, **“The fact that most MGIB participants obtain their education after separating implies that the military does not reap an active duty return on the most important college program that it offers.”** It would seem that this being true, the Navy would try to sell its in-service college program more to reap the active duty return on investment. However, analysis of data of enlistees that participate in this program indicate an almost zero completion rate.

The military's incentives increasingly are not as powerful as they once were in attracting the college bound market. The military's typical response is to simply increase the dollar amounts. However, this approach worsens the return on investment analysis. In a recent CNA report (CRM D0001428.A2/Final, August 2000), the conclusion is that **“CNRC must investigate ways to make serving in the Navy competitive with the alternative path of attending college and specifically, focusing on college-related incentives.”** While this approach may be viable, other alternatives should also be investigated (e.g., contracting support services and augmentation with career civil service employees).

**4.5.1.6 Civilian Employees.** Our interview process pointed out the lack of opportunity for civilians. Indeed, most of the individuals that we interviewed were military, with many having been in their position for only a short period of time. Although Civilian Employee observations were very low, we attribute this to the fact that there are few



civilians with appropriate grades in leadership positions across the EPS. At most EPS organizations, the civilians that we did interview indicated that leadership positions were frequently created for military personnel, but civilians tended to be thought of as support personnel with little thought for career enhancing training, experience, or advancement given by the military that was more interested in enhancing their own career opportunities. Plainly stated, the EPS is not viewed as an opportunity for civilian development and progression.

The study team found many references to increasing civilian participation in the EPS as shown by the following references:

- **"The lead generation and checking process can easily be civilianized"** (Source: Re-engineering DoD Recruiting, RAND Arroyo Center).
- **"The Navy should civilianize the recruiting force. It does not make sense that fleet resources are taken away to be used on a job for which recruiters have no background (and the experience provides no benefit when they return to the fleet). The recruiters are not professional recruiters."** (Source: CAPT Steve Conn, U.S. Navy, Head of Enlisted Strength and Advancement Plans).
- **"The Navy Recruiting Command should run an inventory of jobs that could be assumed by former recruiters"** (Source: SNAPSHOT A Look At The Process, Policies and People With Recommendations, April 2000).

**4.5.2 Process.** The subjects of the Process category deal with the Current Process, Goals/Mission, Losses, and DEP. These subject areas are discussed separately below.

**4.5.2.1 Current Process.** Current processes were developed in an era when the Services drafted individuals in large numbers. They were designed to efficiently process large numbers of individuals that really did not want to be in the Service. Also, the processes did not consider the needs of the individual since, obviously, the individual did not want to be in the Service. Although there have been some modifications to the processes, the basic philosophy of recruiting, selection, classification, and qualification remains the same (as illustrated in our Management Process Model in Chapter 2 of this report). However, these same processes are now hindering the military according to an Army War College Study (U.S. Army Recruiting: Problems and Fixes, December 1999): **"Many of these turn-offs can be attributed to the extraordinary waiting time to talk with a guidance counselor and then to complete voluminous administrative requirements...Would IBM or any other major employer treat potential employees in this manner?"** On the subject of outdated procedures and processes, this same report expresses what many of the individuals expressed during the interviews: **"The real problem might rest with the Army's inability to develop a holistic accession strategy, to institute program modernization, to provide outstanding customer service, and to embrace change of outdated procedures."** The study team notes that many of the individuals being interviewed felt that change was not something the Navy really embraced.

Some of the individuals that the study group talked to expressed an opinion that questions the need for separation of the functions of recruiting, selection, qualification, and

classification. USMEPCOM has experimented with remote physical testing (this allows applicants to take physicals at locations other than the MEPS). However, the Navy has not participated in this program. Our discussion with USAREC indicates that the Army is going to point of sale contracting (the recruiter, with a laptop computer, is able to write the contract instead of having it written at the MEPS).

**4.5.2.2 Goals/Mission.** Conflicting interests and no consensus on common goals.

**4.5.2.3 Losses.** The study team obtained attrition loss data from the Center for Naval Analyses from 1990 to 1999 (we asked for an update of the same data, but were unable to obtain it). This data shows that the 12-month attrition has been steadily increasing from 14.3% to 21.66%. We also note that RTC has several programs under way that are designed to reduce losses from basic training. RTC has reported some success in reducing recruit attrition, but there was no data to see if the individuals receiving the remedial training remained in the Service upon completion of basic training.

The study team also notes that the average years of service (YOS) contracted has increased from 4.38 years to 4.53, but the actual YOS has declined.

Losses from DEP were about 18% in FY2000 and fleet losses have been reported to be about 12.5%. When the sources for all losses are accounted for, the total losses for the Navy are about 44% of the individuals contracted. Additionally, over one-third of the individuals contracted by the Navy yield no return on investment because they leave the military service prior to entering the fleet.

The analysis of losses in general is hampered not only by the lack of data (which the study team found to be a major obstacle in enabling it to look at resource implications of losses), but the data also are not very useful. As stated in GAO/NSIAD-00-146 (June 2000), **"The only DOD-wide data on enlisted separations are not very useful in specifying why enlistees are leaving early. As we reported in 1997, the codes used to categorize separations are vague, more than one code can be chosen to classify the same separation, and the services use these codes differently."** At the last Study Advisory Group meeting for this study, the SAG chairman noted that there was a new definition for attrition, but there was no indication that the definition was accompanied by new Service codes. Also, we note that the new definition did not include DEP losses.

The large percentage of losses and the low return on investment has some practical implications for the EPS. The loss issue is evaluated more extensively in Chapter 6, which also discusses the implications of the loss.

**4.5.2.4 DEP.** **"Studies over the past 15 years have considered the importance of DEP in lowering the probability of attrition, yet none have looked any further at what actually goes on in the DEP"** (Source: The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of the Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training, NPS, March, 1998). Other findings of the report include:

- Training is not being conducted in DEP.

- DEP PQS is not utilized as a primary training guide.
- Over one third of the sample indicated they were not told what to expect at basic training.
- One third of the recruits felt that DEP did not prepare them for basic training.
- Average DEP time is 4.5 months.
- The Navy has a system to effectively train and prepare DEPer for the rigors of basic training. However, when the average time in the DEP for each recruit is only 4.5 months, not much training can take place.
- DEP participation is a key factor in predicting attrition. That point has been brought up many times. However, not one study looked into what the DEP did to prepare recruits for basic training.
- The majority of the DEPer are attending high school or recently graduated. If not given the attention that they need, they will easily be “turned off.”
- The Navy cannot force recruits to be ready for basic training.
- The average hours worked per week was over 33 hours. Hence, giving up work time to attend DEP meetings is costly for the DEPer (there is no compensation for such DEP meetings).

**4.5.3 Consistency.** The subject areas under the Consistency category include Policy, Sales Organization, Team vs. Individual, and Standards. These subject areas are discussed separately below.

**4.5.3.1 Policy.** The Navy lacks a consistent image of itself. This ambiguity is reflected in conflicting messages sent to the market. This leads to the jobs vs. service conflict, the ambiguity around college markets, and weak advertising. Much of the Navy advertising we see on the web shows airplanes. The study team believes that when most people see an airplane, they think Air Force. On a recent joint recruiting advertisement, the Navy picture showed an individual standing in front of a fighter. The image compels one to stop and look closely to see if it was on an aircraft carrier. A consistent image is the foundation for propensity and propensity is the foundation for enlistment.

**4.5.3.2 Sales Organization.** EPS organizations have a command structure and command relationships. The study team noted on many occasions when we probed the command relationships that individuals being interviewed feared to make comments because they were concerned that such information would be available to the command structure. We also observed that the formal command structure inhibited the sharing of ideas “up the chain of command.” When the individuals being interviewed did offer opinions, they were most often very insightful. We also observed the short-term nature of planning since an individual’s performance is evaluated on positive outcome that occur “during my watch.” This also meant that failures are viewed so negatively that they would prompt a bad (and potentially career-affecting) performance evaluation. Thus, there is a great reluctance to recommend or try innovative concepts.

Although recruiter performance is measured in terms of production, many other factors that have little to do with recruiting affect the performance appraisals of recruiting personnel. For example, the Recruiter Excellence Incentives Program (REIP) nominees

not only have to be top producers, they also have to pass a test in their non-recruiting rating area. There also is no sense of proportionality in the "rewards" that the military system uses as incentives. Indeed, every recruiter receives the salary and benefits for a given rank and time in service regardless of production. Additionally, because the "rewards" are actually military awards, they are rationed and awards are closely monitored lest the value of the awards be diminished because too many individuals receive the awards.

Another aspect of the EPS having command relationships is that organizations tend to be autonomous. Although individuals within the organizations have working relationships with individuals in other EPS organizations, decisions tend to be made on what is best for an individual organization.

Individuals in command, management, and other key positions were not selected because of a particular expertise in the area (and frequently, the only training that they receive is on-the-job). Most individuals then transition to an area for which this experience has no relevance.

As a military organization, the Navy has a long tradition. It prides itself on its virtues of duty, honor, and country. Patriotism is a strong motivator for many individuals within the Navy. The Navy also wants its recruits to share these same values. However, the desires and expectations of the youth entering the Service increasingly places little or no value on such attributes.

**4.5.3.3 Team vs. Individual.** The issue that prompted the study team to explore this subject area was the apparent inconsistency between the official policy on team recruiting (referred to as Station Missioning) and what became apparent in the interviews that the reality is that recruiters are individually managed. Throughout our interviews at the Navy Recruiting Districts that individual recruiters feel that they have an individual or recruiting goal. Good or poor performance by an individual on a team was recognized in performance evaluations. Additionally, we note some of the following points that indicate that, despite the official policy, recruiting is actually an individual effort.

- Recruiters are individually trained (using course work that is built for individual sales training).
- Incentives (really awards) are individual, limited, and controlled. The Navy's REIP is an example of a program that promotes highly competitive individual behavior. When the study team visited several Navy Recruiting Districts, we saw this first hand. The recruiters that were actively going after the REIP had significantly higher production than those that were not going after the award. Also, it was pointed out that the high production significantly falls once the individual is no longer a prime REIP candidate. Finally, awards are generally controlled and limited. There is a feeling that if too many awards for meritorious service, for example, were given out, the worth of the award would be diminished. REIP awards are limited to a fixed number of recruiters each period.
- Replacements are made on an individual basis. This is a critical flaw in the team approach. Every time that a "team member" is replaced, the entire team is

disrupted. Upon arrival to a new station, the new team member has a lower production requirement than the other team members. When the study team members discussed team recruiting with some recruiters, they indicated that they try to “specialize” in some specific aspect of recruiting. One team said that when a certain recruiter departed that the internet capability of the team left with the departing recruiter since the other team members did not feel comfortable in using the internet. Obviously, when a team member departs, the expertise that that individual has developed also is lost and must be rebuilt by the new team members or the responsibility has to shift to someone else. The bottom line is that the policy of individual replacements of recruiters causes great distress to the remaining team members and assimilation of the new team member causes production to decline.

- Because of high turnover of recruiters, Recruiters In Charge are more often selected because they are a “survivor” of the team as opposed to being groomed, trained, and selected for the position. As a result, these RINCs tend to lack experience in recruiting. Also, having attained the position of RINC, many of these recruiters have a low or reduced recruiting mission. It seems that the system finds so many ways to turn anyone that starts to get experience into low or no production recruiters. This does not foster teamwork nor does it encourage high production.
- The most common metric used is Production Per Recruiter (PPR). PPR is ok, but it does not reflect team concept.

Despite the official position that the Navy (and recently the Army) uses team (station) missioning, most of the important indicators point to individual goaling in reality. If the Navy really wants a team approach, there are some changes that should be made. The recruiting station would have to be formed as a unit (trained as a unit, assigned as a unit, incentivized as a unit, and managed as a unit). Chapter 5 of this report gives several recommendations for team recruiting.

**4.5.3.4 Standards.** The individuals being interviewed expressed frustration over the lack of consistency in the standards. The study team actually witnessed the frustration on the part of recruits at RTC during in-processing when confronted with verification of security clearance information and medical standards for different ratings. In his report (SNAPSHOT A Look At The Process, Policies and People With Recommendations, April 2000), Scot Slocum discussed several areas where standards are not consistent:

- Medical standards are higher for accession than retention (page 73 and 76) (“**It seems logical to support the notion that the Navy needs to educate recruits to a standard, not hold them to it before they join**”).
- Different medical standards for different ratings (page 73 and 76).
- Different treatment by recruiters and RTC (page 77) (“**We spend a lot of time and effort acculturating DEPers to the Navy and then send them off to the Recruit Training Center (RTC) where they are treated very differently.**”).

**4.5.4 Market.** The subjects under the Market category include Analysis and Changing Attitudes. These two subject areas are discussed separately below.

**4.5.4.1 Analysis.** This is an area that was downsized when the Services were downsizing. However, now that the Navy has “rightsized” itself, the focus now is on recruiting and retention, with the Navy trying to use market results from a different generation. Scott Slocum’s report (SNAPSHOT A Look At The Process, Policies and People With Recommendations, April 2000) indicates that the knowledge gained from the previous analyses no longer is applicable because much has changed over time: **“Recruiting these youth will require meeting them on their turf and dealing with their issues. And it is an unsettling prospect. The trend toward single-parent families, the use of drugs and alcohol at increasingly younger ages, ambivalent morality, and the materialism of a booming economy each have an impact on these youth as they try to find their way to adulthood.”** Many of the Navy’s recent policies (drug testing by recruiters being the most notable) clearly show the conflict between military expectations and the market conditions.

**4.5.4.2 Changing Attitudes.** The needs of the Navy are changing and the nature of the market is also changing. The Navy realizes these affect its recruiting and retention effort but has been unable or unwilling to respond to them. An article in the Edison Herald (June 1999) illustrates the challenge that the military will have in dealing with changing attitudes: **“Some students at Edison refused to take the (ASVAB) because they are afraid they might be drafted into the Army. Some didn’t take it because they didn’t get a chance to, and others weren’t interested.”**

The content of many Navy jobs is becoming more technical and white collar in nature. This requires more education and higher mental qualifications. The workplace is also becoming more technical, but at an even higher rate. Educational requirements continue to rise. The result in the civilian world is a concurrent increase in qualification requirements for entry-level employees. A college degree of some kind is becoming more and more a universal expectation for many kinds of jobs even though all of the jobs can not really justify a degree. The Navy has retained its traditional view of college-educated people being officer material and non-college educated people being enlisted.

The target population is changing. A local paper (Boston area) recently ran a headline that 80% of the local high school planned to go on to some kind of higher education. This is consistent with the results of our limited interviews with High School counselors. RAND has shown that the recruiting pool is large enough, but the high school diploma market is shrinking faster and faster. Anyone now can afford to go to community college and most everyone can afford to go to state colleges. Right now, the recruiters are not competing with employment opportunities. They are competing with life and educational choices. In spite of these changes, the Navy is still recruiting the same markets with the same techniques it has used for decades.

**4.5.5 Program Evaluation.** The subject areas under the Program Evaluation category include Evaluation Over Time and MOE, Metrics and Data. These two subject areas are discussed separately below.



**4.5.5.1 Evaluation Over Time.** Lacking the organizational ability to conduct ongoing evaluations and the near-term focus of the Navy EPS, production and other trends are not being monitored. Our interviews indicate that everyone is working (and spending) furiously to optimize to the performance criteria set for their particular function. The EPS mission is not to maximize the utilization of A School resources or to minimize CNET spending, for example, the mission is to get qualified sailors to the fleet. The study team's review of literature and interview results did not find any major process shortfalls that are not being addressed in one way or another. The study team did find that there is no standard methodology to forecast training requirements. Also, the study team could not find a single integrated data source for MPT planning or decision making (e.g., a data warehouse).

**4.5.5.2 MOE, Metrics, Data.** The lack of useful data hinders the ability of the Navy to evaluate the effectiveness of EPS programs. According to a recent GAO report (Services Need to Assess Efforts to Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition, GAO/NSIAD-00-146, dated July 2000), **"The only DOD-wide data on enlisted separations are not very useful in specifying why enlistees are leaving early. As we reported in 1997, the codes used to categorize separations are vague, more than one code can be chosen to classify the same separation, and the services use these codes differently."**

**4.5.6 Research Capability.** According to a recent GAO report, data to evaluate the effectiveness of recruiting programs are not very useful. Additionally, research tends to focus on alternatives that would have the Navy compete with education, market, and other services vs. taking advantage of existing conditions or adapting. Research also "optimizes" undesirable outcomes (e.g., recruiting vs. training, DEP loss vs. resources, or bonuses vs. educational incentives). This philosophy is illustrated by the comment, **"There is no mechanism to track and analyze cost tradeoffs between the recruiting command and the training command"** (Source: Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, May 1993). Lack of research capability hampers the collection/analysis of production metrics. No follow through on development of models and tools. Some of the findings on research in the literature include the following observations:

- Research generally does not address other Service and private sector competition.
- Military research does not reap an active duty return on the most important college program that it offers (RAND).
- Service is not competitive with attending college (Center for Naval Analyses).
- Current recruiter incentives are not effective in motivating recruiters to meet goals (Naval Postgraduate School)
- Length of service commitment deters some from interest in military service (Army Research Institute).

Despite these and other research findings, the policy and process do not appear to be changing.

**4.5.7 Resources.** Subject areas under the Resources category include Funding, Manpower (which deals with numbers of individuals), and Facilities. These subject areas are discussed separately below.



**4.5.7.1 Funding.** Resources typically constrain full implementation of initiatives. The study team observed that many programs were initiated, but there was no clear source for funding. The result is that many programs just “limp along” without enabling resources. Additionally, some programs that could have a very positive effect (e.g., the Tech Prep program to enhance the Navy’s ability to compete in the college market) remain unfunded. The Advertising and Marketing money is being dribbled out. Ad hoc spending siphons money from on-going advertising programs (we note that in FY2000, for example, there were 67 additional projects funded above the approved FY2000 Advertising Plan). Since budgets tend to remain fixed, funding for these unprogrammed projects apparently was taken from other projects.

**“Navy Tech Prep remains unfunded and CNRC does not have the resources either to create supporting materials or to expand the program at a rapid pace”** (Source: Tech Prep and the U.S. Navy, CNA, July 2000).

**4.5.7.2 Manpower.** The move of CNRC from Washington D.C. to the Memphis area resulted in reorganizations and reductions in personnel. Whereas the number of enlisted recruiters has been increased, manpower in other EPS units has been reduced. In some cases, these reductions in manpower “paid” the bill for the increase in enlisted recruiters. Areas where manpower has been significantly reduced include:

- Education Specialists (further cuts have already been programmed)
- National Training Teams
- Districts and Region reductions in staff statisticians and others to do Operations Research Analysis
- Officer Recruiters
- RQAT manpower was reduced from 10 to 4
- Plans and Policy has been reduced in numbers as well as merged with Operations.

The reductions in manpower have had a negative impact on several EPS processes. Reductions in National Training Teams means that the remaining team’s ability to review recruiting processes and to provide remedial training cannot be effectively accomplished. Education Specialists are needed to help gain access in the college market. Districts and Regions need the ability to perform trend analysis, analyze market potential data to enable it to move into promising areas, and perform analyses on recruiting processes.

**4.5.7.3 Facilities.** This is a subject area that the study team did not see in the literature research. Much of the discussion on inadequate facilities concerned RTC. With the closure of two of the Navy’s basic training installations, the facilities at RTC are increasingly unable to meet the surge requirements of summer shipping. One of the problems with calculating facility requirements for RTC, however, is that the facilities are essentially under utilized during non-peak periods. We note that there is a building program at Great Lakes that will provide better reception facilities. Also, RTC capability is limited by the lack of administrative personnel and medical screening capability.

Marketing and Communications lacks the facilities that would enable it to do advertising research or media development (instead, CNRC depends upon its advertising agency exclusively for media development and has very little capability to preview the in-process work).

**4.5.8 Process Control In-Process Review.** There are few quality control checks for the recruiting process and therefore attrition occurs further along in the process where changes are most expensive and have the most impact on the system. No audit trail or mechanism to control changes during planning or execution.

**4.5.9 Missions & Roles Connectivity.**

- Enlistment contracts are written by a classifier at the MEPS instead of the Recruiting writing the contract.
- CNRC policy is subordinate to the Plans and Operations group.
- CNET and CNRC are independent organizations.
- No link between accession plan and A&C school plans
- Fragmented processes and organizational responsibilities (very difficult to obtain Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on processes....when something was obtained, there was no clear linkages with other organizational processes.

**4.5.10 Schedule Conflicts Await Instruction.** The study team was informed by many individuals that Await Instruction (AI) is a growing problem. Some of the reasons for AI are shown below.

- End of month shipping surge increases Await Instruction time at RTC.
- Delay at RTC increases AI time at A-Schools.
- Restrictions on Female shipping times affects AI time.
- CNET uses a 12-month training schedule while CNRC uses a 15-month planning cycle.
- Holiday stand down, gaps between core and strand causes backlogs.

A Center for Naval Analyses report (CRM 98-138, dated January 1999) provides more background on AI causes and effects.

- AI time has increased steadily over the last four years from 400 man-years (or 3.7 percent of the total training time) in 1994 to over 1,000 man-years (or 8.4 percent) in 1997.
- At schools where training capacity is constrained by berthing capacity, Not Under Instruction time can reduce training capacity.
- Most of the AI time increase in 1996 and 1997 was caused by a relatively small number (15) of high throughput courses with a large AI problem.
- Most AI time results from mismatches between the number of students arriving to take a course and the number of seats (or quotas) available.
- Most student-quota mismatches result from violations to the quota management and reservation process.
- Historically, the schools have scheduled most courses evenly across the year. This does not match with the Navy's recruiting objectives.

- Because courses do not convene during the holiday stand-down period (and sometimes the week before a holiday), there should be no sellable quotas for these convening cycles.

#### **4.5.11 Information Connectivity Information Systems.**

- No connectivity between PRIDE and MIRS.
- Incompatible scheduling systems require hand entry of data. Problem is confounded with need to schedule Navy recruits into other Service training.
- Quota management decisions are not visible across the EPS organizations.
- MPT/INTRPD systems integration strategy behind schedule:
  - No lead integrator organization
  - Perpetuates quota quantity and timing mismatches
  - Redundant data maintenance requirements
  - Requires continued reliance on obsolete systems.
- Key functional capabilities not being addressed in proposed (stovepipe systems):
  - No system to manage out year planning process
  - No system to monitor and re-phase quotas in execution

#### **4.5.12 Drug Testing Counter Productive.** In SNAPSHOT A Look At The Process, Policies and People With Recommendations (April 2000), Scott Slocum states, **"It seems logical to support the notion that the Navy needs to educate recruits to a standard, not hold them to it before they join."**

- Early testing of recruit candidates increases DEP roll-outs, adding burden on recruiters to replace losses.
- Adversely affects recruiter quality of life since recruiter must personally monitor the collection of urine specimens.
- No research was conducted, nor is data being collected, on the effectiveness of the program.
- Recruiters lack ability to supervise candidates in DEP, yet are responsible for their behavior (regarding drug use).
- The military solution to use of drugs is inconsistent with the civilian problem.

#### **4.5.13 Near-Term vs. Long-Term Focus.**

- Leadership tends to focus on near-term problems and monthly production.
- Rapid turnover of detailers tends to make their focus near-term and inhibits the evolution of the process since there is little formal training available for detailers who must rely on historical approaches by their predecessors.
- There tends to be a 3-year orientation due to military rotations.
- Out year planning processes lack integrity and take too long.

#### **4.5.14 Harmful Surges.** Surges (recruits and recruits) have ripple effects throughout the EPS. The policy on end strength and end-of-month mission evaluation contribute to the surges.

- 50% or recruits ship during the three summer months
- Facilities and staff limit the surge capability of RTC.
- Shipping surges reflects high school graduation cycles.

- Goals reflect the capacity of the schools.
- Other than RTC, the surge capability of advanced schools is very limited.

According to the draft RTC Transportation Study (Sabre Government Solutions, April 2000), **“Although school training seats are being booked more effectively, the integration of these new systems have affected timelines of recruits receiving orders, causing transportation and other problems such as insufficient time to obtain airline seats from Chicago to Pensacola, especially during the Summer surge period.”**

**4.6 Organization to Organization Issues.** The SAG asked the study team to look at “organization connectivity” issues. They are shown in Table 22 below.

**Table 22. Organization to Organization Issues**

ISSUE	DESCRIPTION	AGENCIES	SOLUTION
Changing goals within a recruiting year.	Accession goals are changed during the annual cycle, resulting in changes in recruiting goals.	CNRC Enlisted Community Managers	New goaling policy. New accession planning and management system.
Accurate School quotas.	School quotas communicated to recruiters do not reflect reality. This results in missed contracts and classification changes.	CNRC CNET/QMO	Real time school quota systems and real time access by recruiters.
Timely School Quota (synchronize)	School quotas are out of synch with recruiting processes.	CNRC CNET	Align accession and school quota planning processes.
Seat booking abuse	Recruiters and Classifiers game the system to overbook popular courses.	CNRC CNET	New Booking System.
Seat booking difficulties	Recruiters and Classifiers have difficulty booking some training seats.	CNRC CNET	New Booking System.
Timely information on actual accessions	Information on actual accessions takes too long to reach the schools and they are unprepared for what actually comes through the door.	CNRC CNET	Integrated personnel tracking systems that has sailor level visibility throughout the process.
Inaccurate Medical screens	Inaccurate or inadequate medical screening at MEPS results in rescreening and attrition in RTC.	MEPCOM RTC	Align MEPCOM and Navy Medical processes and standards. New medical screening process.
Incomplete and/or inaccurate records	Records problems cause delays at each transition point.	CNRC MEPCOM RTC	Integrated personnel record system (NRAMS could be the answer, but it is in development).

Continued on the next page.

**Table 22. Organization to Organization Issues (Continued)**

ISSUE	DESCRIPTION	AGENCIES	SOLUTION
Inaccurate attrition codes	Inaccurate attrition codes prevent analysis of the problem and response by CNRC and RTC.	RTC CNRC	New attrition codes that cover all reasons (including DEP loss) and application policy.
Timely information on throughput	Information on student output from RTC does not reach A school in time to plan resources for actual student load. Result is Await Instruction Time.	RTC A-Schools	Integrated personnel tracking systems that has sailor level visibility throughout the process.
Waiting time	AI time de-motivates sailors and contributes to planning problems.	RTC CNET	Integrated personnel tracking systems that have sailor level visibility throughout the process. New seat management process and system.
DEP Preparation	Inadequate DEP preparation increases RTC training burden.	CNRC RTC	Resources for DEP management.
Shipping	Lack of control and information on shipping means that the receiving organization does not know what is coming and is not prepared. AI time increases as a result.	CNRC RTC A-School	Integrated personnel tracking systems that have sailor level visibility throughout the process.
Drug Testing	Drug testing by Recruiters at the last minute creates conflict of interest and disrupts the process at the very beginning.	CNRC RTC	Eliminate drug testing by recruiters. New drug testing policy that tests near the end of Basic Training.
Information Integration	Lack of integrated information system means multiple screening and disruption of the process as data is reformatted and regenerated.	All	Integrated personnel record system (could be NRAMS).
Recruiter Selection	Recruiter selection procedures are inconsistent with career management policies and are not necessarily meeting CNRC needs.	Fleet CNRC	Recruiter selection policy that selects recruiters that demonstrate the ability to be successful.
Non-uniform accessions	The expectation of uniform monthly accessions is not realistic.	CNRC CNET	Realistic accession plan that accounts for summer surges in recruits.

Continued on the next page.

**Table 22. Organization to Organization Issues (Continued)**

ISSUE	DESCRIPTION	AGENCIES	SOLUTION
Security checks	Standards for security checks and security information requirements are inconsistent between MEPS and the Navy. This adds to Await Instruction time.	RTC DIS	New security clearance policy. Sequence security clearance process to make the process for collecting security information more efficient.
Conflict in medical standards	Conflicts in medical standards generate the need for multiple screening and recontracting late in the process.	MEPCOM RTC	New process for medical screening.
Recruiter Career Management	The needs of CNRC and BUPERS are inconsistent and result in career damage to recruiters. Incentive systems are also limited by BUPERS policy.	CNRC BUPERS	Align BUPERS policy to eliminate penalties for successful recruiter assignments.
NRAMS Development	CRNC is developing NRAMS without close participation by at least one of the future users of the system (QMO).	CNRC QMO	QMO should designate an individual to actively participate in the design and testing of NRAMS. CNRC should assure that all possible users are involved in the development of NRAMS.
Personnel Service Record accuracy	NRDs must do a better job in quality control for both the security clearance (SF86) and the PSR information.	CNRC MEPCOM	Hold NRDs responsible for the accuracy of information. A Quality Assurance Navy representative at the MEPS should ensure that all data within MIRS are correct before recruit ships.
Personnel Service Record order of records	PSR packet does not arrive from the MEPS in the proper order. This prevents RQAT from having recruits review PSR during the Moment of Truth records check.	CNRC MEPCOM	Change the current process of ordering documents in the PSR packet. Establish standard ordering conforming to MILPERS manual. Ensure that all MEPS perform this action consistently.
Enlisted Bonus Tracking	There is no specific review process for EBs except through the budget on a quarterly basis. Also, there are no procedures to collect money from individuals that do not complete terms of contract after receiving EB.	BUPERS ECMs	EBs should be tracked and Return on Investment determined based on: Years of Service contracted and completed, amount, rating, date of enlistment, and date of accession. Procedures to collect money from individuals receiving the EB without completing terms of contract should be established.

**4.7 Traditional Approaches to EPS Problem Solving and Research.** The literature and interviews have pointed out recruiting shortcomings that we have expressed in the form of 29 issues. The 29 issues were derived from a set of 461 observations collected during interviews of key management individuals in EPS organizations. Our review of literature reveals that research tends to focus on discovering relationships between traditional variables and recruiting success.

Although not explicitly stated in the literature, there are several constants assumed in traditional recruiting research. Some of the constants include: the personnel system, processes, policies, environment, and Navy tradition (e.g., treatment of recruits in basic, job assignments, rotation tours, delivery and schedule of training, use of military position vs. civilian position, etc.). Current recruiting research tends to have one of the following focuses:

- They model behavior as socio-economic and demographic relationships.
- They look for cost effective trade-offs (e.g., DEP loss and recruiting cost).
- They conduct trend analysis over generational time changes (e.g., all youth behave the same way).
- They look for statistical methods to explain behavior rather than seeking out the root cause for the behavior.

As shown in Table 23, there have been several approaches taken in research to deal with attrition, for example. If the desire is to increase the input to the EPS, there are several traditional approaches that have been used. However, each of these approaches has some undesirable consequence. Generally, when these undesirable consequences finally become manifestly obvious, the symptoms of the problem become the goal for another round of changes that lead to another set of undesirable consequences.

**Table 23. Traditional Approaches to Meeting Goals and Consequences**

Goal	Traditional Approach	Consequence
Increase fill	Lower physical/mental standards	Increases attrition
	More non-high school graduates	Increases attrition; requires remedial programs
	Increase recruiting resources	Cost per recruit increases; market builds expectation of more bonuses; education and other incentives decrease retention
	Shorten DEP transition time	Attrition increases
Decrease attrition	Remedial programs	Cost per recruit increases; retention not certain
	Lengthen DEP time	Increases DEP loss



Here are some of the realities of recent changes:

- 18.6 percent of the Navy's recruiting budget is lost due to DEP attrition (source: CNRC memorandum).
- 36 percent of contracted individuals have little or no Return on Investment because they attrite before being in the fleet long enough to perform any meaningful work (we will show this in Chapter 6).
- Attrition rates are increasing (females higher rate than males).
- Increasing losses in 12-month period after accession.
- Little evidence that most of the present "improvements" have had any sustained positive effect on retention across the EPS.

There is a lot of evidence that strongly suggests that the present method of problem solving just "kicks the can down the road." This means that the problem becomes some other organization's problem to deal with. The result is that the EPS becomes more inefficient and more costly.

This is not to say that the research is not of use. Indeed, we need models to help us to determine appropriate missions for different recruiting areas, models that help us to identify trends in enlistment or attrition, etc. However, if management wants to determine an effective policy for reducing DEP attrition, for example, it would seem to be a prudent step to go to individuals that dropped out of the DEP and ask them questions about why they dropped out. The same goes for losses in the training base and the fleet.

Also, the evaluation should not be driven by the need to obtain statistical significance. Usually this means that forced choices are required of an applicant to indicate "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Rather, the individual should be able to provide his or her own reason. One of the things that made a strong impression on the study team was the apparent lack of concern for an individual's concern and the fear that many people had about expressing their opinion lest they get in trouble for stating it.

More research is needed to determine if changing some of the "constants" might provide more desirable results. This research should also try to gain an understanding, from an applicant's view (not simply the applicant's demographic and other characteristics). Unlike the draft era, where draftees had few alternatives to get out of the Service, today's youth have many alternatives. When we talked with the staff at RTC, several expressed the notion that many recruits come into the service with a "ticket out" should they choose to use it. Our discussions with several of the recruits and with some of the recruiters also indicate that the present-day individual has many alternatives to get out, and the recruits know it. In our research of web sites, for example, we came across one that showed an individual how to get out of the Service at any point in time: DEP, training, or follow-on assignment.

It is time to evaluate the constants and stop trying short-term fixes to growing problems!

**4.8 Conclusions.** The study team makes the following conclusions based upon its literature review and interviews of management officials:

- Studies tend to address symptoms of the problem rather than looking at the root causes of the problem. Studies often assume that several key variables will remain constant and do not reflect that the findings could change if the key assumptions are changed.
- Solutions tend to depend on the organization (this is probably due to the fact that each EPS organization is a separate, autonomous command). The EPS has participants, but no owner/controller. It is also very easy (as we repeatedly saw in our interviews) that it is so easy for individuals within organizations to “point their finger” at some other command as the source (and, therefore, the solution to a problem).
- The study team did not see much evidence that solutions that individual organizations found were overall optimal and was best for the fleet.
- Solutions to one problem tend to create additional problems because the EPS system was not considered in the alternatives being evaluated.
- Studies typically do not address Military Service and private sector competition.
- Cost-efficiency decision-making does not work with recruit prospects, yet the cost models assume that individuals will make the best economic decision.
- The process of goaling is based on past production, the erroneous assumption of team recruiting, and lacks the ability to look at new market potential or individual recruiting area capabilities.
- “Tweaking” the system provides, at best, marginal changes. Often improvements in one part of the system show up as problems in other parts of the system.
- No single “silver bullet” will solve the problem.
- Unless the strategy is changed, results probably will not change.
- Research capability is insufficient to effectively deal with the recruiting problem.
- Research has to look at the “constants” to bring about a significant positive change.
- It is not certain from our review of literature and our interviews that the Navy will change how it treats individuals if the Navy is successful in better penetration of the college-bound market. Without a change in attitude, the Navy will probably see the attrition for this market segment echo the attrition of the present market segments.
- Turnover of military (recruiters, administrators, and staff) reinforces the near-term orientation of the EPS.
- The Services use individuals that were experienced/successful in some other field to become recruiters and then returns the recruiters. The recruiting experience does not bring the follow-on organization much benefit, but the recruiting time appears to have the potential to erode the recruiter’s ability on the follow-on assignment.
- There can be no effective solution for the Navy unless the solution solves the flow problem throughout the EPS.
- There is growing evidence that the Services are competing with each other for the same market. This will only increase the cost of recruiting and make the Services even more inefficient in their mission.

- The Navy needs the ability to rapidly test and explore alternative solutions to determine the effectiveness prior to nation-wide implementation.
- Monitoring capability must be implemented and research capability refocused on mid- and long-term effects of change.
- Growing scrutiny will put the Services under increased pressure to be able to articulate the effectiveness of recruiting initiatives.
- Trends apparently are not being used in Navy recruiting in-process reviews.
- It is not apparent that anyone in the EPS has a specific mission to track or analyze program effectiveness. The study team heard very frequently that this is a Research mission, yet Research lacks the personnel, funding, and autonomy to conduct such program effectiveness analysis.
- EPS metrics are not readily/easily available. This means that requests for even routine information requires a separate (and usually laborious) process to satisfy.

## Chapter 5. EPS Metrics

**5.1 Introduction.** Supply, demand, the market, policies, and many other factors affect enlistments. We have characterized the recruiting process in terms of interrelated processes that have inputs, outputs, policy controls, and environmental conditions. Some of the relationships between these major factors have been quantified in past research. However, present research indicates that the relationships between the factors change over time. To aid management in understanding the effect that policies and other factors are having on recruit production, various metrics can be tracked over time.

However, as we reported earlier, according to the individuals that we interviewed, few metrics are actually being tracked. We have also found that some of the metrics that are available in the literature indicate difficulty within the EPS. For example, the military college-benefit program that boosts education the most requires participants to separate from the service, has not kept pace with college costs, and yields no human capital return to the active military components. The fact that most MGIB participants obtain their education after separating implies that the military does not reap an active duty return on the most important college program that it offers (Attracting College-Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options, MR-984-OSD, RAND, 1999).

Policy also plays an important role in the EPS. A policy change may result in an increase in enlistment rates but this reduces retention rates or the prior-service accessions into the reserve component. For example, past research indicates that the Army College Fund increases high quality enlistments and reduces attrition rates, but may also reduce retention rates (Asch and Dertouzos, 1994). Another consideration is whether the policy creates a net increase in total enlistments or simply attracts recruits at the expense of existing college-benefit programs such as MGIB, ACF, or NCF.

The point being made with these two examples is that the choice of metrics is important to enable management to have an accurate picture of the entire Enlisted Production System rather than the isolated view presently employed. Metrics that concentrate on a single specific aspect within the EPS (e.g., increased recruit production) may give false indications of success for a particular area but fail to show what is happening across the entire system. The following sections will explore several metrics that have been proposed during the interview process, some that are contained in the literature, and metrics that are being used.

**5.2 Some Possible Metrics.** In Table 5.1 of Reference 28 (Attracting College-Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options, MR-984-OSD), there are several issues to consider when weighing metric options:

- Overall effectiveness
  - quantity of enlistments
  - quality of enlistments
  - poaching on MGIB/College Fund takers
  - expected man-years (e.g., attrition, retention)

- reserve personnel outcomes
- Returns to the individual
  - timing of college education
  - financial returns
- Returns to the military of college-trained recruits
  - general returns
  - returns from job matching
- Cost to DoD
  - direct costs
  - start-up and implementation costs
- Age of force
- Enlisted/officer distinction

With regards to metrics, one important consideration that we raised earlier in the report is whether the military reaps a return on investment (ROI) that it provides (be that educational benefits, enlistment bonuses, advertising expenditure, etc.). All programs should be evaluated on ROI and retained, modified, or eliminated when ROI is not being achieved.

Some of the metrics that were disclosed in our interviews and literature search include:

- **Production Per Recruiter (PPR).** PPR is a necessary metric, but it is an indication of an individual's recruiting success. However, it does not reflect team approach. There is a need for a Production Per Team (PPT) metric. However, PPR or PPT (or any other production metric) can be manipulated by redefining the denominator of the metric (the number of "recruiters"). Thus, there is a need for a metric that captures support personnel as well as "production" recruiters. The study team could not determine exactly how present PPR measurements treat RINCs, for example. In some areas the RINCs are expected to have a recruiting goal while in other areas they do not. If RINCs are excluded from the denominator, the PPR measurement increases. Inclusion of all recruiters, including support personnel, gives a better indication of the personnel cost for the production.
- **TOTAL EPS losses by cohort.** The present system whereby each individual component in the EPS measures its losses using different definitions obscures the total losses that the Navy is encountering. At the second Study Advisory Group, the study team was informed that a new definition for attrition was recently put in place. However, as was mentioned in our literature review, present definitions are used by different organizations with varying consistency. It is doubtful that a simple definition will improve the situation unless there is a tracking mechanism put in place to monitor compliance. This tracking mechanism should result in the production of Total EPS Losses by Years of Service within a yearly cohort.
- **End Strength.** One of the topics that many individuals discussed was the use of measurements at a certain point in time. For example, total end strength is measured at the end of the Fiscal Year. Several measurements are made at the end of a month. The problem with these measurements is that they can be manipulated to give a false indication of success. For example, according to the interviewed

individuals, measuring end strength at the end of the year results in the Navy retaining individuals that are scheduled for release at the end of the year and “raping the DEP” to push individuals into the EPS. Monthly measurements encourage individuals to wait until the end of the month to go to MEPS or ship. Both of these contribute to the surging within the EPS. End Strength could be measured using a moving average of Average End Strength per month. Similarly, monthly measurements could be made on a more frequent basis, with the monthly measurement consisting of a moving average of the measurements. Tracking the individual measurements provides management with a better picture of progress and could be used to identify situations that might contribute to surges (and, therefore, to explore policy changes to ameliorate the situation).

- **Track bonus-takers.** Bonus-taker information should be tracked by YOS, actual YOS, amount of bonus, and Rating. Information tracked should be part of an on-going process review to determine if bonuses are, in fact, working as expected. In our interviews with the office that monitors the bonuses, the indication was that the only review of bonus-takers was to determine the financial implications of bonuses. Our interviews indicate that individuals are receiving bonuses and discharges prior to completing the contracted term of service. Since the bonus amount generally is higher for higher YOS contracts, it is necessary to determine if the Navy is really obtaining the ROI that the bonus is expected to yield.

**5.3 U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Metrics.** At a Recruiting Research Consortium meeting held at RAND Corporation (Washington, D.C.) in early August 2001, USAREC presented an overview of some of the metrics that are tracked by their Program Analysis and Evaluation director. Such information is used to inform not only the USAREC Commander, but provides a single source of information on the status of Army recruiting.

The information that follows was extracted from a USAREC briefing dated 03/05/01, titled “Recruiting Levers and Drivers.” This information is included in this report to illustrate some of the metrics that should be maintained by CNRC. However, the list of metrics is incomplete from an EPS perspective. Since the Navy contract was prematurely completed, the study team could not effectively work on other EPS metrics or organizations that should collect such metrics. Given the great difficulty that the study team had in obtaining data for analysis, we strongly urge the Navy to not only identify EPS metrics and organizations responsible for collecting and distributing the metrics. Such information should then be used by the EPS organizations to review and revise policy to deal with EPS problems.

Table 24 summarizes some of the USAREC metrics. The referenced briefing uses the term “levers” to identify major factors that directly affects recruiting production that can be controlled by the Army. “Drivers” in the USAREC briefing are those policies, programs, and conditions that influence recruiting levers. The “Levers” available to USAREC include such controllable inputs as recruiters, advertising dollars, mission achievement, and incentives. Non-Controllable inputs include factors such as competition, economy, youth population, and relative military pay. The study team has

discussed levers in terms of controllable inputs and drivers as environmental (or non-controllable) conditions. This briefing also discusses the term “Enabler.” Enablers include outsourcing dollars, policy, leadership, recruiter selection, mission processes, recruiter training, and information technology. The policy enabler is an explicit component of the EPS model discussed in Chapter 2 of this report. The remaining enablers are generally an input in the EPS model. The table below does not discuss the computation of the metric, only the nature and purpose of the metric.

**Table 24. Army Recruiting Metrics**

<b>Lever</b>	<b>Factor</b>	<b>Purpose of Metric</b>	<b>Metric</b>
Resource (Operational)		Tracks Army investments	Cost per accession Advertising Costs Incentive Costs Recruiter Costs
Executive (Tactical)		Tracks command's production performance	Contracts & Accessions Market Share Gross Write Rate Quality Marks Entry DEP Competition
Recruiters		Measures the efficiency and effectiveness of the recruiting force. Determines recruiter ROI.	Size of force Contracts Detail/Cadre Cost per recruiter Market Share Gross Write Rate DEP Losses Zero Rollers
	Competition	Evaluate competitive effects from other Services	On Production Fill Rates: - Untrained <3 months - New Recruiter, 4-12 months - Experienced 13+ months Relative to other Services
	Market Share	Determine and monitor the market share necessary to achieve contract mission.	Percent of the contracts from each Service Market Share over time

Continued on the next page.



**Table 24. Army Recruiting Metrics (Continued)**

<b>Lever</b>	<b>Factor</b>	<b>Purpose of Metric</b>	<b>Metric</b>
	Write Rates	Evaluate the recruiter effectiveness and develop remedial training or strategy to improve effectiveness.	Accessions Achieved Accessions Required Achievement Ratio
	Zero Rollers	Track performance of recruiters and develop remedial training or strategy to improve recruiter effectiveness.	Percent Zero Rollers
Advertising Dollars	Advertising Cost Leads	Evaluate the effectiveness of advertising expenditures.	Advertising Cost Percent Mission Achieved Gross Write Rate DEP Loss Percent Leads Change Tracking Survey
Mission Achievement	Cost per Accession Contract Mission Accession Mission Entry DEP Summer DEP	Evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of recruiting and ability to meet accession goals while maintaining a desired DEP posture.	Percent fill Cost per Accession Percent total mission Track over time
Incentives	Cost per Accession Cost Benefit	Evaluate the ROI of incentives program and	Incentive Cost per accession Percent fill

**5.4 Some Conclusions on the Metrics.** We have reviewed several metrics mentioned in the literature as well as metrics that have been proposed by individuals involved in the EPS. Whereas the collection and use of the metrics are important, the reality is that the EPS in its present condition is probably unable to make much headway into the collection and use of such metrics due to the lack of research capability and funding that we discussed in previous sections of this report.

Again, we point out that the Army Recruiting Command, which tracks and uses a large amount of information that is used in its production metrics, has an organization that is staffed with Operations Research and other analysts. This provides USAREC with the capability of monitoring changes that are taking place in recruit production and to inform

the decision-making processes of the changes. Additionally, USAREC has the ability to project proposed changes in policy, programs, procedures, and the like. Without a very robust in-house capability (supplemented by contractor support focused on the high priority issues confronting the EPS), the Navy will continue to lack the ability to effectively collect and use the information from which the EPS metrics are derived.

## Chapter 6. Resource Implications of the EPS


**6.1 Introduction.** As we were collecting data on the EPS, the study team found that attrition rates across the EPS were very difficult to obtain. Some of the rates that we did obtain were taken from the references. However, we could not find any reference that looked at the rates across the entire EPS. Additionally, there was a lot of discussion by the Study Advisory Group members as to what the actual loss rates were. One of the problems with evaluating attrition is that there are so many different definitions of losses and each EPS organization is trying to show that it is reducing its attrition rate.

In constructing the EPS Model presented in Chapter 2 of this report, it became apparent to the study team that there are many avenues for a loss to take. However, the overall model obscures the ability to focus on EPS losses. Accordingly, the study team decided to look at the overall EPS losses and to present the results in a format that is compatible with the EPS model of Chapter 2. The EPS Attrition Model is discussed in the following sections.

Reference 73 (Navy Recruiting Command Road Show Briefing) states that 80 prospects are required to produce one accession. The Navy Advertising program generates hundreds of thousands of leads each year from a variety of sources. The EPS Attrition Model that is discussed below does not take these pre-enlistment EPS losses into account. Rather, the model starts individuals that have initiated a consideration for enlisting by going to a MEPS for testing. This means that the model does not consider the numbers of individuals that contacted a recruiter but for some reason did not continue the enlistment process by testing at the MEPS. Such information was not available to the study team. In addition to the USMEPCOM loss data, the EPS Attrition Model looks at losses from the DEP through the completion of the first term of service.

**6.2 USMEPCOM Losses.** As shown in Figure 20 below, 51 percent of the candidates that test at a MEPS complete the process (Source: USMEPCOM Command Overview briefing dated 11/14/2000).

**Figure 20. USMEPCOM Loss Model**



Some of the numbers in Figure 20 were derived from values presented in the USMEPCOM briefing and were formatted into the model by the study team to make the presentation consistent with the other models presented in this report. Accordingly, some of the numbers may not have been in the USMEPCOM briefing.

The USMEPCOM Loss Model has several implications:

- A Recruiter has to bring 2 candidates to USMEPCOM for each Contract.
- More individuals are disqualified by Navy than DoD standards.

The second observation on the USMEPCOM Loss Model supports the discussion by several individuals during the interview process regarding the standards used by the Navy.

**6.3 EPS Total Losses.** The study team received attrition loss data generated by the Center for Naval Analyses from CNRC (7 Mar 01). This CNRC memorandum indicates that attrition from DEP in 2000 was 12,136 individuals and that the attrition loss is accounts for about 18.6% of the CNRC recruiting budget. The attrition loss data received from CNRC is presented in Table 25.

**Table 25. Attrition Over Time**


Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
12-month losses (%)	14.13	12.79	15.27	18.40	19.10	20.13	19.50	21.03	21.44	21.66
Total losses (%)	44.10	44.78	42.74	43.63	42.78	43.72				
Average YOS	4.38	4.46	4.47	4.36	4.06	4.17	4.30	4.41	4.52	4.53
Actual YOS	3.46	3.55	3.51	3.36	3.15					

The Average YOS is the weighted average of the number of years of the recruit enlistment contracts for the Year. The Actual YOS is the weighted average of the number of years actually completed by the individuals in the year group (cohort). The total losses (%) for 1995 (43.72) is an estimated value based on actual cohort losses for four years and a projection of losses for the 5 YOS group.

Several comments on Table 25 are in order. First, the total losses for 1996 and beyond could not be completed since the YOS that an individual can contract for can be as long as five years. This means that there will be a lag of five years before a year cohort actual YOS data can be determined. Second, the study team asked for data updated to the end of FY 2000, but that data was not being tracked, so it was unavailable. However, the data does indicate that overall attrition is over 40 percent for the period through 1995. Additionally, the data shows that there is an increase in the average contracted YOS. Generally, higher YOS experience higher attrition rates. Finally, the 12-month losses generally tend to increase over the years displayed. We remind the reader, however, that CNET, which would be the organization that experiences most of the losses for the first 12 months, has several remedial programs in RTC and other schools which may have lowered the attrition rates from the schoolhouse.

Accurate attrition rates with adequate definitions were obtained from various studies. Although the numbers vary from one study to another (because the time frames used for

the evaluations vary, the specific aspects of attrition being evaluated differ, and other reasons), the study team selected values that were within the range used in the studies. Using the estimated value of 43.72% and estimates of attrition for DEP losses (18% from CNRC), RTC Basic Training losses (13.6% from RTC), and the Fleet (12.5%), the study team estimated a value of attrition for School losses since CNET did not provide the study team with any useful data on attrition. To help in demonstrating the losses in clearer terms, the study team applied the loss rates to a group of 100 individuals that entered into the DEP. The loss model is demonstrated in Figure 21.



**Figure 21. EPS Attrition Model**

When 18 percent of the DEP drops out, there are 82 that go onto Basic Training. Of these 82, 13.6 percent drop out (which is 11 out of the 82 that started Basic Training). This means that 71 recruits out of the 100 that entered DEP go on to School. Similarly, estimated school losses and Fleet losses result in 56 individuals completing their contracted term of service and 44 dropping out at various stages within the EPS. Obviously, the further into the EPS process the individual progresses, the more expense that the Navy incurs.

Some implications of this model are shown below:

- With no attrition, CNRC mission would be 44 percent lower. This means that for 2001, instead of a mission of 56,344, the mission would be 31,552.
- A considerable amount of resources would be freed for other use.
- 31,552 recruits would be sufficient to replace 100% of E1s and 50% of E2s per year.

When the 18 percent DEP loss is added to an estimated 12-month attrition of 18 to 22 percent, the result indicates that the Navy gets little or no Return on Investment for 36 to 40 percent of the individuals contracted by the Navy (depending on how good the loss prevention process work).

When the results of Figures 20 and 21 are combined, the workload of the recruiter can be seen. If the recruiter brings 200 candidates to USMEPCOM, roughly 100 will contract. Of that 100 contracts, 56 complete their contract. This means that the recruiter has to take 3.5 candidates to USMEPCOM for each successful contract completion. Thus, not only is the ROI due to losses low, as attrition increases, the workload for the recruiter increases. Recall from the CNRC Road Show briefing that 80 prospects are needed to get one accession. Table 26 illustrates the breakdown of those 1600 prospects, of which

only 56 complete the contracted terms of service. However, for the majority of those prospects (86 to 90 percent), little or no ROI is accrued by the Navy despite the expenditures for USMEPCOM testing, recruiting, Basic Training, and some School Training. Truly, this is an inefficient and expensive system.

**Table 26. Breakdown of EPS Losses**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Number</b>
Total Candidates	1600
No Further Recruiter Involvement	1400
USMEPCOM Candidate	200
- Not mentally qualified	39
- Not physically qualified	14
- Not interested/loss	47
Enter the DEP	100
- DEP Loss	18
- Basic Training Loss	11
- School Loss	7
- Fleet Loss	8
Completed Contracted YOS	56

**6.4 Some Cost Implications of Attrition.** The study team had the ability to review several reports that give insight into the magnitude of losses being incurred by the Navy. A December 1997 Naval Postgraduate School study (Optimal Recruiting Strategy) indicates that each DEP loss costs the military about \$3,000. For 1996, this amounts to \$29.8 million. An Army study by Jeffrey Vales puts the cost for each DEP loss at \$5,000.

A CNRC memorandum (dated 7 Mar 01, Subject: Cost of DEP Attrition) updated the 1996 study to determine the cost of DEP loss for 2000 and 2001. The attrition from the DEP in 2000 was 12,136 personnel. For each loss, the Navy has spent approximately \$8,293. The financial impact is a loss of approximately 18.6% of the overall recruiting budget or \$91.7M. When the estimates were updated, budget numbers for 2001 suggest that DEP loss costs will be approximately \$100.5M.

A GAO report (1997) indicated that 12.56 percent of the recruits separated by the two-month point (which is mostly Basic Training), costing \$81 million. When the 1997 results are updated to 2001 and beyond and other training losses are included, it should be clear that the training cost loss due to attrition is also very large. Similarly, losses from the Fleet result not only in the loss of highly trained individuals, the cost of replacement is also considerable. The study team could not find any references dealing with the entire EPS and did not have time under this contract to do any further work on ROI for the Navy.

**6.5 Some Concluding Remarks on Navy Attrition.** Recall from previous chapters that the Navy recently increased resources (number of recruiters, advertising budget, bonuses,

et al). However, the recruit production per recruiter actually declined. This would be predictable given the inefficiency in the EPS.

At one SAG meeting, some individuals felt that attrition is at an acceptable level. This may be true from an individual organization perspective, but from the EPS perspective, attrition is taking a significant portion of its assets.

As the USAREC Director of PAE remarked, the Army cannot sustain the level of resources presently being spent. This is most certainly true for the Navy as well. The literature review on attrition mostly looks at trading off cost for attrition.

Some studies look at the optimal cost of adding additional resources. However, none of the studies that the study team reviewed recommended looking at the root cause of attrition. Until the EPS is made more efficient, additional resources will, at best, provide a marginal improvement in the EPS. As the study team found in the interviews, there are several changes that the Navy should consider. These recommendations and other conclusions are discussed in Chapter 7 of this report.



## **Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Recommendations**

**7.1 Summary.** The study team has evaluated a significant body of literature on the EPS. The topics dealt with in the 126 documents that the study team reviewed includes: attrition, advertising and marketing, command briefings, DEP management, Joint Service research, instructions, incentives, process descriptions and modeling, recruiting issues, recruiter management, school management, and technology. In addition, the study team conducted interviews of individuals in 36 of the agencies directly involved in the EPS. From these interviews, the study team constructed a list of 461 observations that met specific criteria established to assure that the focus of the analysis was on issues that cross EPS organizations, issues that have multiple observations, and issues that have some corroboration in the literature.

These 461 observations were categorized into 14 issue categories. From these categories, the study team determined that personnel and process observations ranked high as issues while drug testing, near-term vs. long-term, and surges ranked low as issues by the interviewed individuals. From these observations, a set of 29 issues were derived and ranked by evaluating the number of observations and the number of organizations where the observations were made.

The study team also looked at the 461 observations to find a set of recommendations that would address each of the 29 issues. The study group identified 40 recommendations that were grouped into 7 global recommendations, with each global recommendation having several components. The recommendations were also grouped into Courses of Action that could be undertaken by the Navy. Each COA progressively requires more organizational change, changes in the way that manpower requirements are obtained by the Navy, and possible increases in investment resources.

The literature generally is looking at explaining or forecasting attrition behavior based upon socio-economic and demographic data. This research tries to find some optimal trade-off of undesirable outcomes (e.g., the optimal DEP and attrition loss). Research should focus on determining the reasons why so many individuals are leaving the Navy in increasing numbers. Only then will the Navy have the ability to effectively evaluate programs that can counter the problem rather than developing programs that try to take less qualified candidates and make them acceptable to the service.

### **7.2 Conclusions.**

- If the EPS process were to be fully controlled by the Navy, there is a significant impediment to its success: MEPCOM is an organization that is part of the EPS process as well as being part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a major policy maker for the military services. This organization was the source of a great deal of the discussion that the study team encountered in the interview process. As long as the Navy is not in control of the entire EPS, it cannot really take control of the Navy EPS.

- The EPS uses essentially the same processes and policies that were in effect when the Services drafted large numbers of citizens. The military still treats the recruit the same way as when the drafted individuals were undereducated and did not want to be in the military. The MEPS experience is unnecessarily long and complicated. It is also unnecessary in this day of information management systems.
- The military increasingly is going after the higher mental category individuals that are also increasingly going to college. However, the military clings to the use of the ASVAB as the only official tool for classification. The high quality individuals that the military seeks use the SAT, ACT, or other academic tests for admission into college. High schools increasingly are having less time available in student schedules to allow ASVAB testing in school because of mandated standards of learning testing and testing for college admission. Even though the military recently made some accommodation to the use of SAT, the ASVAB remains the official tool for classification.
- Although the basic structure of ratings and NEC has meaning to the military, it is alien to the civilian population. It is a system that was devised in the days of the draft and has been made more complex over the years to accommodate a growing technology required by the military. The military should contract for position categories such as electronics, mechanic, and other terms that are used in the civilian population.
- Training approaches remain essentially the same as when the draft was in place. There is no way for a student to "test out" of some particular training should the student have prior training in that area. Self-paced instruction is available, but students are still handled as a class. Thus, when a student finishes early, the student remains until the normal class graduation date.
- Training should also be streamlined to account for training/ability that the individual brings. This is especially critical if the military continues to pursue the college and technical school market. The Army did a study of the 63B10 (Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic) MOS. A group of students that passed a mechanical aptitude test was given a 4-week advanced individual training course instead of the normal 13-week course. The analysis showed that those students with the mechanical aptitude performed in every aspect as well as the students going through the 13-week course. The point is that training is made to be inefficient to enable the military to push everyone through at the same pace (which was the way it was during the draft when personnel and information systems were unable to cope with the individual).
- Current contracts have so much specificity that the military has lost flexibility in handling individuals that want to change their training. Students in college frequently change majors, so colleges have developed programs that have core courses that all students take and specific courses once a major is declared. This enables incoming students to get more information on their abilities and the requirements of a major prior to declaring the major. The military already has a term called "core and strand" for its courses. Core courses are the ones that everyone that enters a certain field are required to take. Electronics, for example, core courses would include basic electricity. Strand courses would be the

specialty area. If, for example, a person enlisted for electronics, core courses could be completed in a community college as part of College First or the student could test out of the requirement based on some training or aptitude. The students in the electronics area could then compete for the strand courses (the competition could also consider other items such as PT results, performance/academic reviews, etc.). The point is, the military could allow civilian acquired training to have a real effect in the progress of the individual through training instead of forcing everyone through the same training that is aimed at the individual with no prior training or experience. It would also allow the military greater flexibility in determining the students that are qualified for the more technical courses. This would also facilitate the use of civilian standardized tests as an enlistment screen since actual performance on core courses would be available for classification.

- Increasingly, the military is competing for individuals with highly complex technical skills. However, the military is unable to compete with the civilian market. The result is that the military has a very high turnover in its technical skills, resulting in the need for a very expensive training program. To reduce turnover in technical areas, the military could look at the need for having so many of the highly technical skills being filled by uniformed individuals. As things presently stand, the military provides very good entry level skill training, produces a highly experienced technician, and then the person leaves the military. This cycle of acquisition and training is very inefficient and results in the highly experienced individuals leaving the military as the civilian job markets expand. If the technical skills were civilian, the expertise could be retained and the resources dedicated to maintaining an inefficient process could be freed for other use.
- There is also a real generational change that has been taking place at an accelerated rate. This means that the students that are making their way up through the civilian schools have expectations and behaviors that are very much different from the military.
- The study team also got the firm impression when discussing the EPS process with the more senior managers that the present recruiting problems are being solved since the indications are that the Navy will meet its recruiting goals for 2001. However, several enablers have significantly helped that effort: increasing unemployment, significant increases in recruiting resources, and increased incentives. When these enablers are removed, recruiting will undoubtedly decline. Recruiting and retention costs are increasing because of growing competition for the same high quality individuals in the market place that the military needs for its growing high tech systems. This will continue to force the military into even more expensive solutions that will eventually price them out of the high quality market.
- **THE BOTTOM LINE: The military really needs an outsider to look at all of its current processes and to make recommendations to align them with the modern times.** Changes to the system up to now have mostly been adaptations to the processes established when we were fighting the Second World War. This means that some of the traditions that were formed during the draft era have to give way to the present situation. The present EPS is a very inefficient and ineffective system that forces the military to pump more and more resources into it

to keep pace with manpower requirements. Without a thorough process review and appropriate changes in processes, the military will not see a long-term success.

**7.3 Recommendation: Station Missioning.** In Chapter 6, we discussed the need for a Production Per Team metric. This discussion was prompted by the study team's observation throughout the research that despite the official position that the Navy (and recently the Army) uses team (station) missioning, most of the important indicators point to individual missioning in reality. After reviewing the stated policy and the actual practice, the study team concludes that if the Navy really wants a team approach, there are some changes that should be made.

Recruiting activities at the station level should employ a team concept. To accomplish this, recruiting stations should be formed as a unit, trained as a unit, assigned as a unit, motivated through appropriate incentives as a unit, and managed as a unit. The following initiatives could promote team recruiting:

- Appropriate changes in the personnel system would have to be made to assure that once a team is formed, except for very unusual circumstances, the team should remain intact for a specific tour. The current practice of making RINC's out of recruiters that have been on production for less than a full tour of duty is a direct result of a personnel system that treats every recruiter as an individual. The first change that must be made is to make the personnel system think of teams of individuals. Without this change, it will be almost impossible to have an effective team recruiting program.
- Only after completing a tour as a team member, a RINC candidate should be selected and sent to the RINC School.
- The RINC should also be given "train the trainer" training to enable the RINC to be an integral part of the training of the team members.
- When the three or four other members of a new recruiting team report to NORU, they should be formed into a team and the RINC should be the primary trainer for the team.
- The RINC should lead the team through exercises that are specifically designed to foster team recruiting. Exercises should be developed to train and test the recruiter specifically in team recruiting. This would require changes in the current course material since the training for team sales approaches is different from the training for individual sales training.
- The personnel system would have to be changed to identify a unit that would be replaced with this team. Every effort should be made to keep the team together and to foster the team approach. Presently, assignments of Navy recruiters does not take place until relatively late in the process. Also, the current system operates in a "hole" approach. That is, a hole in the organization prompts an assignment to fill the hole. Under the team approach, the entire team would be managed as a team.
- Incentives for team recruiting would have to be developed. For example, a team might earn credits that could be used for a "free vacation" anywhere there is a military installation (Hawaii, for example). Not only would the team be sent to the location, but the team's family members would also accompany the recruiters.

This would build the team from both the professional as well as personal level. Other incentives could be time off, with the mission appropriately lowered. Presently, time off awards do not reduce the mission requirements. Given that recruiters spend many hours on prospecting, a time off award without mission change means that the recruiter will have to work harder some other time. Incentives, unlike awards, should not be rationed. If a team exceeds mission each month, then the team should receive the appropriate incentive each month without regards to a quota limitation. Another incentive could include a variable special assignment amount. This is not to say that individual awards, for example, should be eliminated. Some recruiters may want to remain in the service, so a REIP-like award would have utility for these individuals.

- Measure Production Per Team. Also need a metric that includes support personnel. PPR or PPT (or any other production metric) can be manipulated by redefining the denominator of the metric (the number of "recruiters"). Also, lack of a metric that captures support personnel does not give an indication of the personnel cost for the production.

**7.4 Recommendations: Metrics.** In Chapter 5, we presented several examples to illustrate the need to collect and use appropriate metrics in an EPS process review. We also discussed several metrics mentioned in the literature and several possible metrics and some metrics presently used by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Our conclusion was that even though the collection and use of some set of EPS (not just within a specific organization) metrics is important, the reality is that the EPS in its present condition is probably unable to make much headway into the collection and use of such metrics due to a lack of research capability and funding. Metrics used to evaluate the EPS need to be outcome based as well as process based to avoid sub optimization.

We have also discussed the lack of process review, program evaluation, and policy analysis capability. This all points to the need for the Navy to form an appropriate organization similar to the Program Analysis and Evaluation available to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. This organization provides USAREC the ability to monitor changes that are taking place in recruit production and to inform the decision-making process of changes. This organization also has the ability to project proposed changes in policy, programs, procedures, and the like. Without a very robust in-house capability (supplemented by contractor support focused on the high priority issues confronting the EPS), the Navy will continue to lack the ability to effectively collect and use the information from which the EPS metrics are derived. Establishment of such an organization should be a high priority for the EPS management.

**7.5 General Recommendations.** Based on the interview observations, a set of recommendations has been developed.

#### **CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION**

- Personnel**
1. Use civilian (contractors or employees) to increase the professionalism of the recruiting force, reduce turnover, and reduce recruiter training requirements.

2. Establish a military Personnel Corps with progressive and sequential assignments for military personnel to increase the personnel background of the military in personnel positions.
3. Establish and enforce on-the-job training opportunities for recruiters.
4. Move CRF individuals more frequently, including sea duty assignments, with possible rotations with the NC Counselors, to keep CRF in touch with the fleet and to improve the salesmanship capability of the NC Counselors.
5. Restrict entry into the CRF until sufficient training and leadership has been demonstrated.
6. Leadership should have a higher priority on long term recruiting issues.
7. Use emerging research and interviews with recruiters to develop a set of incentives that will motivate recruiters to higher production and do not put a quota or other limitation on the extent to which an individual can achieve.
8. Navy EPS should increase the number of civilians in key leadership positions with a density sufficient for career progression to the highest civilian positions and provide for developmental and training opportunities.

**Process**

9. The EPS should make more extensive use of civilians (contractor or employees).
10. The Navy should experiment with new programs, expanding programs that work and terminating ones that fail to deliver expected results.
11. The Navy should explore the relationship between the SAT, ACT, and other college entrance standardized tests and test the concept of using these standardized tests when applicants have completed the tests.
12. The entire EPS should establish clear, timely goals across the entire process down to individual recruiter.
13. Extensive, on-going research should be conducted by interviewing individuals at separation points to determine the underlying reasons for the system-wide losses and to identify and test potential programs to reduce premature losses to the system.
14. The planners need to better incorporate projected losses into the planning process.
15. Individuals in DEP need more extensive management and training; including taking core technical courses that will lead to a college degree and/or completion of required service training.

**Consistency**

16. The effects of new policy should be thoroughly investigated prior to implementation and the results of the new policy should be evaluated after implementation with a goal of rescinding or altering policy that does not produce expected results.
17. The Navy Recruiting Command should be restructured to more closely approximate a sales organization and to de-emphasize the command



nature of the organization.

18. If CNRC wants to continue with team recruiting, it should institute consistent procedures that forms teams; trains, evaluates, and rewards team performance; and selects team leaders on the basis of a proven track record as a team leader.
19. The physical, mental, selection, and other standards used by the Navy should be consistent across the EPS.

**Market**

20. A substantial market analysis effort should be undertaken to understand how the current market effects recruiting and retention and develop procedures that more accurately assigns market to recruiting entities.
21. A significant, sustained effort should be undertaken to reach out to high school and college counselors to inform them of Navy employment options, benefits, education, and other programs.

**Program  
Evaluation**

22. Evaluation of new and existing programs should be routinely conducted so that the assessment can be made over time as to which are successful.
23. Appropriate procedures should be put into place when new programs are initiated to capture appropriate data to conduct analyses over time.

**Research**

24. The entire EPS needs increased research capability (e.g., CNRC Marketing, Operations, and Policy; QMO; Research and Analysis; and CNET).
25. The EPS needs the analytical, financial, and personnel resources required to conduct significantly more modeling and analyses.
26. CNRC Operations and Plans and Policy needs separate analytical capability, with Operations requiring production analyses and Plans and Policy requiring the ability to evaluate market and other trends.

**Resources**

27. Evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of existing programs, terminate ineffective programs, and take other actions to make the EPS more efficient.

**Process  
Control**

28. The in-process inspections should be reinstated and resourced for the purpose of allowing trained observers to evaluate recruiter performance and to offer suggestions that will result in more appropriate practices.
29. All Navy recruiting activities should be combined (e.g., Active and Reserve, CNRC and CNET, Navy Academy, and the Reserve Officer Program).
30. Plans and Policy should be a separate entity (Code 20) with appropriate resources to research policy and recruiting issues; and Operations should have a separate analysis capability for evaluating production results.



- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Schedule Conflicts</b>       | 31. CNRC and CNET should be better synchronized through command relationships to better harmonize their efforts.   |
| <b>Information Connectivity</b> | 32. Resources that are being expended to develop essentially “stove-pipe” systems should be merged to better manage the development of information systems that provide seamless connectivity across the EPS spectrum.<br>33. The separate EPS information systems should be merged (e.g., Active and Reserve).  |
| <b>Drug Testing</b>             | 34. Drug testing policy should be changed so that it is first administered after the individual accesses, with random follow-up testing after basic with a stated zero tolerance policy.   |
| <b>Near-Term Vs. Long-Term</b>  | 35. The EPS personnel system should be changed (e.g., Personnel Corps) to enable the leadership and management to better focus on long term issues; this includes the use of civilians in more critical management roles.<br>36. The personnel system should be changed to allow for experience to be retained and a long term focus on issues.  |
| <b>Surges</b>                   | 37. End of Month production should be changed to average monthly production.<br>38. End of year (end strength) should be changed to average yearly strength.<br>39. Enlistees should be able to complete meaningful career advancement while in the DEP (e.g., Tech Prep, taking core training courses, taking courses for early promotion).<br>40. Recruiter incentives should be developed to reward sustained high production, with special consideration for timeliness. |

Inspection of the list of 40 recommendations reveals that several of them deal with the same topic. Although the recommendations were determined on the basis of the issues, they can be readily grouped into a set of seven general recommendations as shown below. Each of the seven general recommendations contains several recommendations that deal with specific issues. The general issues are ranked according to the number of observations that are addressed. The number of observations that are encompassed by the general recommendation is also shown below.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Recommendation Summary (Observations)</u>	<u>Recommendation Number</u>
1	<b>Conduct more research (62)</b> - Market - Recruiter incentives - Experiment with new programs	6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27

- Interview at separation points
- Leadership focus on long term issues and solution
- Evaluate efficiency & effectiveness of existing programs

2      **Establish a Personnel Corps (31)**      1, 2, 8, 9, 35, 36

- Civilian Recruiters (retired Navy and/or former recruiters)
- Civilians in management and leadership positions
- Increase civilian to military ratio to improve continuity
- Military rotates through Personnel Corps

3      **Change outdated or counterproductive practices (30)**      11, 15, 19, 34, 39

- Eliminate recruiter drug testing (test during basic and random test after)
- Explore and implement the use of SAT and other standardized tests to classify
- Increase DEP management and training opportunities
- Unify the standards (e.g., physical, mental, security)

Attrition throughout the EPS should be a focus area for improvements because of the high overall losses. The study team is aware that there are various surveys in place to look at some of the issues. Additionally, upon discharge, certain codes are entered into automated systems to indicate the reason for discharge. However, these surveys and the codes generally are categories of interest to the military. We also reiterate the GAO finding that the codes lack clarity and are not uniformly used. The study team recommends that actual face-to-face interviews be used to determine exactly why individuals are leaving the military, allowing the individual to express in their terms the reason for leaving. When the study team talked with some recruiters and other individuals within the EPS, we got more information than what could be gained by an impersonal survey. We were also able to pursue areas that individuals felt to be important.

The priority of interviews should be given to DEP dropouts since they are the closest to the market that the recruiters are working and they stand the best chance for affecting other prospects. The Navy should consider the following:

- Conduct personalized and comprehensive exit interviews of DEP dropouts.
- Interviews should probe to see if there have been any threats or abuses. If an individual in DEP decides to drop out, let the individual's last experience be a positive one. Make sure that the guidelines in the Recruiter Manual are being followed.
- Improve the incentive program for recruits who are in the DEP. Include the ability to pay individuals for meetings and/or training while in DEP. Provide opportunities for the individual to get training started while in the DEP.

**7.6 Courses of Action.** The recommendations listed in the previous section cover a very broad set of changes. Some of these changes are within the purview of the EPS organizations to change and others will take significant effort by the Navy to accomplish.

Several recommendations can be grouped into a Course of Action (COA) that will take minimal change. Other recommendations will require some organizational changes, while others will require significant organizational changes as well as require moderate resources to implement. Still other recommendations will take a significant change in organizations as well as changes in the fundamental way that the Navy accesses manpower.

These recommendations may also require significant resources to implement. However, it is expected that once these changes are made that resources should be reduced when the new EPS is more efficient and effective. This section will sequence the recommendations into COAs that start with minor changes ("tweaking" the system) and progress through recommendations that will take a significant effort to accomplish. Obviously, the decision to implement a specific COA will require further analysis to determine the cost of implementing and the return on investment after implementing. Although the study team has identified some resource implications of the present inefficient system, an evaluation of resource implications of the COAs is outside the scope of this effort.

The Navy has many alternative courses of action available to it. We will discuss some of the recommended courses of action in Chapter 9 of this report. However, the choices of actions that can be taken include the following:

- Raise the enlistment standards (physical, mental, and moral); reduce funding on remedial programs aimed at individuals that enter service under reduced standards; and fund only programs that have a solid return on investment. This course of action explicitly recognizes that the high level of attrition results in low return on investment (e.g., loss of effective manpower) even though the official end strength may be achieved. The loss of manpower, however, is expensive in that increased recruiting, training, and fleet costs divert money from other Navy programs.
- "Tweak" the current system without major changes in current processes, policies, and business practices. This course of action requires the least amount of effort by the Navy and could produce some marginal short-term improvements in recruitment and retention. However, it does not address the growing recruiting and retention problems in the long-term.
- Develop new programs to compete with the other Military Services, educational institutions, and job market. There is evidence in the literature that the Military Services already are competing with each other for recruits. The competitive service effects are most noticeable between the Navy and the Army. The Navy could try to compete with the educational institutions by offering more money for college and increase its programs for in-service college. However, the research shows that the completion rates for in-service college is very low (probably because of the lack of a suitable environment for studying and lack of command willingness to allow Sailors to be away from their Navy jobs to take college courses). The military also will not be able to compete against industry in pay and

benefits unless something very serious affects the economy. In some respects, this course of action is exactly what the Military Services have been trying to do since the mid-1980s when they enjoyed a competitive edge that they no longer enjoy.

- Make some fundamental changes in policy, business practices, and processes. This course of action would look at the very nature of many current Navy practices. For example, the selection and classification system could be changed to allow individuals to enter the service on the basis of standardized tests used to admit students into college (e.g., the SAT or ACT) in lieu of the ASVAB. Other changes would allow for variable term enlistments (which are presently in effect despite the official policy in view of the fact that over 40 percent of enlistees do not complete their enlistment contract). This course of action would require the Navy to experiment with options such as lateral entry (allowing skilled individuals to enter the Navy at levels appreciably above the normal entry grades), use more civilian employees and/or contractors to outsource technical jobs that are essentially civilian jobs, change the position and classification system so that there are fewer Navy job ratings and the technical ratings are familiar to the civilian market (e.g., electrician, plumber, mechanic), and other changes that would more closely align the Navy technical positions with the civilian world. This would obviously take some initial effort and additional resources to develop, test, and implement the programs. However, because of the cost of current attrition, it could be expected that these changes could have a positive return on investment in the future.

The courses of action need not be viewed as alternatives in the sense that selecting one will preclude the selection of another. Rather, the courses of action could be done sequentially. Start out with minimal changes and develop an approach that will phase the changes in policy, business practices, and processes over time. It is very unlikely that the Navy will be able to or desire to initiate broad sweeping changes rapidly. This course of action would require an investment strategy to be developed to move from the "tweaking" course of action (e.g., do what can most reasonably be done in the short-term) to the course of action that requires more extensive changes in business practices, policies, and processes.

**Course of Action 1: "Tweak" system components using traditional approaches.** According to the interview observations, the current system is inefficient, ineffective, and inconsistent. Implementing the following recommendations will provide some marginal improvements:

- |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| - Personnel: 3, 4, 5  | - Process: 12, 14, 15 |
| - Consistency: 18, 19 | - Market: 20          |
| - Research: 26        | - Process Control: 30 |
| - Drug Testing: 34    | - Surges: 37, 38, 40  |

**Course of Action 2: Select the option of a lower fill rate.** The reality of the current situation is that even though end strength may be met, the number of useful

manyears available to the Navy is decreasing. Research has shown that lowering enlistment standards to allow enlistments having lower mental category, non high school graduates, less physically fit, and moral waivers increases attrition. The Navy has been experimenting with increasing the percentage of each of these categories. It might be argued that the standards should remain high and allow the end strength to decline. This would save recruiting, training, and other resources. Even though the end strength would decline, the number of manyears completed by enlistees would remain nearly the same. We do not recommend this alternative, but present it in the interest of completeness. This is one alternative that can be implemented entirely by a change in policy.

**Course of Action 3: Minimal improvements/changes in organization interaction and some resource changes.** This course of action will take several additional changes over and above those in COA 1. In addition to COA1 recommendations, the following improvements would have to be made:

- Personnel: 6, 7
- Consistency: 16
- Program Evaluation: 22, 23
- Schedule Conflict: 31
- Surges: 39
- Process: 13
- Market: 21
- Process Control: 28
- Connectivity: 32

**Course of Action 4: Organizational changes: same approach with moderate resource implications.** This COA will require the following organizational changes in addition to the previous changes:

- Personnel: 8
- Consistency: 17
- Resources: 27
- Connectivity: 33
- Process: 10
- Research: 24, 25
- Process Control: 29

**Course of Action 5: Organizational changes; different approaches; significant resource implications.** This COA will require the most extensive changes in the EPS and requires significant Navy philosophy changes; The changes in the following recommendations will be required:

- Personnel: 1, 2
- Near Term: 35, 36
- Process: 9, 11

**7.7 Closing Comments.** From this analysis, the study team makes the following conclusions:

- "Tweaking" the system will provide, at best, marginal changes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the EPS. This is based on the assessments in the literature that show that the current research is insufficient.
- No single "silver bullet" will solve the efficiency and effectiveness problem of the EPS.
- Unless the current strategy is changed (e.g., unless the Navy seriously moves towards COA 5), the EPS results most likely will not significantly change. This means that more and more resources will be required by the present system to

keep it at its present capability. Unless overall Navy funding is increased, this increased level of resourcing will come at the expense of other (fleet) programs. However, the EPS will continue to suffer from the ineffective, inefficient, and inconsistent results of a process that requires structural changes.

- The personnel system, processes, and Navy tradition “constants” have not been significantly changed since the inception of the all-voluntary military. In addition to the recruiting environment (specifically the generational differences in the market), these “constants” have also been treated as constants by research. As a result, the current models. As a result, the current models evaluate proposed programs in terms of decision making criteria that may not be used by the target youth population.
- As long as the Navy is not in control of the entire EPS, it cannot really take control of the Navy EPS.

# APPENDIX A

## Statement of Work



## **EXAMINING THE CONTINUUM OF RECRUITING, TRAINING AND INITIAL ASSIGNMENT IN THE U.S. NAVY**

### **OBJECTIVE**

To understand the Recruiting, Initial Training and Initial Assignment processes as an Enlisted Production System (EPS). The goal is to use system analysis to describe the interrelationships of this part of the sailor's personnel system through 1<sup>st</sup> term to be able to identify where improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPS can be made. EPS includes the following subsystems and core processes:

- (1) Marketing - identification of potential interested in joining the Navy, active and reserve,
- (2) Recruiting - the process of signing those individuals to a contract,
- (3) Delayed Entry and Scheduling Training – the processes of holding a contracted applicant, scheduling an accession date to begin training and providing transportation and initial processing at the Recruit Training Center or Reserve orientation,
- (4) Initial Training - common core training ("boot-camp") or reserve orientation training.
- (5) Follow-on Training- scheduling and conducting specialized skill training required during first tour.
- (6) Initial Assignment - relocating the Sailor to their first permanent duty station.

### **BACKGROUND**

As the Navy transforms its hardware systems to take advantage of advances in technology, the personnel system that provides Sailors to operate these systems must also transform. It is imperative that our existing functions and processes be reevaluated and revalidated. Those functions need to be designed so that they are aligned with the Navy's vision of a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sailor. They must also be designed to effectively integrate reserve and active duty recruiting. The goal is to have a transformed EPS that will optimally produce the Sailor required of the future and also be a desired training opportunity by our civilian applicants. It will be necessary to review and assess command roles and responsibilities, regulations, policies, procedures, organizational relationships, communication issues, and the quality of our personnel and training information systems related to the EPS. This is a three-step process involving identification of current procedures and requirements, assessment of future requirements, and identification of the systems required supporting future needs. Of particular interest is identifying improvements to the system balancing the opportunity for cost effective recruiting and accession delivery in summer months with initial training systems that operate most cost effectively with a level student load.

Management of the accession and training process is not only complex but also critical to mission accomplishment for the Navy. It requires careful assessment of the

best practices for achieving optimal efficiencies. It also requires that the developed system be consistent with the plans and objectives of the larger personnel management system. (Many of these are enunciated in Sailor 21.) Most of the processes, policies, practices and tools, integral to manning the force, have been in place many years. In the face of today's competitive manpower market, it is imperative that our objectives, processes and tools be reevaluated. To achieve our goal and to obtain the desired improvements, we need to leverage information technology, apply best business practices and apply available tools and techniques. This approach will ensure that the most cost-effective initiatives for EPS are considered.

## **SCOPE**

This study will examine the entire EPS process, identify and develop methods to evaluate and automate processes, and analyze various courses of action. Where appropriate, the study will capitalize on existing and ongoing research. The expected methodology will employ state-of-the-art engineering and analytic techniques to conduct such activities as simulation and modeling, focus group interviews, survey questionnaires, process maps, value-chain analysis, gap analysis, and best practice benchmarking focusing on the core processes:

- Documenting and mapping/modeling current core processes
- Developing resource implications of these core processes
- Identifying key strategic process drivers
- Determining the interrelationship of these core processes with the overall Navy Manpower, Personnel and Training System

The results of this study will identify a new set of core processes that will be used to build the Recruiting, Initial Training and Initial Assignment System of the 21 Century. The study will provide recommendations on the changes necessary in terms of tools, processes, organizational structure and information systems. It will provide appropriate measures to gauge the new systems effectiveness from the point of initial contact of an individual to the Sailor's initial permanent assignment. To insure timely implementation, results must be briefed NLT 270 days from initiation with final written report due not later than 365 days from initiation.

Establishment of a Study Advisory Group (SAG) will occur to insure the results of this study address the needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Navy. SAG membership will be the process stakeholders and this group will have oversight of this project.

## **TASKS**

The following study tasks must be accomplished in consultation with all major stakeholders considering both active and reserve pipelines:

- Task 1. Determine major objectives to support the accession and training mission and assess the validity of these objectives.

- Task 2. Examine and analyze current policies, resources, and constraints governing the recruiting, accession management and initial training operations and determine which remain valid.
- Task 3. Develop a model mapping the command relationships to policies and procedures that describes the transformation of a civilian into a fully trained, fleet-ready Sailor.
- Task 4. Review research and ongoing studies to identify appropriate factors and their impact on the pipeline.
- Task 5. Analyze the accession, initial training and initial assignment continuum at all stages to assess the impact of these processes on attrition, and on retention during the first term of enlistment and the duration of drilling commitment at reserve units.
- Task 6. Develop metrics that apply to entire EPS.
- Task 7. Determine the effectiveness of incentive programs aimed at both the recruit and the recruiter to determine the impact they have on the processes and how changes to incentives impact the recruiting efforts (market).
- Task 8. Investigate business practices to include those of other service's recruiting and accession processes and pursue potential improvements to be made in the Navy's processes. Evaluate and incorporate relevant research and other studies to establish quality benchmarks by which evaluate the both current and future processes .
- Task 9. Identify potential key business processes that can be modernized, streamlined, automated, or deleted. Integration of reserve and active recruiting processes should be considered as an option. Project impact on EPS metrics.
- Task 10. Define optimal organizational relationships, procedures and tools, support the proposed reengineered processes.
- Task 11. Identify potential obstacles to implementation.
- Task 12. Define gaps between the actual and desired outputs throughout the process.
- Task 13. Provide overall progress reports monthly to the SAG. Provide quarterly progress updates to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the SAG

## **TIMELINE**

The following milestones should be met in the process of the monthly updates provided for above. Completion dates are relative to the Contract Award date, which is Day 1.

<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>COMPLETION DATE</b>
<b>CONTRACT AWARD</b>	<b>DAY 1</b>
<b>In-Process Review (IPR) I - Project/Study Plan Review</b>	<b>DAY 30</b>
<b>Initial Investigation and data collection</b>	<b>DAY 150</b>
<b>IPR#2 – Project Update</b>	<b>DAY 150</b>
<b>Analysis Phase I</b>	<b>DAY 210</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapping/modeling current core processes</li> <li>• Developing resource implications</li> <li>• Identification of strategic process drivers</li> <li>• Analyzing of organization issues</li> <li>• Establishing metrics</li> <li>• Determining the interactions</li> </ul>	
<b>IPR #3 – Project Update –Scripted Brief of Emerging Results</b>	<b>DAY 210</b>
<b>Analysis Phase II – Production of Final Products (For each Task)</b>	<b>DAY 270</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapping/modeling current core processes</li> <li>• Resource implications matrix</li> <li>• List and verification of Strategic process drivers</li> <li>• Mapping/modeling &amp; Analytic Results on organizational climate</li> <li>• Results of analysis related to established metrics</li> <li>• Results of analysis and inference on the effects of interactions.</li> <li>• Recommended Follow-on Actions</li> </ul>	
<b>IPR#4 – Review of Final Results</b>	<b>Day 270</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Products: Draft Final Report</li> <li>Scripted Brief</li> </ul>	
<b>Sponsor Review</b>	<b>DAY 300</b>
<b>Delivery of Final Report and Product to Sponsor</b>	<b>DAY 360</b>

## **APPENDIX B**

### **List of Acronyms**

## Acronyms

Acronyms	Meaning	Notes
ABCS	Army Battle Command and Control System	
ACE	Academic Capacity Enhancement	RTC program
ACE	American Council on Education	
ACES	Aviation Certification Evaluation and Screening	
ACF	Army College Fund	
ACT	American College Testing	Alternative to the SAT
ADCO	Advertising Coordinator	
ADCP	Associate Degree Completion Program	Replaced by NAVY CASH
AECF	Advanced Electronics Computer Field	
AEF	Advanced Electronics Field	
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test	
AI	Awaiting Instruction	
AOC	Aviation Officer Candidate	
AOCS	Aviation Officer Candidate School	
API	Asian/Pacific Islander	
ARADS	Army Recruiting and Accession Data System	
ARI	Army Research Institute	
ARISS	Army Recruiting Information Support System	Army replacement for ARADS
ARMS	Automated Recruiting Management System	USMC reservation system
ASAD	All Service Accession Data	
ASN	Assistant Secretary of the Navy	
ASTB	Aviation Selection Test Battery	
ASVAB	Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery	
AT	Aviation Technician	
AT	Awaiting Transfer	
ATF	Advanced Technical Field	
BA	Billet(s) Authorized	
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing	
BAS	Basic Allowance for Subsistence	
BBDO	Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn	Former Navy Advertising Agency
BCNR	Board for Correction of Naval Records	
BDCP	Baccalaureate Degree Completion Program	
BEERS	Basic Enlistment Eligibility Requirements	
BEST	Biological Evaluation and Screen of Troops	RTC program
BOOST	Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training	
BOY	Beginning of Year	
BPR	Business Process Re-engineering	
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure	
BRC	Business Reply Card	
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine	
BUPERS	Bureau of Personnel	
CAM	Commercial Air Movement	
CAST	Computerized Assessment Selection Test	
CEP	Career Exploration Program	
CFMS	Consolidated Financial Management System	Replaces STARS-FL
CHRM	Center for Human Resource Management	
CLASP	Classification and Assignment with PRIDE	
CLO	Campus Liaison Officer	
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses	

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

CNET	Chief of Naval Education and Training	
CNP	Chief of Naval Personnel	
CNRC	Commander Navy Recruiting Command	
COI	Center of Influence	
CR	Chief Recruiter	
CRF	Career Recruiter Force	
CRFA	Career Recruiter Force Academy	
CRFC	Career Recruiting Force Continuum	
CSM	Compensatory Screening Model	Now HP-3
CTO	Commercial Travel Office	
DAT	Drug and Alcohol Test	
DBM	Dominant Buying Motive	
DEE	DEP Enrichment program	
DEF	DEP (pending) Full Kit waiver	
DEM	DEP (pending) Medical waiver	
DEP	Delayed Entry Program	
DET	Delayed Entry into Training	
DER	Delayed Enlistment Reserve	
DINEIRS	Defense Integrated Manpower and Human Resources System	
DLAB	Defense Language Aptitude Battery	
DLPT	Defense Language Proficiency Test	
DON	Department of the Navy	
DOR	Drop On Request	
DPEP	Direct Procurement Enlistment Program	
DRTV	Direct Response TV	
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center	
EAIS	Enlisted Assignment Information System	
EAOS	End of Active Obligated Service	
EB	Enlistment Bonus	
ECM	Enlisted Community Manager	
EDSPEC	Education Specialist	
ENRA	Enlisted Navy Recruiting Academy	
ENRO	Enlisted Recruiting Orientation	
ENTNAC	Entrance National Agency Check	
EOM	End of Month	
EOV	Educator Orientation Visit	
EOY	End of Year	
EPA	Enlisted Programmed Authorization	Also Extended Planning Annex
EPA	Enlisted Processing Assistant	
EPDS	Enlisted Processing Division Supervisor	
EPO	Enlisted Programs Officer	
EPS	Enlisted Production System	
EPSQ	Electronic Personal Security Questionnaire	
EQ-i	Emotional Quotient Inventory	
EST	Enlisted Screening Test	
FAP	Financial Assistance Program	
FAST	Fundamental Applied Skills Training	RCT program
FMAM	February, March, April, May	
FMD	Fleet Manning Documents	
FRS	Fleet Replacement Squadron	
FY	Fiscal Year	



# Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

GAO	Government Audit Organization	
GED	General Education Degree	
GENDET	General Detail	Undesignated SN, AN, FN
GME	Graduate Medical Education	
GMS	Government Movement Service	
GPA	Grade Point Average	
GTEP	GENDET Targeted Enlistment Program	Replaced TASP
HARP	Hometown Area Recruiting Program	
HP-3	High Performance Predictor Profile	Replaces CSM
HIPSP	Health Professions Scholarship Program	
HRM	Human Resource Management	
HSCP	Health Services Collegiate Program	
HSDG	High School Diploma Graduate	
HTML	Hypertext Markup Language	
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol	
HumRRO	Human Resources Research Organization	
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve	
IT	Information Technology	
IT	Interrupt-Instruction	
JAG	Joint Advertising Group	
JAG	Judge Advocate General	
JMRP	Joint Market Research Program	
JOBS	Job-Oriented Basic Skills	
JOIN	Jobs and Occupational Interests in the Navy	Navy vocational interest
JRAP	Joint Recruiting Advertising Program	
LAN	Local Area Network	
LEADS	Local Effective Accession Delivery System	
LPT	Leads Production Team	
LPTS	Leads Production Team Supervisor	Was LTCS
LRP	Loan Repayment Program	
LTCS	Lead Tracking Center Supervisor	
MED	Medical	
MEPCOM	Military Entrance Processing Command	
MEPS	Military Entrance Processing Station	
MET	Mobile Examining Team	Alternative to MEPS testing
MGIB	Montgomery GI Bill	
MLPO	MEPS (or Military) Liaison Petty Officer	
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness	
MOT	Moment of Truth	
MOV	Medical Orientation Visit	
MPT	Manpower, Personnel and Training	
MTG	Marketing Technology Group	
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation	
NACCS	Navy Aircrew Candidate School	
NACLC	National Agency Check / Local Agency Check/ Credit Check	
NAEPE	Naval Aviation Entrance Physical Examination	
NAES	Navy Advertising Effectiveness Study	
NALTS	National Advertising Leads Tracking System	

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

NANU	Naval Aerospace Medical Institute	
NAMRL	Naval Aviation Medical Research Laboratory	
NATAM	Native American	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
NAVET	Navy Veteran	
NAVMAC	Navy Manpower Analysis Center	
NAVPTO	Navy Passenger Transportation Office	
NAVSOC	Navy Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges	
NAVY CASH	Navy College Assistance Student Headstart	
NBQ	Not Best Qualified	
NC	Navy Counselor	
NCA	New Contract Attainment	
NCF	Navy College Fund	
NCO	New Contract Objective	
NCP	Nurse Corps Program	
NCPACE	Navy College Program for Afloat College Education	
NDCP	Navy Degree Completion Program	
NEC	Navy Enlisted Code	
NETCON	New Enlistment Contracts program	PRIDE Software
NF	Nuclear Field	
NFOC	Naval Flight Office Candidate	
NFQT	Nuclear Field Qualification Test	
NHSDG	Non High School Diploma Graduate	
NITRAS 11	Navy Integrated Training Resources & Administration System	
NOMI	Navy Occupational Medical Institute	
NRLA	Navy Recruiting Leadership Academy	
NROU	Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit	
NPQ	Not Physically Qualified	
NPRDC	Navy Personnel Research and Development Center	Now NPRST
NPRST	Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology	
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School	
NPS	Non-Prior Service (-M males; -F females)	
NQS	Non-Qualified Swimmer	
NRAMS	Navy Recruiting and Accession Management System	
NRD	Navy Recruiting District	
NRLA	Navy Recruiting Leadership Academy	
NRS	Navy Recruiting Station	
NROTC	Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps	
NSIPS	Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System	
NTC	Navy Training Center	
NTMPS	Navy Training Management Planning System	
NTO	Nuclear Trained Officer	
NTQMS	Navy Training Quota Management System	N-13
NTRS	Navy Training Reservation System	
NTT	National Training Team	
NUI	Not Under Instruction	
NUPOC	Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate	
O-Tools	Software for officer recruiting	Goldmine
OAIS	Officer Assignment Information System	
OAR	Officer Aptitude Rating	
OCCSPEC	Occupational Specialty	
OCS	Officer Candidate School	
OHARP	Officer Hometown Area Recruiting Program	

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

OPE	Out-of-Pocket Expense	
OPO	Officer Programs Officer	
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempoc	
OR	Officer Recruiter	
ORS	Online Recruiting Station	
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense	
OSVET	Other Service Veteran	
P-A	Processing – Arrival	
P-card	Prospect card	
P-days	Processing days	
P-R	Processing - Receiveing	
PACE	Program for Afloat College Education	
PAE	Program Analysis and Evaluation	Army Recruiting organization
PASS	Personal Applied Skills Streaming	RTC program
PCs	Permanent Change of Station	
PDC	Personally Developed Contact	
PEL	Program Eligible Lead	
PEWS	Performance Evaluation Worksheet	
PFTU	Physical Fitness Training Unit	
PMA	Positive Mental Attitude	
PMR	Permanent Medical Rejection	
POE	Planned Operating Environment	
PORT	Personalized Officer Recruiting and Tracking	
PPR	Production Per Recruiter	
PPT	Production Per Team	
PQS	Personal Qualification Standards	
PRC	Police Record Check	
PRIDE	Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment	
PROMIS	Procurement Management Information System	USAF reservation system
PRT	Physical Readiness Test	
PSA	Public Service Announcement	
PSAT	Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test	
PSR	Personnel Service Record	
PFTU	Physical Fitness Training Unit	
PTO	Part-time Office	
PT-0	Physical Training – Zero	RTC program
QI	Qualified Interested	
QMA	Qualified Male Applicant	
QMO	Quota Management Office	CNRC has two billets
QNE	Qualified, Not Enlisted	
QNI	Qualified, Not Interested	
R&D	Research and Development	
R-Tools	Software for enlisted recruiting	
RAD	Recruiting Aid Device	
RAF	Recruiter Assignment Factor	
RALP	Recruiter Assistance Leave Program	
RAP	Recruiting Assistance Program	
RDAC	Recruiting District Assistance Council	
RDC	Recruit Division Commander	
RDS	Recruiting Data Systems	Ancillary to PRIDE & PORT
REIP	Recruiting Excellence Incentive Program	

# Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

REQUEST	Recruit Quota System	Army recruit reservation system
RFU	Remedial Fitness Unit	
RIDE	Rating Identification Engine	Replaces CLASP after R&D
RINC	Recruiter-in-Charge (of a station)	
RIS	Recruiting Incentive System	
RLAMM	Recruiter Leadership and Management Manual	Formerly "Science and Arts"
ROC	Required Operating Capability	
ROI	Return on Investment	
ROMO	Recruiting Officer Management Orientation	
RQAT	Recruit Quality Assurance Team	
RQS	Recruiter Qualification Syllabus	
RSG	Recruiting Support Group	Formerly NTT
RST	Recruiter Selection Team	
RTC	Recruit Training Center	
RTD	Reserved-to-Date	
RTO	Rejected to Obligate	
RZ	Prior Service	
SAG	Study Advisory Group	
SAM	Sea and Air Mariner	Reserve program
SAT	Scholastic Aptitude Test	Alternative to the ACT
SDA Pay	Special Duty Assignment Pay	
SDS	Source Data System	
SELRES	Selected Reserve	
SEMINAR	Senior Minority Assistance to Recruiting	
SFIT	Student Flow in Initial Training	
SIP	Student Input Plan	
SMART	Sailor/N4arine ACE Registry Transcript	
SMD	Ship Manning Document	
SMDP	Shore Manpower Determination Process	
SOC	Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges	See NAVSOC
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure	
SOW	Statement of Work	
SQMD	Squadron Manning Document	
SRB	Selective Reenlistment Bonus	
STASS	Standard Training Activity Support System	
STEAM	Standardized Territory Evaluation and Analysis for Management	
STP	Student Test Program	
TAD	Temporary Additional Duty	
TAR	Training and Administration of Reserves	
TASP	Targeted A-School Program	High-tech A-schools
TechPrep	Technical Preparation	Community College Partnerships
TEM DU	Temporary Duty	
TFNWS	Total Force Manpower Management System	
TRM	Training Requirements Module	
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice	
ULB	Unified Legislation and Budgeting	
UMG	Upper Mental Group (B- Black; H- Hispanic)	
URL	Universal Resource Locator	
USAREC	U.S. Army Recruiting Command	
USMEPCOM	U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command	
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command	

VE	Verbal Expression
WAN	Wide Area Network
YATS	Youth Attitude Tracking Survey
YOS	Years of Service
ZS	Zone Supervisor
Zone SUP	Zone Supervisor

## **APPENDIX C**

### **Catalogue of References**

#### **ENLISTED PERSONNEL SYSTEM (EPS) LIBRARY INDEX**

## CODE DOCUMENT CATEGORIES

A	Attrition
AM	Advertising and Marketing
C	Command Briefings
G	General and Joint Service
I	Instructions
INC	Incentives
P	Process Descriptions and Modeling
R	Recruiting Issues
RM	Recruiter Management

**Organization Abbreviations**

<b>ARI</b>	U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
<b>BUPERS</b>	Bureau of Personnel
<b>CNA</b>	Center for Naval Analyses
<b>CNET</b>	Chief, Navy Education and Training
<b>CNRC</b>	Commander, Navy Recruiting Command
<b>DMDC</b>	Defense Manpower Data Center
<b>HumRRO</b>	Human Resources Research Organization
<b>NPS</b>	U.S. Navy Postgraduate School
<b>NPRDC</b>	Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (Now NPRST)
<b>NPRST</b>	Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology
<b>OASD</b>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
<b>QMO</b>	Quota Management Office
<b>RTC</b>	Recruit Training Center
<b>USMEPCOM</b>	U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command

ITEM	CAT	TITLE	DOCUMENT NUMBER	AUTHOR	PUBLISHER	DATE
1	P	RTC Transportation Study - Summary Process Description		Sabre Inc, Dynamics Research Center	CNET	4/24/00
2	C	Navy Recruiting Districts CO/XO List				
3	P	Sailor 21: A Research Vision to Attract, Retain and Utilize the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Sailor		Murray Rowe, Tech DIR, NPRDC 901-874-4640 <a href="mailto:Rowe@nprdc.navy.mil">Rowe@nprdc.navy.mil</a>	NPRST	12/14/98
4	P	Training Continuum and Readiness Modeling: Task Technical Development Plan		Ilia Christman NPPDC Code 111 901-874-4645 <a href="mailto:christman@nprdc.navy.mil">christman@nprdc.navy.mil</a> ; <a href="mailto:ilia_christman@peersnet.navy.mil">ilia_christman@peersnet.navy.mil</a>	CNET Code TR215	7/12/99
5	C	CNRC Study Program: Proposals, On-Going, Completed		n/a	CNRC	8/21/00



Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

6	P	EPS IDEF Workshops, Summary Report		Dr Margaret Barton, SRA Corp 703-558-7506	NPRDC	???
7	P	New Recruit Processing-Process Definition				
8	I	Navy Recruiting Manual-Enlisted	COMNAVCRU ITCOMINST 1130.8F			2/00
9	I	Naval Military Personnel Manual	NAVPERSINST 15560c			7/00
10	I	Naval Military Personnel Manual- Recruiting	NAVPERSINST 15560C; Sect 1100-010			7/00
11	G	From College to Kosovo		Charles Moskos, Prof of Sociology, NW University	Wall Street Journal	8/25/00
12	I	Mission and Functions of the Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC), New Orleans, LA	BUPERINST 5450.34B			6/21/99
13	I	Missions and Functions of the Navy Recruiting Command	BUPERSINST 5450.16D			4/21/93
14	I	Organizational Structure and Mission and Functions of Activities Under the Command and/or Support of the Chief of Naval Personnel	BUPERINST 5400.9J			4/25/95
15	I	Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) Distribution Lists	BUPERSINST 5218.3E			7/19/00
16	I	Policies and Administrative Procedures for the Hometown Area Recruiting Program (HARM)	BUPERSINST 1150.1			8/21/97
17	I	Administration of Naval Reserve Career Recruiting Force (NRCRF)	BUPERINST 1300.42			5/6/94
18	I	Application Procedures for Career Recruiter Force	BUPERINST 1133.29C			8/5/98
19	P	EPS IDEF				Undated
20	G	United States Army Recruiting Command	AR 10-24			2/15/80
21	G	Staffing guide for US Army Recruiting Brigade Headquarters	DA PAM 570-563			2/12/87
22	G	Staffing Guide for US Army Recruiting Battalions	DA PAM 570-562			5/15/91
23	G	NDRI Pentagon Theme Day Features Overview of RAND Recruiting Research				Undated
24	G	Being All They Can BE?: Panel Discussion		Elizabeth Farnsworth		3/12/99
25	RM	Encouraging Recruiter Achievement	MR-845-OSD/A	Carole Oken and Beth Asch	RAND	1997
26	R	Recruiting Trends and their Implications for Models of Enlistment Supply	MR-847-OSD/A	Michael P. Murray and Laurie McDonald	RAND	1999

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

27	R	Military Recruiting Outlook: Recent Trends in Enlistment Propensity and Conversion of Potential Enlisted Supply	MR-677-A/OSD	Bruce R. Orvis, Narayan Sastry, and Laurie McDonald	RAND	1996
28	R	Attracting College-Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options	MR-984-OSD	Beth J. Asch, M. Rebecca Kilburn, Jacob A. Klerman	RAND	1999
29	R	Educational Benefits Versus Enlistment Bonuses: A Comparison of Recruiting Options	MR-302-OSD	Beth J. Asch and James N. Dertouzos	RAND	1994
30	R	Enlistment Decisions in the 1990's: Evidence from Individual-Level Data	MR-944-OSD/A	Rebecca Kilburn and Jacob A. Klerman	RAND	1999
31	INC	An Assessment of Recent Proposals to Improve the Montgomery G.I. Bill	DB-301-OSD/FRP	Beth J. Asch, C. Christine Fair, M. Rebecca Kilburn	RAND	2000
32	AM	2000 NAES Topline Wave XXXV			CNRC	7/2000
33	R	New Recruit Survey (Brief), September 1999			CNRC	9/99
34	RM	1999 CNRC Recruiter Quality of Life Study Oct-Dec 1999			CNRC	5/2000
35	G	Point Paper- USAREC FY 00-FY01 Recruiting Initiatives		Jim Larsen ATTG-EO		8/18/00
36	INC	Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment Incentives		Amanda Kraus, Henry Griffis, Peggy Golfin	CNA	8/2000
37	I	General Military Training (GMT) and Navy Military Training (NMT)	OPNAVINST 1500.22E			Undated
38	I	Navy Military Training Policies and Procedures	CNET INST 1540.20			6/7/99
39	I	Organizational Policy and Instructions for the Naval Education and Training command (NAVEDTRACOM)	CNETINST 5450.6F			8/12/95
40	I	Policies and Administrative Procedures for the Hometown Area Recruiting Program (HARP), etc	BUPERINST 1150.1			8/21/97
41	R	Recruiting Issues (Briefing)		Henry Griffis, Peggy Golfin	CNA	Undated
42	P	Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Vol I (Final Report)		Price Waterhouse Coopers		11/15/98
43	P	Reengineering of Navy Recruiting Information Systems Vol II (Functional Economic Analysis)		Price Waterhouse Coopers		11/15/98

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

44	P	Managing Navy Accessions and Skill Training (With Appendices)		Margaret Barton, SRA Corp	NPRST	5/93
45	R	US Navy Recruiting Command Snapshot: A Look at the Process, Policies and People with Recommendations		W. Scott Slocum		4/17/00
46	R	Draft Audit Report: Increasing Navy's Likelihood of Achieving Fiscal Year 2001 Recruiting Goals	NAVAUDSVC P-7520.1		Auditor General of the Navy	7/26/00
47	I	Responsibilities and Procedures for Recruit Quality Assurance Team	COMNAVCRU ITCOMINST 1137.1C		CNRC	9/6/95
48	C	Inspector General Overview Brief		CDR FITZGERALD	CNRC	9/28/00
49	I	Policies and Procedures Governing Investigating and Reporting of Recruiting/ Enlistment Irregularities and Hotline Complaints	COMNAVCRU ITCOM INST 1137.2A		CNRC	5/9/98
50	P	Low Quality Recruit Report (LQRR) Process-Information Paper		CDR Fitzgerald	CNRC 001	Undated
651	C	Career Recruiting Force-Overview Brief				10/2/00
52	R	LQRR Breakout			CNRC IG	
53	I	Education Specialist Activity Report	RCS NAVCRUIT 1155-2			
54	C	NRC Enlisted Recruiting Policy Code 356 Overview Brief		Bob Bliss		
55	C	Studies and Analysis Program			NPRST	
56	R	Military Downsizing: Balancing Accessions and Losses is Key to Shaping the Future Force	GAO/NSIAD-93-241			9/93
57	R	Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed	GAO/NSIAD-95-22			12/94
58	A	Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel	GAO/NSIAD-97-39			1/97
59	A	Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save DOD Millions of Dollars	GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102			3/97
60	RM	Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and Incentive Systems	GAO/NSIAD-98-58			1/98
61	A	Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (Testimony)	GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109			3/98

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

62	A	Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (Report)	GAO/NSIAD-98-117			3/98
63	RM	Military Recruiting: New Incentives Could Improve Criminal History Screening	GAO/NSIAD-99-53			2/99
64	R	Military Personnel: First Term Recruiting and Attrition Continue to Require Focused Attention	GAO/T/NSIAD-00-102			2/00
65	A	Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD's 1999 Survey of Active Duty Members	GAO/T/NSIAD-00-110			3/00
66	R	Military Personnel: Services Need to Assess Efforts to Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition	GAO/NSIAD-00-146			6/00
67	AM	Navy Recruiting Advertising Contract Update			CNRC, Code 80	9/19/2000
68	AM	Joint Market Research and Advertising Programs- Brief		DMDC		Undated
69	I	FY01 Enlisted Recruiting Goals and Policies	COMNAVCRUITCOMNOTE 1133	CNRC, Code 353		09/05/00
70	C	NRC Career Recruiting Force- Brief				10/02/00
71	C	POC/PXO JAG Brief			CDR Brenda Lyles	10/02/00
72	RM	Recruiter Productivity by Rank Oct 97-July 00- Brief		CNRC OPS	Rudy Sladyk	08/23/00
73	C	NRC Road Show Brief				Undated
74	C	Enlisted End Strength Planning: N132C- Brief			BUPERS	Undated
75	INC	All Hands- Navy College Program			All Hands	11/99
76	C	Evaluation of the DoD Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Career Exploration Program	FR-WATSD-99-46	Laurence, Janis H and Peter F. Ramsberger	HumRRO, Alexandria, VA for DMDC	10/99
77	G	Population Representation in the Military Services- FY 98			OASD (Force Management Policy)	11/99
78	P	Quota Management Office- Selection and Classification Brief			QMO	
79	R	Draft Proposal for a 28 Day Recruiting Month		Davidovich, Maureen N793P, CDr Brent Boston, N793L, Stven Muir, N793M		5/16/00
80	R	Talking Points- Optimizing Accession Flow				02/99
81	A	Boot Camp Attrition Reduction Initiatives				
82	R	Summer Surge of Enlisted Accessions and Recruit Training Command Capacity		Brent L. Boston N793L		10/18/00

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

83	R	Information Paper- Feasibility of San Diego "Overflow Boot Camp"		Steven A. Muir N793M		10/24/00
84	R	Core Project Proposal, CNA- Non-Instrumented Drug Testing of Recruits Prior to Accession			CNA	Undated
85	INC	Core Project Proposal, CNA- Benefits of GED Advantage Program			CNA	Undated
86	INC	Navy College Program- Briefing				Undated
87	INC	ACE Registry Transcript (Sample)			Navy College Program	Undated
88	P	Users guide to Quota Management Analyst			SRA International	Undated
89	I	Navy Training Quota Management- Draft	OPNAV INST 1500.47A			10/20/00
90	G	Sales Management, Concepts and Cases		Douglas J. Dalrymple and William Cron	John Wiley and Sons, Inc: NY, 1998	
91	RM	Navy Recruiting Production			CNRC	9/2000
92	R	DEP Program News				10/19/00
93	C	US Military Entrance Processing Command (Brief)			USMEPCOM	11/15/00
94	C	Naval Training Center Initial Skills Training			RTC	
95	I	Recruiting Leadership and Management Manual	COMNAVCRU ITINST 1133.6B		CNRC	2/11/98
96	D	Optimal Recruiting Strategy to Minimize US Navy Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition		Simpson, Paul Glenn	NPS, Monterey, CA	1996
97	D	The Navy's Delayed Entry Program: A Study of the Effectiveness of Preparing Recruits for Basic Training		Nell, John Dennis	NPS, Monterey, CA	1999
98	P	A Functional Analysis of Consolidating the Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting Commands		Hammond, Anne G.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Undated
99	D	Analysis of Navy Delayed Entry Program and Recruit Training Center Attrition			NPS, Monterey, CA	1994
100	RM	Development of a Navy Recruiting Vehicle Budget Model		Pry, David W.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Mar 1999
101	P	Development of a Navy Recruiting Vehicle Budget Model		Gudayao, Jenniffer D.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Undated
102	AM	An Economic Approach to Evaluate Navy Advertising Efficiency		Wittenburg, Sven-Olaf	NPS, Monterey, CA	6/21/99
103	T	Effectiveness of the Navy's Cyberspace Recruiting Efforts During CY 1998		Golfin, Peggy And Michael Y. Katz	CNA, Alexandria, VA	
104	P	An Exploratory Cost Analysis of Navy Recruiting Stations		Munoz, Patricia	NPS, Monterey, CA	Undated

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

105	RM	An Analysis of the Effectiveness of US Army Recruiter Incentive Program to Motivate Recruiters: A Survey of Enlisted Recruiters		Coronaod, Christine A.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Oct 1997
106	R	Building and Retaining the Career Force: New Procedures for Accessing and Assigning Army Enlisted Personnel – Final Report		Campbell, John P. and Lola M. Zook, editor	ARI	Mar 1996
107	I	Navy School Management Manual	NAVEDTRA 135B		CNET	Mar 1998
108	S	Analysis of Student Not-Under-Instruction Time in Initial Skills Training: Trends, Causes, and Proposed Fixes	CRM 98-138	Belcher, Steven, Valerie C. Reinert and Catherine M. Hiatt	CNA, Alexandria, VA	Mar 1994
109	INC	Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment Incentives	CRM D0001428	Kraus, Amanda B. Henry S. Griffis Peggy A. Golfin	CNA, Alexandria, VA	10/2/00
110	S	Student Flow in Initial Training (SFIT) Model	CRM D0001931.A2	Belcher, Steven Theresa H. Kimble	CNA, Alexandria, VA	Jun 1994
111	INC	Tech Prep and the US Navy	CRN D0000399.A1	Golfin, Peggy A. Darlene H. Blake	CNA, Alexandria, VA	10/2/00
112	R	US Army Recruiting: Problems and Fixes		Jones, Reuben D. LTC, USA	US Army War College, Carlisle PA	Jun 1999
113	R	Major Factors Affecting Recruiting: Making Them Work for the Army		Harris, Lee A., LTC, USA	Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, WASH D.C.	Jun 1997
114	R	A Summary of Navy Recruiting Efforts in Community Colleges in FY 1997	CRM 97-139	Golfin, Peggy	CNA, Alexandria, VA	Sep 1999
115	T	Technology and Navy Recruiting	CAB 97-60	Golfin, Peggy A. and Scott E. Smith	CNA, Alexandria, VA	1 Mar 1997
116	D	Forecasting Future Accessions and Losses from the Delayed Entry Program		Milch, Paul R. Lyn R. Whitaker	NPS, Monterey, CA	1999
117	D	US Navy's Delayed Entry Program: Effects of its Length on DEP Loss and First Term Attrition		Matos, Rafael E.	NPS, Monterey, CA	2000
118	D	US Army's Delayed Entry Program: A Survival Study		Vales, Jeffrey S.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Jul 2000
119	T	The Use of Internet Technology in Navy Recruiting: The Online Recruiting Station (ORS)		Dodge, R. Nicholas	NPS, Monterey, CA	8/25/00

Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy

120	SUP	Analysis of Enlisted Recruiting Patterns Within the Department of the Navy		McGregor, James A.	NPS, Monterey, CA	1997
121	P	Allocation of Recruiting Resources Across Navy Recruiting and Metropolitan Areas		Jarosz, Suzanne K. and Elizabeth S. Stephens	NPS, Monterey, CA	Undated
122	SUP	Modeling the Individual Enlistment Decision: Analysis of the Career Decision Survey		Sticha, Paul J., C. Mazie Knerr, Robert A. Ramos, and Ani DiFazio	ARI, Alexandria, VA	
123	R	Issue Paper: Reengineering DoD Recruiting		Thomas, James R.	RAND Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, CA	Aug 1996
124	R	Overview of ARI Recruiting Research		Borman, Walter C., Kristen Hogan, and Lisa M. Penny	ARI, Alexandria, VA	Sep 2000
125	A	Summary of DEP Attrition History		CNRC	CNRC	
126	RM	Navy Recruiters and Motivation: A Survey of Enlisted Recruiters		Emerson, Ellen H.	NPS, Monterey, CA	Mar 1996



## **APPENDIX D**

### **Categorized List of Interview Observations**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Page</b>
1. Personnel	D-2
2. Process	D-8
3. Consistency	D-12
4. Market	D-15
5. Program Evaluation	D-17
6. Research	D-19
7. Resources	D-21
8. Process Control	D-23
9. Mission & Roles	D-24
10. Schedule Conflicts	D-25
11. Information Connectivity	D-26
12. Drug Testing	D-27
13. Near-Term vs. Long-Term	D-28
14. Surges	D-29

**1. Personnel (1 - 20)**

1	Some of the concerns of using E4s: fraternization with potential candidates; asking young sailors to give up social/family life; lack of maturity of E4s and E5s; and finance concerns for lower ranks.
2	CNRC needs recruiters with college background to recruit from colleges.
3	Research finding that recruiters have some financial burden because it is hard to get reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses.
4	CNRC needs recruiter incentives.
5	Detailers are new to the area and spend time simply learning the job.
6	Direct shipment of individuals to the fleet affects not only the fleet but also the individual (making the individual less competitive relative to the group that went to C-school).
7	Direct ship individuals typically have to receive OJT (although, it is possible that the individual can be sent to some subsequent C-school).
8	Feeling that contracted civilian or civilian employees could recruit effectively and reduce the turnover of the recruiter force.
9	Navy has few opportunities for civilian development.
10	Most places have few civilians and the career progression to all positions in organizations is not always possible.
11	Expressions that trainers are not being effectively used at the NRD (some felt that trainers were either relieved recruiters or recruiters with very low production).
12	CNRC's Head of Research has low visibility with CNRC Commander due to organizational affiliation with Operations.
13	CRF gets out of touch with Navy by not rotating to sea duty
14	Lack of clarity on mission of CRF (many in support functions; effective supervision of production recruiters is lacking).
15	NC(C) counselors lack the training on how to present the Navy that the NC(R) recruiters have.
16	Individual should not be NC(R) without 10 years of experience
17	NC(C) are separate from NC(R); does not allow for cross-training
18	Military turnover results in very low longevity in the force.
19	Navy is hampered because it does not have a professional Personnel Corps like the Army has.
20	Turnover of military in personnel hurts Navy personnel.

**1. Personnel (21 - 43)**

21	Small community of Navy individuals with personnel background, but they have to be “engineered” to get them the right assignments.
22	Lack of Human Resource ability means that much time is spent explaining fundamental manpower things to officers that have personnel-related positions for the first time.
23	A professional sales force (e.g., recruiters) is not in the Navy culture.
24	Military recruiters are not professional recruiters.
25	Should look at civilian career recruiting force. It does not make sense that fleet resources are taken away to be used on a job for which recruiters have no background and the experience provides no benefit when they return to the fleet.
26	CRFs can remain in an area as long as they want. This was identified several times as a problem.
27	CRFs have “medical things” that enable them to do nothing for long periods of time.
28	CRFs have seen threats by management and have lost their “fear.”
29	It does not take recruiters long to figure out (ways to get around) the rules.
30	As long as a recruiter does not cause some specific problem (e.g., insubordination), the recruiter will not be disciplined for low (or even no) production.
31	It is possible, due to recruiter turnover, to go from a recruiter to RINC to ZS in a very short period of time.
32	It is possible to go to RINC in nine months to a year.
33	Recruiters are assigned to a team mission, but the Recruiter Excellence Incentives Program (REIP) allows the NRDs to nominate one for each fifty recruiters.
34	Even though the NRD may have more than the allotted number of candidates (based on high production), they can nevertheless nominate only the quota.
35	CRF does not have the right people in it now.
36	CRF’s may have been good as recruiters, but are not necessarily good trainers or leaders.
37	CRFs want to be in a certain area and have little stress.
38	Many individuals become recruiters to get near home or some specific place prior to leaving the service.
39	CRFs should strive to be the top recruiter, not to be assigned to a certain location.
40	The recruiter is “out of his element” while in recruiting.
41	The Chief Recruiter should be a Warrant Officer.
42	Younger recruiters may be better able to use more/new technology and process more information better than the older (CRF) recruiters.
43	Have a CRF that is ambivalent toward new technology.

## 1. Personnel (44 - 61)

44	Feeling that the CRF wants to use the old processes rather than look for new processes that would improve recruiting.
45	Key positions (e.g., advertising) at CNRC are filled with military personnel who lack specific expertise in the subject area and with high rates of turnover.
46	Feeling expressed that advertising strategy may be unduly affected by chain-of-command and others that exert pressure to change something based on personal opinions in lieu of research on the market.
47	Recruiters accompany prospects to MEPS for testing; possible reason given, "Recruiters want to get to the city."
48	As the trend for using E-4 recruiters continues, there will be more E-5s that are eligible for the CRF.
49	Analysis is needed to determine the effects on the CRF because of the increase in lower graded recruiters.
50	The "up or out" policy in the services works against the needs of keeping a technically proficient force.
51	The Military should retain individuals if they have satisfactory performance at the technical level.
52	Presently, (Army) Captains arrive with little or no recruiting experience, but they become company commanders because "Captains command companies."
53	Need the ability to give specialist pay (and not so much emphasis on NCO duties).
54	The Services could use more enlisted personnel to relieve the (Army) Captain shortage. Could take some good E-7/E-8 and make them Warrant Officers as company commanders.
55	The "just in time" model (for developing recruiters) now does not work because the system now only looks at individuals for recruiting duty that are ready to PCS.
56	Problems with using young recruiters: far away from Chain of Command; independent behavior not usually required of less experienced individuals; may be viewed by target market as authoritative; and it takes a lot of energy to be a recruiter and that energy takes away from energy needed by family.
57	7 to 11 percent of the recruiter students fail the recruiter course.
58	Giving a recruiter a "formula" for awards leads to troubles in that the individual may receive more awards than someone else in the fleet.
59	Navy has been using E-4 recruiters for over a year; from 2 June to 1 December 2000, 20 percent of the 761 recruiter school graduates were E-4s.
60	The trend of using E-4s seems to be growing.
61	The Navy has turned to using E-4s because they are plentiful. However, their experience at working without close supervision is very limited.

**1. Personnel (62 - 81)**

62	A recruiting tour takes the individual out of his/her rating for three or more years.
63	A recruiting tour could make recruiters returning to the fleet less competitive relative to their non-recruiting contemporaries that go into another assignment in their rating.
64	Recruiter force is turned-over by design.
65	Classic sales organizations do not force turnover and will also fire poor performers.
66	Navy leadership is trained in Navy-to-Navy business practices.
67	Navy recruiting imposes different conditions on leadership that generally are not imposed on leadership in the fleet (geographic dislocation of workforce; different business practices, including frequent contact with civilians; and the public being an integral part of the business practices).
68	A large number of the Officer Recruiters (ORs) that are assigned to CNRC leave the Navy because of efficiency reports received prior to assignment to CNRC.
69	It is difficult to build a group of officers with recruiting experience.
70	If there is no forced turnover, a lot of things could change. For example, there would be no need for a Recruiter School since the field could train new recruiters for the local conditions using training materials locally available.
71	E4s bring with them a set of baggage: less maturity, higher risk, lower income, and higher likelihood of sexual encounters.
72	There is a constant need for officers to learn a new job and they take it with them when they leave.
73	There would be an expectation that if one achievement award leads to an award, repetition of that achievement would also result in the same award.
74	If awards are medals, the meaning of the medal is diminished.
75	Since end strength of the Navy was not changed with the increase in CNRC recruiters, there are more vacancies in the fleet.
76	There have been "No fault transfers." However, excessive use of these by a commander lessens the commander's leadership skills.
77	Navy feels that leadership skills should overcome the problems of recruiting, so the commander should be able to take any trained individual and motivate the individual to perform.
78	Being a Navy recruiter is a good opportunity for a sailor to get an assignment near home.
79	There is a sense of "fairness" in making recruiting policy.
80	Every recruiter gets the same pay, special duty pay, etc. regardless of production.
81	The Chain of Command is not addressing the issue of different treatment for successful recruiters.

**1. Personnel (82 - 101)**

82	Most of the officer recruiters do not stay in the Navy (adding to the turbulence of the workforce).
83	Feeling was that the recruiters were already identified as losses prior to being assigned recruiting duties.
84	Recruiting from the work market requires immediate responses from recruiters, frequently requiring the recruiter to cancel scheduled training.
85	Turnover of the CRF adds to instability of recruiting force.
86	CRF not being filled as fast as losses take place.
87	If recruiter positions are being filled with volunteers, this should not be a problem.
88	If recruiter needs to talk to someone, training gets cancelled. When in the workforce market, have to talk to individuals immediately. When Navy used to be in high schools, could set up appointments to allow for scheduled training.
89	Navy Recruiters are taken from the fleet of Sailors that was recruited and trained for some other mission and given a very short course on recruiting.
90	Recruiter Selection Team runs the selection process for prospective recruiters.
91	If volunteers do not fill recruiter requirements, system is set up to identify and obtain the proper number of recruiters.
92	Use of civilian and/or contracted recruiters may be useful to build the experience level of the recruiting force.
93	Navy recruiter turnover does not foster the growing of experienced recruiters.
94	When an individual becomes a recruiter, he/she is "out of the field" for three years and becomes less competitive relative to contemporaries.
95	E-4s lack of sales experience is compounded by the short period of time in the force in general and in recruiting in specific.
96	Civilian grades and density are not sufficient to assure a career path to the highest civilian positions (saw this in every EPS agency that was visited).
97	Many organizations are largely (80-90 percent) military, with turnover being a chronic problem.
98	Leadership is driven by a "political game" of what makes them look good and personal gains.
99	A feeling at RTC that CNRC recruiters are out of touch with RTC.
100	There is too much of a penalty for "failure" and too little reward for "success."
101	Current policy encourages individuals to "be safe." For example, if a recruit writes a complaint on the Recruit Division Commander, the RDC's promotion might be affected.

## 1. Personnel (102 - 107)

102	RDCs have to be careful on how they push the recruits (for fear of sexual harassment charges).
103	There was a feeling expressed that RDC's are frequently given a choice of being an RDC or getting out of the Navy.
104	There should be a probation period prior to entering the CRF.
105	The Navy needs to move the CRFs around more.
106	Might be better to have 1350 qualified recruiters that have been screened for success rather than having 5000 that have been trained in techniques for which they may not be suited.
107	Need some way to give recruiters a sense of urgency in doing their job early in the month. There is a feeling that "if I do something at the start of the month, I will be asked to do more at the end of the month."



**2. Process (1 - 18)**

1	MEPS concept is a “throw-back” to the days of conscription.
2	Need to talk to prospects in terms that are used in the civilian world.
3	Distribution of recruiters is determined by the NRDs when the individual arrives.
4	When there are more A-school students than C-school seats, some graduates are sent directly to the fleet (resulting in less trained fleet).
5	There were 50 percent more Avionics Technician (AT) students in FY00 than what was planned for.
6	Civilian training requirements for C-school has no formal process, so each case is individually handled.
7	The Aviation training facilities are owned by CNET, but CNET does not control the schedule or quotas. CNET cannot manipulate courses or instructors. Thus, if there are idle facilities or instructors, they cannot be programmed for other use.
8	FY01 goals were not available to CNRC even though Fiscal Year recruiting had already started.
9	DEP attrition is generally seen at the beginning of a month because that is when recruiters call the individuals in DEP.
10	Army is using contractors to recruit Prior Service recruits.
11	Need to experiment with letting some recruits enter the Navy on the basis of the SAT/ACT alone.
12	Need to evaluate possible linkages between the SAT and the ASVAB line scores.
13	Army is using contracted civilian recruiters to recruit (several programs to recruit Prior Service and Non Prior Service) soldiers.
14	The emphasis in boot camp is on providing programs up front that help to identify and reduce the reasons for attrition from boot camp.
15	The Navy, unlike the Army, does not have echeloned maintenance. This means that Navy recruits have to have a broad training because that person will do much more on a ship. Inability to echelon training is due to the limited space on a ship.
16	End of the year strength is measured on the last day of September. This encourages a slow down of separations, taking individuals out of DEP, and taking in lower quality recruits to meet end strength goals.
17	Rollouts (individuals that do not ship on the contracted date) account for almost half of the losses for schools.
18	CNRC usually oversells school seats because algorithms that estimate losses do not account for those losses.

**2. Process (19 - 37)**

19	Recruiters generally feel that local leads are better than national leads since national leads to not screen out unqualified individuals, do not always have accurate addresses, and require too much time for the recruiter to contact.
20	Enlisted person receives the Enlistment Bonus after completing agreed-to training (for nuclear, for example, that could be 18 to 24 months).
21	The same process are used today as when services took in large number of lower mental category individuals.
22	Recruiting does not adapt to change.
23	More individuals entering the Navy have college credits, but there still is the traditional school training.
24	Navy does not embrace the idea of lateral entry with advanced skills; rather, Navy sends all individuals through the same training.
25	Level loading training seats makes the planning for the training community easier.
26	NRC does not have the goals at the start of a Fiscal Year even though they are contracting for them ("working in the dark").
27	Level loading (training seats) is a constraint to CNRC, but makes the planning for the training community easier.
28	PRIDE automatically replicates the current year as a starting point for the next year for CNRC to start contracting ("working in the dark").
29	Feeling that models/processes do not appropriately account for rollouts. Rollouts are really hurting CNRC.
30	Classifiers at the MEPS match applicant capabilities to the needs of the Navy.
31	Classifier looks for three-month window for applicant's desired ship date and provides a list of top 15 priorities for Navy.
32	If an applicant wants something different than the Navy top priorities, the counselor has to call the PRIDE shop at CNRC to get other options (a manual process).
33	Critical rating goals can change. There was an example provided of one goal that changed at the end of a month to one that was not on the list prior to the month. This resulted in failure to meet the goal since there was no time to adjust.
34	Navy School goals should be synchronized to the recruiting conditions.
35	CNRC feels that training should be synchronized with recruiting conditions.
36	Training base tries to build schedule for even flow of students to better utilize its facilities and capabilities.
37	Even flow in the training base is not consistent with the flow of prospective recruits.

## 2. Process (38 - 55)

38	Distribution of local advertising for leads generation is based on the National Advertising Market and not on the local advertising market; this hurts areas that are not key markets for National Advertising.
39	Success requires a paradigm shift to enable recruiters to write contracts. Technology now will allow what was not heretofore possible.
40	The “selling” part of the recruiting process is done by recruiters selling Navy “life,” but the classifier at the MEPS has about 20 minutes to contract a specific job.
41	Sophomore ASVAB testing has been eliminated because the test results are good for only two years. There has generally been a decrease in ASVAB testing in the schools.
42	USAREC is funded for a contractor to recruit 1300 NPS Army Reserve recruits.
43	NETPDTC developed some packages to provide training in DEP, but was not allowed to use them. This included math and reading skills training. The objective was to get training prior to basic so that less time would be required in basic for remedial training.
44	The historical recruiting model is still being used: recruiter sells the Navy; classifier sells the job.
45	Even though the Navy refers to recruiting as “sales,” it is not a sales organization.
46	In most processes, the Navy deals with Navy issues. With recruiting, the Navy has to deal with civilians. However, it deals with these issues as if it were dealing with Navy organizations.
47	Get a lot of folks qualified by leads, but don’t contract them.
48	The recruiting goals for CNRC are not available at the end of one year for the next year, requiring CNRC to contract for seats that have not been officially scheduled.
49	The current processes were developed in an era where the view toward service was different and there was a draft.
50	Current systems were state-of-the-art when they were developed, but they were stovepipe systems.
51	There are a lot of changes taking place.
52	There is frustration in the field because of the change and lack of training time for the changes.
53	The introduction of new things (policy, technology, software, etc.) without training time causes problems in the field.
54	Concern expressed that processes used today that were developed in the past may not be applicable today. (Usually reason for not investigating processes is that there is no time or budget to conduct in depth review of plans and policies.)
55	The SAT or ACT may provide a more appropriate measure of potential training success of today’s market.

**2. Process (56 - 72)**

56	Using measures developed for the past (to predict training success) may not be as useful today.
57	Lack of individual incentives may also be an inhibitor to explicit goals. Discussed the use of civilian and contracted recruiters.
58	CNRC would like to see a relatively low and flat mission during off-season, with a rapid build-up in the summer months. CNET would like to see a flat mission. The budget people would like to see mission rise and fall in accordance with the budget process.
59	Recruiter incentives should be market driven and could do away with the need for assigned quotas.
60	DEP training is not taking place. This means that enlistees arrive with no idea of what to expect or what is proper behavior.
61	Accession plans are not realistic.
62	To enable RTC to do better planning for support such as meals, transportation, clothing issue, dental examinations, and scheduling, CNET and CNRC need to work better together.
63	Recruits sometimes arrive at RTC with suitcases of clothes. This causes difficulties because the recruit has to ship clothes home at his/her cost.
64	Some recruits are not being told in DEP what to expect at basic.
65	Some recruits expect to get leave following basic, but this policy has changed some time ago. Recruits not do not get leave until after they finish their A-school. For some, this could be almost a year.
66	The recruits are not being prepared for boot camp because of the lack of DEP meetings.
67	Many of the programs needed to enhance recruiting run counter to the current military culture.
68	Army is changing from individual goal to team mission. Not unanimous support for station missioning.
69	Recruit carries records to the RTC. Because records lack standard data entry, recruits do not review the records (as apparently they used to do). According to MEPCOM, the problem is that the Navy liaisons (CNRC) do not apply standard procedures in the right side of the enlistment packet.
70	Lack of ability to review records causes recruit difficulty during the "Moment of Truth."
71	There are supposed to be two complete checks on records by CNRC at the MEPS; during testing and pre-shipping time. The Navy liaison office (which is run by CNRC) is supposed to do the check. However, there were several problems noted in the accuracy and completeness of records during processing.
72	A DoD form is used during in-processing for the security check. The Navy has a different standard in completing the form than what the form requires. This is a source of difficulty during processing.

### 3. Consistency (1 - 17)

1	Recently developed kiosk has a menu of choices: one choice is “high school” that shows enlisted opportunities; another choice is “some college” that shows Navy officer programs.
2	CNRC is a sales organization that cannot let the customer know about a cash back bonus until after the customer approaches it (EBs are not advertised).
3	EBs are not paid until after training is completed. For some, this could be a year or longer before the EB is paid.
4	Navy “is offended” because of the notion that someone would join the Navy because of money. Feeling is that someone should join because of patriotism. Yet, the Navy advertises jobs and offers money for college.
5	Navy contracts for positions that are meaningful to the Navy (e.g., Fire Control Technician). However, this terminology may be misleading to the potential recruit. The counselors need to talk about positions that are used in the civilian market.
6	Right now, every recruiter gets the same pay and the same Special Duty Assignment amount without regard to performance.
7	Recruiting Command is referred to as a “sales organization,” but it is organized like a military organization.
8	Accession and retention standards for the services differ; the services are responsible for waivers and can waive almost anything.
9	A big problem now is asthma. More often, the problem is detected in boot camp. Could this be screened better in the physical exams.
10	EBs are paid using the funds for the year in which they are earned, not when they are contracted. This causes problem in having to track individuals through school and estimate the attrition over several fiscal years.
11	Feeling was that the EB amount for the Navy was less than the Army but larger than the Air Force and Marines.
12	The Enlisted Community Managers (ECMs) used to determine who gets the Enlistment Bonus and the amount, but now CNRC determines bonuses. This allows CNRC to target hard-to-fill ratings.
13	REIP nominees have to be a top producer. To be eligible, REIP recruiters have to pass a test in their non-recruiting rating area.
14	Some policy is inhibiting the use of new technology (e.g., electronic signatures are authorized by law, but no enabling policy has been written).
15	The MEPCOM uses the DoD standards that are set by the service groups.
16	MEPCOM performs an occupational medical exam that qualifies an individual for military service, not a specific MOS or rating.
17	More individuals are disqualified by Navy standards than what are disqualified by DoD physical standards.

**3. Consistency (18 - 37)**

18	MEPCOM has had test program for remote physicals, but little use by Navy of this program.
19	Team goals are used now, but incentives and awards are individual.
20	Army has a Recruiter Exercise at the end of its training course.
21	Length of the recruiter-training course for each Service varies (Active Army length is 7 weeks and Army Reserve is 8 weeks).
22	Need a solid recruiter-training pipeline and need to enforce on-going recruiter training.
23	Each district has a different training program for professional development, professional qualification standards for recruiter trainers (some failed in the field, some are ready to retire, lots of reasons).
24	Recruiting system is a push vs. pull system (orientation in training community is that the system should be optimized to use existing training facilities).
25	Some CAT IV's may be excluded from service even though they could score high in some area that the Navy needs.
26	Recruiters are being made to get individuals to join the Navy while at the same time recruiters are made to screen individuals out through drug testing.
27	Navy sells "jobs" but requires the applicant to sign a contract.
28	Civilians do not sign contracts, take physicals, or remain in a position if he/she does not want to stay.
29	Nobody wants to put on paper what an individual should produce; yet CNRC tracks individual Production Per Recruiter.
30	Policy is not giving clear guidance down to the individual level.
31	Physical qualifications for recruits differ from retention standards.
32	Physical qualifications for MEPS and Navy differ. Physical exam at Recruit Training Center can uncover disqualifications that MEPS do not examine. This can result in rewriting contract or discharge.
33	Recruits have different performance standards than fleet standards. This makes it difficult to deal with discipline matters in basic training.
34	Basic training is 9.2 weeks. Many recruits think it is 8 weeks followed by leave. With ACE, basic training is 10.2 weeks. Leave is not allowed after basic training.
35	Recruiters encourage recruits to act in a manner that is not consistent with Navy customs. For example, recruits call the recruiter by their first name and want to call the staff at RTC by their first names.
36	Every year, the Navy should consider removing the lowest producers.
37	The Navy should provide recruiter incentives that tie pay to performance.

### 3. Consistency (38 - 40)

38	CNRC would be better off with 3000 recruiters that produce than 5000 under current conditions.
39	Need legislation to be able to reward those (recruiters) that do better (no penalty or reward for production produces mediocre recruiters).
40	All services would benefit from a recruiter incentive program that rewards success in proportion to the production of the recruiter.



**4. Market (1 - 21)**

1	Frequent comment made by high school counselors, "We don't see the Navy Recruiter much." The Army and Air Force are very active.
2	We don't see the Navy recruiters much (view from a selected high school).
3	The Army and Air Force are very active in recruiting from (selected) high schools.
4	Would like to see more visibility by military on campus outside the recruiting-sales roles.
5	Need to be able to experiment to determine programs that work in the present market rather than resorting to the programs used in the past under different market conditions.
6	The counselors need to talk about positions that are used in the civilian market.
7	Market is changing; youth expectations are changing; military essentially is using same methods of dealing with the youth market that it used ten or more years ago.
8	CNRC has two markets: work force and high school. Working the work force market tends to decrease DEP time.
9	Aware that recruiters are in the school, but cannot tell a Navy recruiter from Army or Air Force.
10	School Counselors are aware that military has educational assistance programs, but did not know specific details.
11	Recruiters deal with a single "military liaison" neutralizes the effectiveness of high school counselors as a source of contacts with recruiters.
12	CNRC needs to focus on market factors; expand market, test new ideas, identify barriers.
13	Navy needs to spend time/energy/assets on market research (where population is going, what market expects, etc.)
14	Market potential is not known. Navy needs to look at market segmentation.
15	Recruiter distribution now is not good and market potential is not known.
16	Need people to go to talk to school counselors to convince them to let military into the school system to test.
17	Many schools are under mandatory testing programs. Little time or desire to administer ASVAB or other tests.
18	Recruiting from the work market requires immediate responses from recruiters, frequently requiring the recruiter to cancel scheduled training.
19	For college bound market (approximately 66% of youth market), the value of ASVAB testing is not apparent.
20	SAT has value to the college-bound market, but is not effectively used by the military.
21	Need to do better in allowing the individual to be simultaneously in the Navy and get college credit.

#### 4. Market (22 - 35)

22	Attitudes of youth (and influencers) have changed. Currently used procedures were developed in an era where the view toward service was different.
23	School systems don't want us to come into schools to ASVAB.
24	Need people to go to talk to school counselors to convince them to let military in to test.
25	For a college bound person, the value of the ASVAB is not apparent.
26	We need to work better at market identification.
27	Problem with recruiting now is that Navy is in the work force, not the high schools and colleges.
28	Recruits going through RTC are a reflection of society.
29	Individuals vary in demographics and socio economic background.
30	It is very difficult to manage a group with such a diverse background.
31	There is a feeling among Navy organizations that recruits arrive with the attitude, "If I don't like it, I can go home in six months."
32	Some (military) feel that recruits arrive with an "ace in the hole" for getting out of the Navy if they don't like it.
33	There is a web site that tells individuals how to get out of the military and even has sample letter for requesting separation.
34	When the ASVAB was limited to juniors and seniors, the logistics became impossible.
35	We're either going to have to come up with a different plan or show the (High) Schools why the ASVAB has value.

**5. Program Evaluation (1 - 18)**

1	Services do little research on their own policy on waivers.
2	There should be objective research conducted to evaluate the overall effect of a change in waiver policy.
3	What has not been done is to follow the recruits that participate in special programs at RTC into advanced training and the fleet to see if they have the same or better completion rates as the recruits that do not attend the special programs.
4	Should use average end-strength instead of end-of-year to ease bulges at the end of the year.
5	Programs should be available to evaluate successfulness of recruiters and eliminate poor performers.
6	Lack an appropriate metric on total attrition, which should include rollouts.
7	Need to be able to get an early indication of attrition at the front end of the process so recruiter has time to adjust.
8	There is no way to analyze why recruiters are not (or are) successful. There used to be metrics (PATE) that would help to evaluate in-process problems.
9	Some recent programs have been instituted at RTC to reduce attrition. Apparently, from an RTC perspective, attrition has declined recently (attrition had increased from FY98 to FY99). What has not been done is to follow those recruits into advanced training and the fleet to see if they have the same or better completion rates as the recruits that do not attend the special programs.
10	Need to be able to evaluate production of recruiters over time and determine why production peaks and then declines for new recruiters.
11	On the measuring of end strength, a better metric would be average end strength. Metric should encourage proper mix (quantity and quality) with minimum over filling.
12	The ability to evaluate recruiter production over time for recruiters is limited.
13	Need to determine an appropriate metric for measuring production.
14	Presently, only on-production recruiters are included in the calculation of production (this excludes other support functions).
15	Information and analysis of the Enlisted Bonuses contracted for, planned, and paid was not readily available.
16	There is no specific review process for EBs other than through the budget on a quarterly basis (number of payments by award amount).
17	Measures of Effectiveness (Red, Amber, Green) used to be reported by Plans and Policy, but no longer are being collected and reported.
18	Information collected over time on issues related to legal issues is not being retained and evaluated.

**5. Program Evaluation (19 - 34)**

19	Army is establishing a "future cell" to help it conduct research for future recruiting requirements.
20	The study team has not seen evidence that the issue of the use of E-4 recruiters is being evaluated. There has been a good deal of discussion (some pro and a lot of con) regarding the increased use of E-4s.
21	Downsized analytical staff at the Region level several years ago resulted in the inability to obtain operational data to tell how stations are performing and to track trends.
22	The Navy looked at attrition in the 1992/93 timeframe and concluded that attrition was caused by delay. Therefore, the gap between A-school and Basic Training was reduced (no leave following Basic) and the DEP time was reduced. Now attrition is higher.
23	There does not seem to be a program review at the headquarters level of the reasons for the large number of "zero rollers" (recruiters that do not make one contract in a month).
24	There is a need to measure the effectiveness of on-going programs.
25	No follow-on research data is being collected during implementation of the Drug testing program.
26	Many new programs are being implemented without data being collected to measure the effectiveness of the programs.
27	Policies now tend to be quickly fixed.
28	The Navy is not looking at the impact of the program or policy.
29	Current process is to flood the system with initiatives to fix a problem rather than evaluating the success of the program before implementing it.
30	When asked to provide data on various topics (e.g., recruiter productivity and losses), frequent response was that Head of Research can get the data.
31	Program Evaluation does not appear to be a high priority.
32	Mechanisms to track changes in policy have not been put into place.
33	It was not apparent that the command has visibility on the production of recruiters.
34	USAREC will test (as a result of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act) a test of outsourcing ten recruiting companies starting 1 October 2001.

**6. Research (1 - 18)**

1	Lack of research on E4/E5 performance and difficulties they face with regards to Quality of Life, etc.
2	Conducting research on the attributes of a good military recruiter (research generally is not looking at civilian recruiters).
3	Few Operations Research Analysts available for conducting Navy recruiting research.
4	CNRC's Head of Research has low visibility with CNRC Commander due to organizational affiliation with Operations.
5	Enlisted recruiting relies on Code 35 for analysis.
6	No dedicated CNRC research budget.
7	There is no ability for CNRC to conduct in-house advertising research; only ability is for advertising agency to do research.
8	Marketing and Communications lacks the ability to do in-house advertising research (capability was lost when CNRC moved from the DC area).
9	Do not have a lot of tools to assist in medical recruiting programs.
10	Army is establishing a "future cell" to help it conduct research for future recruiting requirements.
11	About 80% of the work of the Navy Education and Training Professional Development and Technology Center (NETPDTC) is research for organizations outside of the Navy schoolhouses.
12	NORU has no research capability of its own. It depends on CNRC Head of Research for studies and research.
13	There is a need for a combination of strategic (long-term) research, but also some Operations Research to inform decisions that have to be made in the 6 to 12-month timeframe.
14	Need to spend more time/energy/resources on solid market research (where the population is going, what market expects, etc.).
15	Research is programmed on the issues of today, with little concern for developing tools and understanding of the effectiveness of programs being instituted.
16	Several initiatives initiated simultaneously; no research was conducted; hard to tell what worked.
17	Research capability for CNRC insufficient (little in-house advertising research, little ability to research proposed policy changes, operations tends to dominate research to the exclusion of mid- to long-term research)
18	Proposals for long-term research generally are unfunded (CNRC has to compete with other Navy agencies to get CNA and other agencies to conduct its long-term research).

**6. Research (19 - 32)**

19	It is generally felt that some of the recent recruiting initiatives have worked; however, there has been no research to determine the effectiveness of the initiatives.
20	Concern at CNRC is to make mission, not to set up conditions to test initiatives.
21	There frequently is a lot of justification provided for doing what is done now (e.g., using ASVAB) and little research on how something new can be used (e.g., SAT and ACT
22	QMO has no research and study capability per se.
23	QMO has no dedicated funding for conducting or contracting studies. QMO depends on convincing other agencies to do the work.
24	Research projects conducted by NPRST and CNA tend to be several years long and are large. There is little flexibility to start unplanned work since something else has to be dropped.
25	Lack of research on end-of-month surge effect on losses, "problem enlistments," and effects of "easy to get through MEPS at the end of the month."
26	USAREC Recruiting Operations has its own group of analysts (MOS 49) to do production analysis on a day-to-day basis.
27	USAREC PAE has MOS 49 officers to do trend analysis.
28	The USAREC PAE develops recruiter missions and maintains the long-term production trends.
29	USAREC is setting up an "Experimental Force" consisting of several units that are available for experimentation.
30	USAREC has a Center for Army Recruiting Lessons Learned (CARLL) for collecting completed studies (including electronic transcripts).
31	Need the ability to get Operations Research Analysts and Statisticians to do quantitative recruiting research.
32	CNRC needs the ability to research policy instead of being reactive as is presently the situation.

**7. Resources (1 - 18)**

1	Tech Prep program is unfunded and Ed Specs have been severely cut back.
2	To put on an unplanned course costs the Navy schools extra money. For example, the Disbursement Clerk (DK) course costs \$80,000. Misalignment of fill means that some school/instructor resources are underutilized or extra courses have to be scheduled at increased costs.
3	Few incentives (bonuses) for CRF individuals (felt that promotions rates are higher than fleet)
4	Online recruiter station is presently unfunded.
5	There is no DEP bonus/incentive.
6	At a time when CNRC is trying to get into the college market, the number of Education Specialists has declined significantly and is scheduled for another reduction.
7	Several Community College initiatives (the most notable being the Tech Prep) have been hampered due to lack of funding.
8	Enlisted recruiting lacks resources to do research.
9	RTC capacity imposes a constraint on shipping in that RTC has a fixed amount of beds, facilities, and personnel.
10	With downsizing, cuts were made in personnel and resources needed to conduct internal management reviews.
11	Number of boot camps for the Navy has been reduced from three to one (Army retains several boot camps).
12	National Training Team conducts training inspections with a significantly reduced staff and mission.
13	Marketing and Communications does not have the capability to do advertising research or facilities for media development.
14	The Army is funded more than the Navy for recruiting; Navy has about 80% of the Army mission, but less than 50% of the budget.
15	CNRC is receiving the new Yankolovich and Roper data (replacement of the Youth Attitude Survey), but do not have resources to evaluate it.
16	Lack of funding for services to work on standard data systems.
17	The NETPDTC program to convert PQS and other material to CD and interactive software courseware is not presently funded.
18	ADPE for NORU is not sufficient, but is getting better; five-year replacement cycle is too long to keep abreast of changing technology; roughly one-third of computers are new and one-third are very old systems.



**7. Resources (19 - 30)**

19	District and Region Commanders lack a staff statistician and others to do Operations Analysis. This staff has been downsized at the Region level several years ago. This results in the inability to obtain operational data to tell how stations are performing and to track trends.
20	NTT does not have enough resources to do what really has to be done.
21	Some of the requirements are funded over several years, making the transition to new systems difficult as old publications, procedures, etc. have to be simultaneously maintained with new systems.
22	In recent past, officer recruiting lost recruiters to help for the bill for increases in enlisted recruiters.
23	No dedicated CNRC research budget; proposals for long-term research are unfunded..
24	Domicile to duty policy resulted in increasing numbers of individuals having the authority, but funds for increased mileage has not been factored in.
25	MEPS lack automation to more appropriately use and screen information gathered.
26	Navy needs funds and authority to correctly classify in the first place rather than depending on the reclassification process.
27	No budget for the NPC Research and Analysis office to conduct research and studies.
28	Resources (money and personnel) were reduced in the drawdown beyond what is needed to perform required research.
29	RQAT has only four presently, but there used to be 10. Only one in the present office went to the IG course. Most of the members are CRF.
30	Capacity at RTC is constrained by space (including accommodations), personnel, and medical screening capability.

**8. Process Control (1 - 19)**

1	Lack of ability to perform inspections at stations, Navy lacks opportunity to identify and correct process errors.
2	Inspections used to be performed by a Mobile Inspection Training Team (MITT). These teams were eliminated, eliminating the ability to detect and correct process errors.
3	Navy used to take 5% Non High School graduates. It is now taking in 10%. Preliminary studies suggest that this change was not cost effective for the Navy.
4	With downsizing, cuts were made in the ability to conduct internal management reviews.
5	Former Commander abolished the formal command inspection program (because they were considered intrusive and imposed a burden on recruiters and recruits).
6	National Training Team now conducts inspections with a significantly reduced staff. NTT used to be part of the IG, but is now part of the Recruiter Schoolhouse.
7	Quality Control has been downsized, removed, or moved. QC is now basically at the end of the recruiting process.
8	Need to look at the in-process inspections that were once conducted.
9	Process of quality control has been downsized, removed, or moved. QC is now basically at the end of the process.
10	Generally felt that previous advertising agency did not have an effective quality assurance program.
11	USAREC IG investigates any recruiting irregularities of the contracted recruiters, but the contractor is the one that has to take disciplinary action.
12	CNRC has all but shut down the National Training Team (NTT) assets. Some places have bad business practices. NTT does not have enough resources to do what really has to be done.
13	There does not seem to be much interest in "zero rollers" at the command level.
14	There does not seem to be a review process at the command level for "zero rollers."
15	CNRC no longer inspects to see if policy is being adhered to. CNRC presently has no ability to monitor adherence to rules and policies.
16	Lack of in-process progress data was apparent at many locations.
17	Individual recruiters are not held to an individual goal due to the "Team Recruiting" philosophy used in the Navy.
18	Some felt that Team Recruiting results in a large segment of the recruiters producing zero recruits per month.
19	Male Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) do not discipline female recruits as they do make recruits out of fear of charges of sexual harassment being filed against them.

**9. Mission & Roles (1 - 19)**

1	CNRC and CNET do not work for the same boss. In the Marine Corps, they do.
2	QMO apparently lacks authority to enforce quota rules.
3	Active Navy recruiters do not recruit for the Navy Reserve.
4	Active Duty and Reserve recruiting processes are separate
5	Navy Reserves run their own system of Enlisted Bonuses separate from the Active Navy system.
6	Recruiters do not enlist the person, the counselor at the MEPS contracts the individuals based on the needs of the Navy.
7	Plans & Policy as part of Operations is a problem area (used to be separate code).
8	Use of the same (information) systems by Active and Reserve recruiters is inhibited by the present stovepipe systems used by each organization.
9	No requirement for Active and Reserve Components to cooperate in advertising.
10	Active and Reserve Navy Components have their own advertising agency (as opposed to Army Recruiting Command, which has the Active and Reserve recruiting mission).
11	Navy Academy does not go through CNRC for its advertising.
12	The Army is going to Point of Sale contracting in 3 to 5 years.
13	Point of sale contracting will eliminate the need for an applicant to go to the MEPS for counseling and position classification.
14	With Point of Sale contracting, recruiter will be able to sign the contract directly with the applicant.
15	Reserve officer program is not part of CNRC.
16	Policy should not be part of Operations; present approach is to provide quick fixes to problems without regard to what it will do in the long term (e.g., financial responsibility of recruiter, single parent, and waivers for misdemeanors and felonies policies).
17	The Recruiter Selection Team (RST) and the order writers in NPC should be the same organization or have closer ties.
18	In addition to the ability for P&P to do long-term research, Recruiting Operations needs some analysis ability for day-to-day work.
19	Plans and Policy should be separate (Code 20) as it was before moving to Memphis.

**10. Schedule Conflicts (1 - 16)**

1	Shipping large numbers of recruits at the end of the month puts the Await Instruction (AI) burden on the training community (including the increased cost of housing).
2	CNET has to work with other Services to schedule courses.
3	Services have different scheduling/quota systems, requiring manual entry of information into the different systems.
4	CNET planning tends to work on a 12-month schedule, but CNRC wants a 15-month schedule for A-schools.
5	There is a problem in requisitions generated by the fleet for C-school graduates. There frequently is waiting time for detailers to say where open seats will be (detailers are part of the QMO).
6	Most RTC divisions are males. When females are present, the division will be made 50% female even if the recruits have to be in an Await Instruction mode until the proper number is achieved.
7	Shipping of females is restricted to certain days of the week to reduce Await Instruction (AI) time (requires different facilities and other resources).
8	When individuals do not ship and complete basic on time, they arrive too late to start the assigned school. This increases AI time.
9	Some positions that are easy to fill are filled early in the FY (e.g., Yeoman). This either locks out others later in the year or results in over shipment of these positions.
10	If the A-School schedule changes significantly, it will cause some Await Instruction (AI) time.
11	PRIDE cannot disconnect the A-School seat from the C-School class convening date (if something happens to change A-School completion, the C-School encounters Await Instruction time as students are put into a hold mode)
12	Training and Recruiting must be better synchronized. This results in having to resell and rebook individuals when school dates change or errors in scheduling are detected.
13	Training plan should take into account lead times for recruiting (market, graduation, etc.) and adjust for recruiting schedules.
14	Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE) program allows for more non-high school graduates to enter the Navy. However, because ACE participants have an extra week of training, ACE units have to be formed. This may require some recruits to be held until there are enough to form a recruit division.
15	Because of special tests for females, females are not supposed to be shipped on Fridays, but some are shipped. Because females are in all-female divisions, they have to be held until a division can be formed.
16	Because ACE participants have an extra week of training and are placed in entirely ACE divisions, ACE recruits have to be held until there are enough to form a full division.

**11. Information Connectivity (1 - 16)**

1	Services have different scheduling/quota systems, requiring manual entry of information into the different systems.
2	CNRC Commander expressed difficulty with communications with the recruiters and other support personnel in the command.
3	Some information that the IG gets is aged because of the time lag for the security people to make information available.
4	CNRC's PRIDE and MIRS are not connected. This means that the pass through of applicant data is not seamless.
5	Navy Recruiting Accession Management System (NRAMS) is being developed to provide recruiters better access to automated systems and to reduce the amount of effort to manually enter the same data into different systems.
6	Technology has enabled capability that could not be done when the recruiting system was put in place.
7	Navy Reserve could/should use the new tools being available for the Active Navy. Navy Reserve has expressed interest in NRAMS.
8	Services and organizations in Navy are looking for upgrades of information systems individually with no sure funding.
9	MEPCOM feels that better accession communications is needed so that MEPCOM can better communicate to the trainers what is coming to them.
10	NRAMS is being developed, but it will take 3+ years to field.
11	NRAMS will be available only for the "back office" and will not be of use to the recruiter.
12	Need to get PRIDE & PORT and the quota systems to talk to each other.
13	Seemed to be a lack of connectivity between Personnel and Logistics and other programs being planned. Result is that resource changes are not being programmed for future changes.
14	QMO is not participating in the development of NRAMS even though QMO will be the agency that populates the seat requirements (as they do now under PRIDE).
15	Inaccurate data is entered at the MEPS and data are not updated. In addition to causing difficulty during in-processing, it means that researchers (e.g., CNA) that use the Enlisted Master File use incorrect or missing data.
16	Navy should make all forms that are used at the MEPS electronic to facilitate web-based recruiting initiatives.

**12. Drug Testing (1 - 15)**

1	The new early drug testing (NIDT) program will likely add to the problem of increased rollouts.
2	"Drug testing is a thorn in the side."
3	Very hard to hold individuals to military standards when they live in a community that does not view drug usage the same way.
4	Recruiters want to explain their frustration with drug testing, but are convinced that management will not listen to them.
5	Recruiters feel that drug testing could be done at the start of basic and, if the individual tests positive, inform individual that another test will be administered 30 days into basic. If individual then tests positive, then service can take action to separate individual.
6	Random drug tests throughout the military are ok to show recruits resolve for zero tolerance WHILE IN THE MILITARY.
7	Recruiter now has to watch applicant urinate (a real Quality of Life issue).
8	Recruiter has to do more screening now than ever before, but still is being told that recruiter is responsible for making mission.
9	Determination of the need for drug testing was not done with the benefit of research before or after the decision was made to institute the drug tests.
10	The recruiter has no ability to change the applicant's drug use behavior or location.
11	Recruiters are made to screen individuals out through drug testing.
12	Drug testing program is an example of a program that is to be initiated without the ability to conduct research before or after implementation.
13	The NIDT (Non Invasive Drug Test) is an example of a Navy policy that ineffectively deals with civilians.
14	The recruiter has no ability to change the applicant's (drug) behavior.
15	Navy should give waivers for some drug use prior to active duty with the understanding that there is zero tolerance after entering the Navy.

**13. Near-Term vs. Long-Term (1 - 14)**

1	Detailers are turning over so much that they don't have time (or inclination) to look into the future.
2	Recruiter training conducted "on the fly" because of schedule conflicts
3	Focus on educational initiatives is on the operational (near-term), with little time or resources for the long-term education research programs.
4	Short term fixes result because of the rotation of military into leadership positions.
5	Many of the ECMs are on their first tour in a personnel position.
6	It takes a long time for ECMs to learn their function and they generally look at short term solutions.
7	Problem solving typically takes on a three-year cycle due to the turnover in military positions.
8	Things must happen "on my watch," so long term efforts generally are not undertaken.
9	Long range plans with reasonable periods of evaluation and appropriate metrics should be undertaken to experiment on a civilian career recruiting force.
10	Focus of Plans & Policy is on day-to-day operations to the exclusion of mid- to far-term research.
11	Plans and policies may not be looking at the long-term effects and they continue to be essentially what was done in the past.
12	Policy spends most of its time answering the phone for current questions (a genuine operational need, but this does limit the ability to perform policy research).
13	Focus on Personnel and Logistics tends to be on the here and now, with little involvement in programs that are being developed that could have significant long-term resource implications.
14	There is a feeling that the focus of leadership is on the near-term and an expectation of instantaneous results without follow-up analyses.



**14. Surges (1 - 12)**

1	Program to allow recruit to take college credits prior to accession can help the surge problem if the individual attends summer classes, which would mean that the person enters Active Duty in the Fall or Winter.
2	CNRC ships as much as 50% of its recruits in 4 months (June to September).
3	Tendency to surge shippers at the end of a month, with fewer at the start of the next month. This causes difficulty at the schoolhouse because of limitations in processing capability. Recruiter productivity is measured at the end of the month.
4	Surges to the training base also affect the fleet: Some positions remain unfilled, pushes more basic training graduates into advanced schools which do not have surge capability, and contributes to increase in Awaiting Instruction (AI) time.
5	End strength is counted at the end of September. Should use average strength to avoid surges that happen at the end of the Fiscal Year.
6	The Army contracted recruiters are paid twice a month to help to get an even flow throughout the month (about half of the salary is a per capita bonus and the other half is a salary).
7	The Navy reduced the number of Basic Training locations from 3 to 1. Now all recruits go through one facility with limited capability. It is hard for the school to effectively deal with the surges caused by recruiting graduating high school seniors.
8	The number of recruiters in training tends to surge in the summer months, following the summer fleet rotation schedule.
9	Surging by recruiters at the end of a month allows more candidates to “slip through the cracks” at the MEPS. 40 percent of production typically takes place the last three days of a month.
10	Trying to put recruits into the Navy in 2-3 months or less. Don’t have time in DEP to even out the flow rate.
11	Problem enlistments occur at the end of a month when the MEPS are flooded with applicants and it is easier to get through the MEPS (this seems to be something that many people suspect that recruiters count on happening).
12	Summer surges strains RTC facilities.

## **APPENDIX E**

# **Organizations Visited**

<b><u>Location</u></b>	<b><u>Dates</u></b>	<b><u>Organization</u></b>
<b>Millington, TN</b>	<b>2-5 Oct 2000</b>	<b>Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Career Recruiting Force</li> <li>- Enlisted Recruiting (Code 33)</li> <li>- Plans/Policy (individually)</li> <li>- Educational Specialists</li> <li>- Marketing and Communications (Code 80)</li> <li>- Cyber Space e-Recruiting</li> <li>- Information Systems (Code 70)</li> <li>- Inspector General (Code 001)</li> <li>- Personnel and Logistics (Code 10)</li> <li>- Director of Operations (Code 30)</li> <li>- Officer Programs (Code 33)</li> <li>- Medical Programs</li> <li>- CNRC Deputy</li> <li>- Judge Advocate General</li> <li>- Commander, Navy Recruiting Command</li> </ul>
<b>Millington, TN</b>	<b>3 Oct 2000</b>	<b>Navy Personnel Research, Studies, &amp; Technology (NPRST)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Navy Recruiting Research</li> </ul>
<b>WASH D.C.</b>	<b>23 – 27 Oct 2000</b>	<b>Department of the Navy</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enlisted Bonus</li> <li>- Quota Management Office</li> <li>- Research and Analysis</li> <li>- NRC – Washington Detachment</li> <li>- Deputy, Chief of Naval Personnel (Manpower &amp; Personnel)</li> <li>- Navy College Program</li> <li>- DoD Accession Policy</li> <li>- Enlisted Strength and Advancement Plans</li> </ul>
<b>WASH D.C.</b>	<b>25 Oct 2000</b>	<b>Center for Naval Analyses</b>
<b>National Training Center (NTC) Great Lakes</b>	<b>14-16 Nov 2000</b>	<b>Recruit Training Center (RTC)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In-processing Center Tour</li> <li>- RQAT</li> <li>- In-processing</li> <li>- Chief of Staff for Training</li> <li>- RTC Commander and XO</li> </ul>
<b>NTC</b>	<b>15 Nov 2000</b>	<b>U.S. Military Enlistment Processing Command (USMEPCOM)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Commander, USMEPCOM</li> <li>- Office of the Command Surgeon</li> <li>- Director of Operations</li> </ul>

<u>Location</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Organization</u>
<b>Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL</b>	5-7 Dec 2000	<b>Naval Recruiter Orientation Unit (NORU):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Director of Training</li> <li>- Commander</li> <li>- Senior Enlisted Master Chief</li> </ul>
<b>NAS, Pensacola, FL</b>	6 Dec 2000	<b>Chief Navy Education and Training (CNET)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RTC Program Manager</li> <li>- Deputy Director Schoolhouse Operations</li> <li>Fleet Liaison</li> </ul>
<b>Pensacola, FL</b>	7 Dec 2000	<b>Navy Education and Training Professional Development and Technical Center (NETPDTC)</b>
<b>Indianapolis</b>	12 Dec 2000	<b>Navy Recruiting District (NRD)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enlisted Processing Officer</li> <li>- Leads processing</li> <li>- Command Master Chief</li> </ul>
<b>Boston, MA</b>	12 Dec 2000	<b>Navy Recruiting District (NRD)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- XO</li> </ul>
<b>Indianapolis</b>	15 Dec 2000	<b>High School Counselors:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lawrence Central High School</li> <li>- Lawrence North High School</li> <li>- Hamilton Southeast High School</li> </ul>
<b>Boston, MA</b>	7-8 Dec 2000	<b>High School Counselors:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lowell High School, Lowell MA</li> <li>- Billerica Memorial High School, Billerica, MA</li> <li>- Chelmsford High School, Chelmsford, MA</li> </ul>
<b>Fort Knox, KY</b>	27 Nov 2000	<b>MPRI, COL (Ret) Donald Tarter, Army Reserve Contractor Recruiting</b>
<b>Fort Knox, KY</b>	14 Dec 2000	<b>Director, Program Analysis &amp; Evaluation, U.S. Army Recruiting Command</b>
<b>Millington, TN</b>	17 – 18 Jan 2001	<b>CNET (Deputy and Advertising/Marketing)</b>
	18 Jan 2001	<b>Center for Career Development</b>

<u>Location</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Organization</u>
Warren, MI	22 Feb 2001	<b>Campbell-Ewald Advertising Agency</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Introduction to Campbell-Ewald with agency tour</li><li>- Review of Navy FY01 Communications Plan<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strategic Direction/Plan Overview</li><li>• Creative Review of:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>--- Advertising</li><li>--- Direct Marketing</li><li>--- Life Accelerator</li></ul></li></ul></li><li>- DMDC – An overview of Research Activities/Top line results</li><li>- Wirthlin – Review of findings from four market studies</li><li>- CE Research – Youth Values and Attitudes</li><li>- General Discussion on presentations</li></ul>